CO-DEVELOPMENT AS A LONG-TERM STRATEGY TO REDUCE PRESSURE FOR EMIGRATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MIGRATION POLICIES IN NAFTA AND THE EU TOWARDS SENDING COUNTRIES.

Thesis Submitted to the University of Sussex for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in
part to another University for the award of any other degree

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Abstract

The topic for this thesis is the package of policies referred to as “Co-development”. Co-development or Cooperation for Development comprises the actions of formal institutions at the national and regional levels as well as those of non-governmental organisations which are designed to stem immigration by fostering development in the source-country. The thesis examines co-development by comparing the migratory regimes in the European-Mediterranean Partnership and the North American Free Trade Agreement areas, focusing on Spain and the United States as host countries, Mexico, and Morocco as primarily sending - but increasingly transit and host - countries. The starting point for the thesis are the two trade oriented development programmes under way in each region - the MEDA Programme in Morocco and the Plan Puebla Panamá in Mexico-Central America.

The thesis critically examines the “development-migration” nexus, particularly conventional ways of analysing the relationship between migration and development, and the way in which these models inform official policies for trade and development.

The comparison draws upon a Multi-level Governance analytical framework which examines the interaction of state and non-state actors at the three main levels (Macro, Meso, and Micro) where Co-development takes places. The analysis of the multi-level interaction allows understanding the vertical or horisontal interrelation among actors in the process of co-development. Moreover, it allows a fuller understanding of the contribution of “bottom up” as much as “top down” co-development. Within this framework, the migrant emerges as a central actor - a transnational agent who is able to foster co-development by comparison with many national and international programmes.

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Glossary

AFC-LIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
CONAGO	Confederación Nacional de Gobernadores
CONAPO	Consejo Nacional de Población
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EU	European Union
EUROMED	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMVA	Forma Migratoria de Visitante Agrícola
FTA	Free Trade Agreements
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
HLWG	The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IME	Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INM	Instituto Nacional de Migración
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
MEDA	Mesures d'accompagnement
MIC	Middle Income Countries
MRE	Marocain Résident a l'Étrangère
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
PP	Partido Popular
PPP	Plan Puebla-Panamá
PSOE	Partido Popular Socialista de España
RIAs	Regional Integration Agreements
SEDESOL	Secretaría de Desarrollo Social
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
TIEM	Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

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CHAPTER 1 KEY CONCEPTS, OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

1.1 Introduction

This thesis compares the dynamics of migration flows and policies in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. In each case, the countries in these regions lie at the heart of a complex set of arrangements governing economic development and migration. On one level, these frameworks constitute economic regimes consisting of rules and institutions which aim to foster regional economic integration. On another level, they can be regarded as broader regimes in which issues such as migration are debated and controlled. Regional integration aims to be the driving force for trade-oriented agreements, while migration issues are increasingly addressed on regional security agendas. Studying these two regions allows us to explore the relationship between regional integration, economic development and migration in both theoretical and policy terms. Following the neoclassical development paradigm, liberalisation of markets and an export-led economy for high–rate migrant sending countries were considered the ideal formula for stemming migration. In practice, however, the ways in which development and migration interact are more complex.

In recent years, the migration-development nexus has been much debated in academic and policy communities. From the point of view of many decision-makers, migration is an outcome of the lack of development. Hence, North-South cooperation (as embodied in policies of “co-development”) provides a mechanism to stem migration. Definitions of co-development, however, vary and include different policy and theoretical approaches, while the variety of forms co-development takes includes both official “top-down” programmes and “bottom-up” initiatives, in which migrants are more active participants, to spur local development.

From the bottom-up perspective, co-development policies are based on a cooperative approach focusing on the migrant as a factor of economic

development in both sending and receiving countries. NGOs and/or states collaborate with migrants to achieve co-development. The process is transnational given the circulation and recirculation of migrants (and their potential as agents of local development). Migrant-based organisations in the host countries carry out communal activities seeking the improvement of their own communities of origin. The migrant is at the heart of a consensual-community process conducted to foster local development through a variety of remittances (financial, political, and cultural). This is in contrast to the top-down strategy of co-development which has emerged as a policy attempting to address the migration-development issue between the governments of receiving and sending states on the basis of economic liberalisation.

The thesis examines the role of co-development by comparing the experience of such policies in Mexico and Morocco, two countries with long-established histories of migration. An analysis of the historical and ongoing trends in emigration in both cases is at the heart of this comparison. Overall, the institutional regional framework has used financial aid and trade-oriented agreements as mechanisms to reduce the pressure to migrate. More recently, remittances are also regarded as a mechanism to achieve development in the sending regions and thereby have an impact on emigration rates. The dynamics of co-development are apparent at different levels of policy-making and involve a variety of governmental and societal actors, including migrants themselves. Our examination therefore adopts a “multi-level governance” approach, embracing the international, national and local levels as well as public and private actors.

In this chapter, we outline the theoretical basis of the thesis, both in terms of the substance of the migration-development debate and the approach adopted. We start by outlining the key research questions which the thesis seeks to answer, providing the basis for a review of the key literatures which inform our approach. Substantively, we address the debate on the relationship between migration and development and co-development in particular. In terms of approach we focus on ideas of regional integration and governance and the way in which concepts from these literatures can be used to analyse migration

policy in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. The second part of the chapter provides a brief overview of the issues at stake regarding migration policy in the two regions. Finally, the chapter outlines some background on the methodology underlying the research and sets out the structure of the rest of thesis.

1.2 Research Questions

The main research questions centre on ways to identify: the elements of co-development policy and the actors who participate in policy design; the differences between governance of migration in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions; and the way in which the multi-level governance approach to analysis of the issue of migration helps us understand the dynamics of both top-down and bottom-up co-development policies. Firstly, in order to understand the similarities and differences between Mexico and Morocco regarding the economic and social dimension, the study addresses the question of migration trends in both countries: what are the similarities and differences between Mexico and Morocco as sending countries in terms of their migration trends?

Secondly, the debate about migration and development from mainstream international organisations and the global community of scholars and stakeholders leads to the question on how the policy of development is linked to the migration issue. In this sense, what are the main objectives of MEDA and PPP as development programmes and what has been the impact on Morocco and Mexico regarding development and migration? What has been the effect of the emergence of security concerns on the way in which the migration-development nexus has been governed?

Thirdly, the concept of co-development as depicted by a Euro-centric policy, poses the question how the components of migration policy are managed in a multi-level setting. From a comparative perspective, what has been the role of the different levels of governance in managing co-development strategies? How effective have transnational actors been in influencing or pursuing such strategies? How is the state responding in terms of migration

policies at the regional and national level and how are transnational actors involved in local development and its achievement at the local level

1.2.1 The Link between Migration and Development

Mexico and Morocco have traditionally been sending countries and, while different theories have attempted to identify their continuous processes of emigration, these countries have also become receivers of Southern migration flows. Lack of a successful development policy is underlined as the determining factor for this phenomenon. Remittances in a broad range of categories (technical, political, financial, and cultural, etc.) are also considered development factors for the same sending countries. Therefore, migration is considered both a consequence of the lack of development and a factor serving to promote development.

In recent years, conventional wisdom concerning development has placed greater emphasis on the issue of migration. International organisations have formulated economic policies favouring trade–oriented regional agreements to improve the global competitiveness of less developed countries. The link between the causes and effects of migration has been reduced to a question of global labour market tendencies. Economic factors can be used to explain the historical and geographical destination of both Mexican and Moroccan migrants. Moreover, diversification of the demographic characteristics of their migratory phenomena can also be explained by the way social networks serve as a factor perpetuating migration. As a consequence, regional agreements should be expected to include the issue of migration. Here the question is why migration is still excluded from regional trade-oriented agreements when migrants are also considered a factor of regional production, as well as the way migration is addressed in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regional settings.

Co-development is a policy adopted by receiving countries to control migration and in particular historically traditional flows. Critics of this model promote a theoretical debate on co-development, which focuses on regional and national policy as well as its ameliorated deployment in European receiving countries. Assumptions centring on the migrant’s role in co-development draw

attention to the potential of transnational links for improving well-being in both sending and receiving countries. Employing a decentralised formula, local governments attempt to integrate migrants as a factor of development. However, due to the different political approaches adopted in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions, the practice of co-development reflects two distinct regional processes. Therefore, the question here is precisely who the proponents of co-development are. Furthermore, how do authorities and other actors in sending and receiving countries evolve as counterparts in a co-development strategy? From a comparative perspective, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Euro-Mediterranean and North American regions as spaces for fostering co-development? Moreover, to what extent could co-development stem immigration in our case studies? Who are the institutional and non-institutional actors involved in the design of economic development policies intended to stem migration flows within the economic regions?

1.2.2 MEDA and the PPP as Integration Mechanisms

The other main question is related to the process of regional integration experienced by Morocco and Mexico. The PPP and MEDA are development programmes designed to extend the scope of rich neighbouring markets. The lack of competitiveness of agricultural sectors is the central problem to be addressed by trade agreements. Dislocation of the agricultural labour force, which in turn participates in international migration, is considered the result of an imbalance in trade. After more than a decade, NAFTA has failed to reduce migration despite more intensive trade between Mexico and its two partners, whilst its migratory rate has greatly increased over the same period. Therefore, trade-oriented development programmes can be said to correspond to economic expansion where migration is conceived as a negative effect in the short run as well as proving inefficient in the long run as a means to curtail migration.

The political dimension refers to those security and political factors influencing the perceptions of policy makers involved in addressing migration issues in both sending and receiving countries. Thus, the description of the

institutions, actors, and processes involved in the direction of migration policy at different levels of policy design and implementation and how migration is reduced to a secured border control agreements are central in this comparative analysis. The question is how the components of migration policy are managed by multi-level policymaking.

1.3 Literature Review

This research utilises a variety of bibliographical sources spanning the migration, development, and political science disciplines including literature which examines the various approaches to the immigration phenomena in Europe and North America; literature which debates the economic dynamics of migration and its relationship to development; and literature which analyses the policy process in international settings. The thesis draws on migration and development literature in order to highlight the potential and problems of co-development relative to other immigration policies, and on political science literature concerning multi-level governance as a way of understanding the dynamics of immigration policy in these two regions. While the overall approach is a synthesis of these different areas, this review considers each of them in turn.

1.3.1 The Theoretical Debate on the Migration – Development Nexus: Migration, Trade and Development

At the heart of debates on the "migration and development nexus" is the interaction between migration, development and trade. From an economics perspective, this relationship is the subject of contentious debate. The perspective of many "orthodox" economists is that, as free trade blocs, both NAFTA and EuroMed will ease migration pressures if trade and migration are, indeed, substitutes (de Melo and Faini, 1995; Faini and de Melo, 1996; Martin and Taylor, 1996: 413; Taylor, 1996; Martin, 2003a). Hence, cooperation through regional integration should enable countries to deal with migration flows. However, according to Martin and Taylor (1996), this is not the case for our current trade and migration models. Factors such as differences in technology and skills affect comparative advantages within the trade relationship.

Furthermore, following research by Martin and Taylor (1996) that refers to the “migration hump”, development could result in a short term increase in migration between sending and receiving countries since increasing incomes would permit further migration before income equilibrium is achieved. In the longer term, however, it is suggested that employment as a result of free trade in fair conditions along with improvements in labour force skills might lead to a reduction in immigration (Martin, 1996; Martin and Taylor, 1996; Taylor, 1996).

The debate has continued by examining the consequences of trade liberalisation on differences in the wages and welfare of unskilled workers in a “North-South” economic regional area (what the economist Faini refers to as the “trade-jobs debate”). International economists have argued that trade liberalisation does not affect workers’ welfare in the industrial countries. Moreover, when talking about developing countries, they are in agreement concerning the positive effects on unskilled workers in a liberalised region versus those in a protected one. In his review of Wood’s work, Faini notes that Wood supports the idea that liberalisation has a negative impact on skilled workers even in developing countries. Furthermore, Wood (1996) suggests that African and Latin American countries could receive the benefits of trade liberalisation provided they expand their semi-skilled labour force, although semi-skilled workers would tend to migrate to developed countries in search of better prospects. Wood warns, however, that the above statement might only be true to a certain extent, pointing to the different distributional effects of trade openness in the cases of Latin America and East Asia. He highlights such factors as a greater international mobility of capital, discriminatory trade liberalisation, and perverse trade-policy effects that serve to undermine a benign process of trade liberalisation (Wood, 1997).

In an earlier defence of trade liberalisation as a positive influence in deterring migration, Martin and Taylor concluded that trade liberalisation could reduce migration pressure both by contributing to higher domestic income and by fostering employment growth (Martin and Taylor, 1996). On the other hand, the authors Schiff and Winters contest this theory of migration and trade as substitutes. They argue that North–South trade and migration might be

complements leading to increased migration. From this perspective, trade can supply the capital required to pay for travel as well as information about the destination country (Schiff and Winters, 2003).

An opposing perspective on the effect of development argues that this cannot be used as a device to stem emigration since development increases migration (at least in the short run), making it no longer a middle class phenomenon (Massey, 1988; Tapinos, 2002). It was the high cost of travel that previously kept the poorest sector of the population from participating in migration (Bustamante, Reynolds, and Hinojosa Ojeda, 1992; Castles and Miller, 1993). Hinojosa (2001) suggests a scenario where the legalisation of migrant workers and investment in the sending regions of Mexico would break up the current labour dynamics between the US and Mexico. He argues that current anti-migration policies are based upon the US economy's dependence on low-income migration which is a factor that increases demand for undocumented workers. This fact, along with the lack of investment in sending communities and the negative impacts of free trade liberalisation, serves to widen the gap in low-wage incomes and equity among those FTA members.

Beyond the effects of trade liberalisation on labour markets, Faini concludes that globalisation intensifies the interaction between foreign direct investment, trade and migration(Faini, 2004). Economic policies in the 1990s considered free trade and FDI as complements which would foster development. Meanwhile, migration and trade have been seen as substitutes. According to this approach, the capability of a developing country to expand the traded services sector is positively correlated to migration. However, Faini outlines the risk of the lack of coherence between policies that curtail immigration on the one hand, and others which foster trade and foreign investment on the other, as these are co-dependent. The lack of skilled workers discourages FDI in developing countries and, consequently, its absence deters investment in further education. The scenario is aggravated because the industrial world attracts skilled workers provoking a brain drain in the developing world. Trade policy and migration are linked; the restriction in trade would inhibit exports from developing countries and increase the push factors. Thus, a disruption in the

liberalised market would have consequences for migration where a protected sector in an industrial country would create demand for migrants from developing countries. From his perspective, trade and migration are complements rather than substitutes (Faini, 2004).

According to Pastor (2003), in the case of NAFTA integration may have negative effects on different parts of the economy, varying from sector to sector as well as between geographical regions. In the same line, Hanson concludes that the globalisation process in Mexico since 1985 has increased wage inequalities and poverty between those regions with a low and high exposure to foreign investment and trade (Hanson, 2005). Nevertheless, it is the political factor which constrains full integration since such an objective would require extensive development policies.

Skeldon (1997) seems to support Lewis's theory of development in concluding that migration might be necessary for development since it is a natural process by which surplus labour in the rural sector is released to provide the workforce for the modern urban industrial economy. As Jolly notes, "one of the reasons given for trying to increase productivity in the agricultural sector was to release sufficient labour for urban industrialisation" (Jolly, 1970: 4). Todaro argues that this assumption is no longer held among economists because of the low capacity for integrating rural migration into the urban sector, and that therefore migration is perceived as both a symptom of, and contribution to, underdevelopment (Todaro and Smith, 2003).

In some of the literature on economic development and political economy there is a comparison between Mexico and Morocco as migrant-sending countries. This literature highlights similarities in terms of their historical, geographical, economic, and political links with their neighbouring partners within a regional economic framework (Faini and de Melo, 1996; Schiff, 1996b; Taylor, 1996; Castles and Miller, 1998; Mansvelt Beck and De Mas, 2001; Salama, 2002). In both cases, Mexico and Morocco have attempted to include in their free trade area negotiation agendas the issue of the liberalisation of agricultural products. This is a sensitive issue due to economic policies which protect local producers in the US and the EU. However, according to some

economists, the liberalisation of agricultural products, whereby trade could be carried out on equal terms, might indeed be an effective mechanism for stemming migration to the North (Martin, 1996). Furthermore, Martin and Taylor (1996) suggest that one does not rely solely on free trade given the short-term negative impacts leading to increased migration flows and the decreased economic dynamics of sectors in which the impact is negative on agriculture while services enjoy increased productivity. Therefore, the surplus labour force that cannot be absorbed by dynamic sectors will be attracted by another labour market. As an alternative, the issue could be included in trade negotiations and in the development of cooperative policies with emigrant countries for the management of migration flows.

1.3.2 The consequences of migration for development: remittance and "brain drain" effects.

A review of policy maker assessments and mainstream development theories would conclude that migration is the outcome of a lack of development. As Massey explains, "a common belief among lawmakers, policy specialists, and the public is that migration from developing countries stems from a lack of economic development" (Massey, 1988: 383). An important part of the debate on development and migration relates to whether migration has a positive or negative impact on development in the sending country (de Haas, 2003b; Kapur et al., 2003; Farrant et al., 2006). If one takes the view that underdevelopment is the cause of migration, development should reduce the pressures for migration. Whether migration causes underdevelopment or development causes migration are assumptions that have been contested by migration scholars throughout the history of migration studies (Massey, 1988). However, there is also the question of whether migration is a factor shaping development. In considering the effects of migration on development, two particular issues have been debated – the impact of remittances and the consequences of "brain drain" effects.

Remittances as capital flows for investment in sending regions have been seen as potentially important in fostering development (OECD, 2005). There is

moreover a debate about the possible beneficial or detrimental effects of remittances in a broader sense, not only as capital flows but as political, educational and social remittances (Levitt, 2001). So far, financial remittances have been the most studied element, whether in the analysis of macroeconomic effects by international development institution or in studies of the impacts at the national level. However, there is still a need to examine the micro level which focuses on strategies in households and sending communities as units of analysis. Such studies require more multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary analytical frameworks. For instance, to measure educational or cultural remittances as an influence on migration would require longitudinal research, although some insights can be deduced in the short term. Instead, local infrastructure in sending communities as well as business and households financed with remittances are the most tangible benefits of migration in terms of local development. Overall, therefore, remittances-based development as a mechanism to inhibit migration can be assessed only in the long term.

Remittances as flows of capital used to sustain economic growth have an undoubtedly beneficial effect on the sending country's macroeconomic indicators (Adams and Page, 2003; Ratha, 2003; Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Guptaa et al., 2008). However, there is less of a consensus concerning the microeconomic benefits of migration in general. Several studies focus on the use of remittances by households, the unit of analysis used for measuring benefits (Cohen, 2001; Adams, 2007; Alarcón and Rabadán, 2009). On the one hand, those claiming there are benefits conclude that remittances are used to alleviate poverty and represent a strategy for supporting migrants' families (Stark, 1991; Adams and Page, 2003). On the other hand, there are studies claiming that the inequity generated by those receiving remittances leads to inflation in real estate and commodity prices in sending communities. There are also debates as to whether remittances are used for investment in "productive projects" or only for the consumption of goods. Duran et al. (1996) survey high rates of consumption in sending regions in Mexico and conclude that, even if most remittances are used to acquire consumer goods rather than for

investment in productive projects, such expenditure leads to an indirect "multiplier" effect.

Research conducted by international development agencies has focused on the macroeconomic potential of remittances to boost development as well as the extent to which migrants are able to send financial resources (López Cordova, 2004; OECD, 2005). The question of whether remittances translate into development seems to depend upon the migrant per se as the channel for financial flows. In contrast, the microeconomic level study focuses on the migrant as part of a household within a community that interacts with and impacts upon local development. Policy makers from sending countries have considered migration as a safety valve for containing unemployment, a source of capital for stabilising the balance of payments and even as a substitute for the government's budget destined for sending communities. By contrast, migration researchers have questioned the contribution of remittances to boost development due to economic and infrastructure constraints in developing countries (de Haas, 2003b; Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004).

The extent to which migration entails a "brain drain" from developing countries with adverse effects on development is also contested. Taylor and Mora argue that there is a vicious circle whereby underdevelopment provides the incentives for migration and migration perpetuates underdevelopment since it acts as a drain on the labour force required to boost development (Taylor and Mora, 2006: 11). It might be argued that, if the unskilled labour force is abundant in sending countries then migration would have a positive impact in the sending region. However, if the number of skilled workers or the productive human capital emigrating from rural sectors is larger than that remaining, then the consequences are a negative impact on production: effectively, migration fosters a "brain drain" from the sending country (Taylor, 2006: 3).

In the debate on the costs and benefits of migration for developing countries, Faini and other authors believe that the "brain drain" is detrimental to development (Lowell B. and Findlay, 2001: 11). Schiff's work on brain drain versus brain gain approaches concludes that the brain drain surpasses brain gain due to the limited return assets from highly skilled migrants (Schiff, 2005).

While skilled workers are considered “welcome” immigration in industrial countries, they represent a drain on investment in education for most developing countries. In contrast, the brain gain approach assumes that the return of highly-skilled workers is a factor that increases productive efficiency in developing countries (Stark et al., 1997; Patterson, 2006). This debate is centred on the likelihood of skilled migrants returning (Weil, 2002: 42; Martin et al., 2002) and increased investment in education as factors having a positive impact on human capital and economic growth. This is despite the fact that human capital theory correlates higher levels of education with a greater likelihood to migrate (Adams, 2007: 5). Returning migration for short-term periods, which includes high-skilled workers as well as less-skilled migrants, has been shown to have a positive impact on development (Black et al., 2003). In contrast, those claiming there is a brain drain argue that the reduction in overall levels of education in sending countries diminishes their competitiveness and attractiveness for foreign investors (Faini, 2004).

The relative effects of these two features of migration – remittances and brain drain – have also been debated. Sriskandarajah (2005) identifies positive and negative effects of migration on development. The positive effects are those related to the transfer of a wide range of remittances such as technology transfer, investment and capital from diasporas, and the associated social consequences of investing in communal projects. The sending country benefits from increased trade with the receiving country and reduced unemployment in certain sectors. The main negative effects are associated with a possible brain drain, which could reduce growth and productivity, and with the adverse effects of remittances on inflation, income distribution and dependency.

Reinforcing a positive perspective of migration as an element of development, Levitt and Nyber-Noressen assert that remittances are a decisive factor in the economic development of sending communities. They also reject the idea of brain drain as a negative consequence of migration for developing countries and instead focus on brain gain as a positive result of transnationalism (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004).

Given the lack of consensus on whether migration is beneficial or detrimental to development, a number of theories have sought to explain the impact of migration on development. The historical–structuralist school considers migration detrimental to the sending country since it loses strong, young and healthy workers. The concept of cumulative causation promoted by Myrdal (1956: 9) considers migration as a determining factor for persisting underdevelopment. According to this argument, migrants are “pushed” to serve the capitalist developed world while draining labour and raw materials from the developing world, maintaining a relationship of dependency (de Haas, 2003b: 41). In contrast, neoclassical theory, which assumes that the best allocation of resources will foster economic development, sees migration as a response to labour market forces (Todaro, 1977). In a further explanation of the “pulling” factors, the dual labour approach focuses on the economic dependence from the industrial countries on the immigration labour (Piore, 1979).

From the socio-demographic perspective, some authors consider differences in population growth rates as another pull factor for continuing emigration. Growing populations in the sending country versus aging populations in receiving countries contributes to push-pull migration dynamics (Castles, 1998; Copeland, 2000a; Stalker, 2002). Along with this approach, we find those authors who emphasise social networks and economic instability as factors perpetuating emigration (Massey et al., 1987). These same approaches consider transnational migrant organisations as key actors for the channelling of economic, social, technological, and even political remittances as instruments for co-development (Portes et al., 2001; Martin et al., 2002).

The literature on the new economics of labour migration has reviewed the unit of analysis used in the migration-development debate and provided answers to empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant communities pursue communal livelihood strategies (Stark and Bloom, 1985). How much a migrant sends is a question that has prompted several studies which target households rather than individual migrants as a unit of analysis. As households are part of a community, social network theories understand migration as a strategy used to increase household income, spread the risk and gain access to capital. Social

and political remittances are also taken into account as migrants participate in the activities of their communities of origin (Goldring, 2002b). This theoretical framework offers a broadly positive perspective of the relationship between migration and development and advocates circular and managed migration. Taking into account the role of remittances in income growth in sending countries, economic policy analysts propose a set of mechanisms to ensure that a steady flow of remittances is maintained and that migration flows are managed. Cooperation between sending and receiving countries is seen as a basic element to enhance a positive interaction between migration and development (Dayton-Johnson et al., 2007).

1.3.3 Co-development: a Contested Concept.

The interaction between migration and development and the need for cooperation between sending and receiving countries around this interaction have been central to the debate on “co-development”. The concept of co-development was initially developed by the French government as part of a policy to encourage return migration (Malgesini, 2003). This return policy involved migrants as the main actors since they would foster development in the place of origin by means of self-employment generated by the provision of financial and technical assistance. Sami Nair is considered the “father” of French Co-development policy. In 1997 he was appointed the Chargé de la Mission Interministérielle Migrations/Codéveloppement with the main task of defining the political guidelines for co-development (El Mouaatamid et al., 2005). New elements in his approach were the involvement of migrants in an innovative return policy for the purposes of economic reintegration and migration while maintaining the previous inter-state coordinated policy. Visas, instead of economic aid, would be granted to those successfully reintegrated in the sending country (Nair, 1997). However, the policy failed to achieve the expected massive deportation: in 2001 the total number of returning migrants was just 575 for all origin countries (Lacroix, 2005). The problem with the policy was that it was based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the likelihood of

migrants returning to their home countries. Table 1-1 provides additional information on these attempts to apply co-development principles in practice.

Although the policy can be criticised for its limited impact, it had some positive aspects. It brought together the components of a transnational relationship enabling the diaspora to liaise with and invest in communities of origin. Assessing the policy's impact in terms of inhibiting migration is more complex and requires consideration of local development projects positively affecting the hometowns of migrants. As Nair states, the originality of co-development is to make the migrant an actor with a key role in development (Nair, 1997).

Subsequently, non-governmental organisations debated the efficacy of such initiatives for financing return migration and the use of remittances to replace aid and entrepreneurial aid for local development in sending countries. One of the main arguments was that the mainstream policy did not take into account the migrant-led investment projects already pursued by the migrants for their origin communities and the focus on return rather than integration in the host country. A distinction between co-development as a policy and as a migrant experience is evident in the academic debate on co-development which has challenged co-development as a policy and proposed that it be revised to centre on the well-being of migrants and their role as agents of development.

The early attempts at such a policy prompted an academic debate on the nature of co-development and its relationship to the migration-development nexus. The theoretical approach adopted by some authors envisaged co-development as a policy involving governments from sending and receiving countries in "the management of both legal and illegal migratory flows" along with policies that foster "the economic and demographic development of both sending and receiving countries" (Weil, 2001: 2) Moreover, it should be designed "not to block, but smoothly regulate the circulation and re-circulation of the majority of foreigners and immigrants" (Weil, 2002: 45). It would link immigration policy with development, with host countries seeking to encourage voluntary return accompanied by financial assistance and/or technical training (Martin et al., 2002).

Table 1-1 Aid Return Policy in France

Mechanism name	Objective	Population	Origin place	Personal support	Travel aid	Entrepreneurial support	Total returns	
							2001	2002 1st Semester
Programme Développement Local Migration (PDLM) MAE-MAS-MOI	Development Reinsertion into the economy	All Migrants, independently of their migratory status	Mali, Mauritania, Senegal			€3 660	70	50
Programme Co-développement Migrations MAE-OMI	Information and accompanied migrants in France	Migrant with legal migratory status of African origin	Africa	Training in France	Bursaries for feasibility studies type "go and see"	Access to credit for distance investment		1 000 benefited persons 20 bursaries 15 long distance investment
Programme Co-développement Migrations (PCDM) MAE OMI	Development Reinsertion into the economy	Legal or illegal migrants	Romania	Training in the origin country		€3660	47	35
Aide Publique à la Réinsertion (APR) OMI-FASILD	Project support	Working migrants with permits	All countries		Yes			
Invitation à quitter le territoire (IQF) OMI	Incitement to return	All those refused residence	All countries	€153 per Adult	Yes and excess baggage fee		575	318
Rapatriement Humanitaire (RH) OMI	Physical return	Foreigners with difficult social or personal situation	All countries	€153 per Adult	Yes and excess baggage fee		562	178

Source: (European Reintegration Networking, 2003)

In recent years the debate on co-development has moved in many directions. A conceptual review of the term “co-development”, as described in several official documents as well as in the migration policy literature, reveals a differentiation in terms of its meaning. Throughout this thesis the concept is explored in different contexts in order to analyse how it is used by those actors involved in the theoretical debate as well as in migration policy. This review of the literature on co-development explores the concept’s diverse meanings.

An attempt to provide a global approach to co-development was presented in the First High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development conducted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 (UN General Assembly, 2006a: 3). This dialogue highlighted how migrant communities had significant potential to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. A number of countries had taken measures to strengthen ties with their nationals abroad and to encourage highly skilled workers in the direction of return and circular migration (UN General Assembly, 2006a: 3) Moreover, “... through co-development projects, migrant entrepreneurs had been agents of development in their countries of origin. The role of international migrants in transferring know-how, skills, technology, expertise, and new ways of thinking to their countries of origin is also underscored” (Al Khalifa, 2006: 969).

Support for the principle was also provided by a report for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. From this perspective, “the interaction between migration and development could be most successfully achieved through co-development policies, given the fact that migration contributes to sustainable development and that, in turn, development contributes to the management of migration. Co-development is of value for European as well as North-South co-operation” (Parliamentary Assembly, 2006).

According to Weil, co-development can be regarded as a “coherent policy of cooperation between receiving and source states in the management of migrant flows - also known as co-development - in order to effect positive outcomes for host nations, countries of origin, and for immigrants themselves” (Weil, 2002: 45). His definition implies a migration-management policy which

could bring benefits to both sides only if it permits the circulation of immigrants, the recirculation of skilled persons, retirees, and seasonal workers (Weil, 2002).

Graciela Malgesini, a Spanish scholar, describes elements from her own definition of what co-development should mean, including: “equal treatment for migrants, as individuals with full rights”; “a participative proposal emerging from dialogue and consensus which includes the participation of migrant-based organisations, development-related NGOs, host and sending country governments as well as the European Union”; measures which are “voluntary (non-compulsory, not linked to forced repatriation) and progressive”; “financial resources and sufficient means in relation to proposed objectives and volume”; “realism in terms of time and effectiveness”; “adaptation of each subprogramme to the socio-economic and cultural conditions of each flow”; “special attention to the problematic of gender”; “the conversion of migrants into local development actors” and “public messages to favour development within the society we are born into as a basic human right” (Malgesini, 2003: 97). From her perspective, co-development policy should be accompanied by a fair migratory policy which considers migrants’ rights, penalties for traffickers, revision of quotas, a broader list of bases for seeking asylum, as well as public messages discouraging xenophobic reactions (Malgesini, 1998).

In the Spanish academic sphere, intellectuals, journalists, scholars and Arabic world researchers have intensively discussed the concept of co-development together with the elements it should embody, its main objectives and mechanisms. They generally agree that co-development should be based on promoting an increase in the living standards of the migrant population as transnational communities should be able to promote welfare in their sending region as well as in the receiving one (Rodríguez Gil, 1998; Casas Alvarez, 2000; Alonso et al., 2003; Malgesini, 2003).

As this review shows, therefore, there is no single definition of co-development but rather a number of factors which are featured in all approaches, such as greater North-South cooperation and the role of migrants. Policy perspectives tend to emphasise greater North-South cooperation to manage migration as well as institutional arrangements for managing financial

aid or remittances with the aim of promoting development. Sending countries and their migrants emerge as active participants in stemming migration, either cooperating on the restriction of flows and/or increasing living standards in the communities of origin (Fernández, 2006: 40). In contrast to this policy perspective – which is focused more on management than development – are those theoretical perspectives which envisage the development of highly flexible migration policies (Malgesini, 2003).

In sum, the meaning of co-development is not precisely defined in the literature and different usages refer to different instruments linking the management of migration to the promotion of development. Moreover, this process of involving sending and receiving countries is not always fully embodied in immigration management proposals. Nevertheless, co-development has become part of the political and academic debate on how development policies should address the migration issue. The debate between migration scholars has its basis in the concept of cooperation between both sending-receiving countries and the promotion of development though migration rather than restrictive policies related to co-development. My own definition refers to “co-development” as a policy which aims to improve the economic situation of migrants in both sending and receiving countries by fostering a cooperative approach between migrant communities on the one hand and NGOs and/or Public Authorities on the other. This process is essentially transnational in nature, spurring the circulation and recirculation of migrants who become the agents of local development.

The following table provides an overview of the different dimensions of co-development whether as a state-led policy or as a migrant-led strategy. Although the migrant is always present as the subject, the approaches differ in the extent to which the migrant plays an active or passive role. Moreover, there are important distinctions in the mechanisms of co-development and the governmental and non-governmental actors involved. Table 1.2 presents a stylised characterisation of the approaches, making a distinction between state-led (top-down) and migrant-led (bottom-up) models. As we will see, however, in practice this distinction is blurred and the relationships more interlinked.

Table 1-2 Comparative Conceptual framework for co-development

	Policy (State-led type)		Strategy(migrant-led type)	
	Host country	Home country	Host country	Home country
Objective	Meet labour force needs Demographic needs Control illegal immigration Return of unwanted migration	Preferential immigration quotas by country Increasing amount of remittances Return and recirculation of skilled and seasonal workers	Integration of immigrants	Empowering migrant as the co-development agent Local development programmes in origin-country Promote skilled return migration Lower transfer costs and increase sending remittances
Mechanism to achieve co-development	Migratory labour agreements Integration policies Readmission Third country agreements Return Aid projects	Temporary Bilateral agreements Institutional support for the diasporas Extensive Banking system for remittances	Agreements with Banks to channel remittances and reduce costs	Incentives for investment
Participating Governmental Institutions	Multilateral Organizations Federal and local authorities Development Agencies	Immigration –Related Institutions Diaspora-oriented governmental offices	Development agencies integrating NGOs in co-development programs and HTAs	World-wide banking institutions Diaspora-oriented governmental offices

Source: Elaborated by the author

1.3.4 Understanding Migration Policy: from Governments to Governance

So far we have focused on the debates surrounding migration and development. While these constitute the issues which are substantively at the heart of the dissertation, our other objective is to explore the dynamics of how migration and development issues were played out in policy terms. The migratory policies pursued by governments in the US and the EU have been based on two main approaches: the control approach where the main issue is to establish restrictive legislation in the destination countries (Cornelius et al., 1994; Brochmann, 1999; Cornelius, 2001) and the developmental approach which aims to foster equitable and sustained growth in the sending countries (Martin, 1995; Taylor et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2002 ; Faini, 2004). Immigration and security are linked in their migration control policies (Kostakopoulou, 2000; Leiken, 2002) while development is based on free-trade agreements with the goal of preventing illegal immigration (Martin, 1995; Taylor et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2002; Faini, 2004).

International migration might be explained as an element of this current economic order, but migratory policy has generally been dealt with politically within nation states and, to some extent, international organisations (Soysal, 1994; Hoffmann-Nowotni, 1997; Milner, 1998). Such approaches assume that the state is at the heart of immigration policy. While this may be true in many respects, it is possible to argue that other factors affect migration and migration policy. In this sense, migration may be an example of the growing importance of other forms of governance beyond those provided by traditional state actors. In recent years there has been increasing academic debate about the erosion of the nation state relative to authorities at the sub- and supranational levels as well as to other political actors. Authority is dispersed upwards, downwards and sideways from the nation state: governance is becoming as important as government in understanding how and where policy is made. Guy Peters outlines various circumstances where the state's capabilities are transmitted to other realms such as markets, networks, or international organisations (Peters, 2000).

Migration as a phenomenon involving governments and transnational societies can also be analysed through this lens of governance. From Peters' perspective, every aspect of a government's intervention is performed to differing degrees with other groups whether at other levels of public authority or with civil society. At the international level, regional organisations are adopting wider-oriented objectives while multilateral organisations have been important in setting the terms for programmes of economic reform and development. At the level of the nation state, Peters and Pierre highlight the importance of networks as a central component shaping the goals and preferences of governments (Peters and Pierre, 2002: 8). Regarding the local level, Peters refers to formal and informal relations between local governments and private organisations. Decentralisation emerges as a new form of governance which allows the participation of local governments. Local development is a field of action where migrants and government are converging in this kind of governance. Informal relations give way to migrant organisations which are certainly now a political force in the decision making process for the allocation of public and private resources.

A key component of the thesis will therefore be an analysis of the political context for immigration and immigration policy which takes into account this governance perspective. While traditionally the focus of analysis would be on the nation state, the case studies offered here highlight the way in which migration as a phenomenon transcends national borders and the increasingly coordinated response among countries in at least a regional setting.

1.3.5 Approaches to Regional Integration

This leads us to ask whether the use of current economic-political approaches to regional integration could help in our understanding of this process. At the heart of the thesis are developments within two core regions – North America and the EU – both of which have been extensively examined by theorists of regional integration. NAFTA and the EU as regional agreements are at the centre of various comparative studies in terms of the degree and nature of integration, leading to the theoretical review of their similarities and

differences (Anderson and O' Dowd, 1999). International relations theory approaches the formation of regional blocs from different angles. The study of regionalism can be divided into two main periods: 1950 to 1980 and from 1980 onwards (O'Brien, 1995). These periods have been referred to as constituting "old" and "new" regionalisms by, amongst others, Splinder (2002) to explain changes in the evolution and construction of regional arrangements. Accordingly, post World War II regionalism emerged as a liberal response to interwar protectionism whereas new regionalism refers to an open world system in the process of globalisation (Lawrence, 1996).

From a more multi-dimensional perspective, O'Brien reviews different theoretical approaches to explain regionalism during these two main periods. Neo-functionalism and state interest theories have dominated much of the literature historically (though there have also been more structurally based approaches). Despite the varied emphasis given to each factor involved, these theories still take into account a geo-strategic spatial dimension within a delimited region. State centric approaches stress the state's interest while neo-functionalism emphasises transnational interaction between interest groups and bureaucrats (O'Brien, 1995).

The second period of regional integration theory has been marked by an adaptation of older debates and in particular the emergence of globalisation as a phenomenon. High rates of interaction between states, societies and economies are stressed when using this perspective. Following this theoretical revision, interstate bargaining stresses the behaviour of the state as an influential factor to slow or accelerate integration which is shaped by the traditional state interests of sovereignty and security. Global Political Economy emerges in this analysis as a way of comparing the evolution of regionalisation in NAFTA and the EU and how systemic forces influence regional, national and transnational responses. Epistemic communities play a decisive role in policy making as they embody "a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy – relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1992: 3; Cited in O'Brien, 1995: 710). In the case of NAFTA, Mexicans and Canadians were

professionals acting as transnational actors belonging to the political and economic elite sharing “the prescription of the neoclassical economics for economic growth” (O'Brien, 1995: 710). The behaviour of states in this sense reflects a liberal project to establish low cost production as a comparative advantage to compete with other regions where they are contested by popular groups.

In their attempts to explain the new regionalism, IR theorists have studied those factors constraining and shaping regions and the categorisation of regionalism varies according to the social, geopolitical and economic orientation. Hurrell identifies five categories in his review of the theoretical and empirical dimensions of regionalism: regionalisation, regional awareness and Identity, interstate cooperation, state-led integration and regional consolidation. Of particular relevance to this study is his first category of regionalisation which underlines economic and commercial factors as driving forces that delimit a region. It highlights an increased interdependence resulting from the intense interaction of economic actors (markets, private traders and investors as well as companies) within a determined geographical area. States have a limited influence on such regionalisation processes; instead, cross-border interactions (migrants, markets and social networks) are the drivers of “transnational regionalism”. Hurrell uses the Northern Mexico-Southern California area as an example comparable to trans-border growth triangles within Europe (Hurrell, 1995).

Another current has centred the debate on the regionalisation-globalisation relationship. Does regionalisation facilitate globalisation or is it a reaction to it? Several authors attempt to analyse regionalisation in terms of its contrast vis-à-vis globalisation. On the one hand, the process of creating delimited geopolitical or geo-economic spaces as a result of nation-state arrangements describes regionalisation, on the other; the process of an open world without boundaries enabling flows of capital and goods refers to globalisation (Nesadurai, 2002).

1.3.6 The concept of Multi-level Governance

While the relationship between regionalisation and globalisation has been at the heart of much debate on regionalism, there has also been a debate on the dynamics of particular regional processes which draws on the concept of governance highlighted above. In a European setting, the traditional approaches of neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism have been challenged by the multi-level governance perspective. Inter-governmentalist approaches would see member states remaining central to policy (only cooperating within strict limits) while neo-functionalists would see a common approach to immigration issues as "spilling over" as a result of economic pressures within the region. Both, however, would emphasise the formal and harmonised aspects of European policy, either reinforcing or transcending the nation-state. The macro, meso and micro levels envisaged by multi-level governance scholars do not deny that the state is a unit of analysis, but argue that it interacts with different state and non-state actors, thereby producing a multi-level politics framework (Smith, 1997; Benz, 1999; Scharpf, 2000; Sutcliffe, 2000).

Hooghe and Marks have described at least two types of multi-level governance. The first type “conceives of dispersion of authority to multi-task, territorially mutually exclusively jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with limited jurisdictional levels and limited units” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 4). The second type, “pictures specialised, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 9). Taking these concepts of multi-level governance in tandem with broader notions of governance, such as those developed by Peters and Pierre (2002), may provide the basis for a better understanding of the overall migration regime in the Euro-Mediterranean and North American regions. Indeed, while it has generally been used to analyse intra-EU policy making, multi-level governance as an approach is more easily applicable to cases involving the EU's relations with its neighbours (such as EuroMed) and other examples of regional integration (such as NAFTA) than are the

traditionally EU-centric approaches of neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism.

1.3.7 Regionalism and Migration

Having considered some of the ways in which questions of governance have addressed regional issues, we now turn to their relevance in analysing migration. The need to address migration issues from a regionalist perspective is clear but what sorts of frameworks have been applied and what kinds of assumptions have been made? For some authors, Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) are potential mechanisms for creating links between strategic geopolitical neighbours and for addressing sensitive issues such as migration. These agreements aim to increase free trade as a political channel to ease political relationships with non-democratic neighbours (Schiff and Winters, 2002; Schiff and Winters, 2003). Schiff explains RIAs "as a means of preventing or reducing the spread of civil disturbances or civil war from neighbouring nations for controlling migratory flows" (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 196). Accordingly, this is the ulterior motive of the EU in its promotion of Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. Moreover, "mutual investment or migration flows also can stimulate trust, as can the meetings between public servant that are necessary for policy cooperation" (Schiff and Winters, 1998: 277).

However, this literature does not explore the policy-making processes undertaken in the regional framework to deal with the migration issue. It reduces the migration issue to a sending-receiving relationship framework and limits discussion to the lack of harmonised policies (Paul-Marie, 1996). These facts lead us to believe that cooperation should underline this relationship and therefore political willingness should prevail. According to some authors, however, this is not self-evident when immigration control policies in the receiving countries are analysed. Nevertheless, the development project is limited to liberalising economies and expanding markets (García Alvarez-Coque, 2002).

One attempt to examine the way in which regional integration agreements have dealt with migration issues has been presented by Pellerin. Examining the

cases of NAFTA and the EU, Pellerin considers the relevance of theories of integration to their engagement with migration policy. From her perspective, the neofunctionalist theory “emphasises the role of regional institutions in migration” and “overlooks the shift from the public to the private sector in the management of migration” (Pellerin, 1999b: 998). In this sense, convergence of migration policies at the regional level is the result of a decision-making process shaped by the eroded state and the emergence of private actors (migrants and business sectors). Thus, the idea of further harmonisation of migration polices can be explained by the need of the state to seek supranational rules to reach agreements at the regional level. However, as we will see, while migration is an important regional issue, the institutional responses have varied considerably.

The diversity of levels of authority and the engagement of a variety of actors with those authorities is apparent in the development of policy in the EU and, arguably, the North American region. In the case of the EU it is clear there is a well developed set of institutions which preside over policy making along with a practice of “intensive interactions between national policy makers” (Wallace, 2000: 6). But the role of these national and supranational actors varies and often involves a range of other non-governmental players.

According to Helen Wallace, there are not only different levels of interactions, or locations, as she calls them, but also different domains where transnational actions define the policy making process. Non-state and transnational actors are influencing domestic economic regimes and international politics (Wallace and Wallace, 2000). Thus, the issue of international migration is not confined to only one EU institution and certain state interests or local powers but depends on the sphere of influence of every institution, delimited by its procedural system at different levels of governance and with different degrees of interaction among partners (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Therefore, even though in the case of immigration management functions are concentrated in state institutions, the inputs and outputs of its policy dynamics include different levels of interactions among state institutions and global agreements

1.3.8 Migration and Multi-level Governance

One way of approaching the regional dimension of migration is through multi-level governance. Moreover, although initially developed in an EU setting, this approach has the potential to be applied to regional settings other than the EU. Harlan Koff's studies of cross border integration have examined the interaction between units from a multi-level perspective. He sees the US border as a space created by interactions between two communities which have influenced the overall international framework, a process similar to the bottom–up process of multi-level governance (Koff, 2008: 563). In an analysis of the similarities and differences between regional integration processes which focuses on cross border interactions, Blatter distinguishes between a "multi-level" system in the EU and a "multi-polity" system in the NAFTA (Blatter, 2001). He believes the multi-level governance approach offers a contrast between the different layers of the EU's highly institutionalised system on the one hand and the more weakly institutionalised but intensely interactive NAFTA region on the other (Blatter, 2001).

In what ways has this approach been applied to analysis of migration and migration policies? Based on a review of literature on migration studies, Giovana Zincone and Tiziana Caponio identify a "fourth and half generation" of studies on "the issue of the multi-level governance of immigrants and immigration" (Zincone and Caponio, 2004:1). The design of migration policies has mainly been studied from a top-down perspective which assesses the impact of supranational institutions on the state. However, there is a trend towards looking at local level policy using a bottom up perspective. Nevertheless, migrant associations and their impact on the EU's migration governance have not been studied using a comparative perspective. Comparative studies between the EU and NAFTA are mainly concerned with the process of integration and its impact on migration as a collateral issue rather than as an element of regional integration.

There are other references to the NAFTA and EU regionalism regarding integration of the migration issue using a systemic approach. Despite the regular distinction between the two entities on the basis of different stages of

interdependence and organisational governance, migration flows from North Africa to Spain and from Mexico to the US are referred to as being at similar stages (Muus and van Dam, 1996; King et al., 2001). The Euro-Mediterranean has been described as an “EU mini-NAFTA” in terms of the dynamics of regional integration and cooperation on migration policies (Miller and Stefanova, 2006: 563). Irregular migration and control of the external border is also a point of comparison in different studies which share a state-centric approach to analysis of the governance of migration in both regions (Cornelius et al., 1994; Martin et al., 2002; Pastor, 2003; Weintraub, 2004b). However, the inclusion of immigrants as a unit of analysis and their influence on migration policies is out the scope of these comparisons, largely ignoring its influence on the dynamics of regional migration governance. This gap in the multi-level analysis is addressed by recent studies that also compare both regions and the potential of migrants as actors in development (de Haas, 2006b).

The policy-making process of migratory policies has been traditionally studied as a component of the state’s domestic politics. Within a state-centric framework, the main unit of analysis is the central government influenced by both domestic and, to some extent, international considerations. The multi-level governance approach reviews the “vertical” interactions between the different levels of those engaged in EU policy. At the macro level, there are “supranational” constraints on the pursuit of national policies at the meso level (given the willingness of member states to transfer some sovereignty to the EU in this area). The framework becomes more complex when the micro level of analysis integrates informal and non-governmental actors whose interests are driven by societal factors contesting the political economic interests of the state and regional institutions.

While the EU has created a supranational structure whereby the state cedes certain functions, the level of analysis for the interaction of transnational actors is limited to the macro-level. Analysis of the institutional structure of EU transnationalism is absent and this impedes understanding of the link to multi-level governance. In a critical assessment of the multi-level governance approach, Peters and Pierre claim there has been an extensive analysis of the

inter-governmental relationship and the inclusion of local units in the making of policy and policy decisions. However, the novelty of taking into account international politics as a external factor shaping the relationship between sub-national and supranational levels is recovered by multi-level governance (Peters and Pierre, 2002). Nevertheless, study of the migration issue has been limited to supranational agreements for the control of external borders whilst there is a consensus to create a borderless European Union. Despite this fact, the relationship with third countries is approached from a state-centric perspective in which the EU simulates a state (Collinson, 1999).

1.3.9 Transnationalism as a theoretical approach

Our framework of multi-level governance and regionalism takes into account both state and non-state actors in its analysis of the migration development nexus. Within such a framework, the roles of transnational actors and factors are important but are often implicit in the literature on regional integration. It is therefore worth examining in some detail the way in which transnationalism has been debated, particularly in the context of migration. As with regionalism and governance, the term transnationalism has taken on a number of meanings in the social sciences. For international relations literature it refers to the role of groups and organisations operating below and between states (Keohane and Nye, 1989). In the field of migration studies, transnationalism has emerged as an approach which attempts to explain the relationship between migrant communities in both the host and the home country.

Pioneering work is attributed to the anthropologists Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton as they explain the relationship between migrants and their homelands in the transition from one country to another. In this sense, “new” transnationalism refers to the actions of “transmigrants” who “…. maintain, build, and reinforce multiple linkages with their countries of origin” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1180). Further studies detail the experiences of migrants in maintaining ties with their home countries while attempting to integrate in the receiving country. The characteristics of transmigrants found in these early

studies assume mobility within a North-South push and pull framework and are limited to the observation of economic migrants.

Initial studies of transnationalism focused on potential benefits for the origin country. Patterson suggests that it is possible to overcome African poverty on the basis of a closer two-way relationship between communities in the diaspora and their homeland (Patterson, 2006). However, the mechanisms to achieve such a goal are unclear unless support is given for the development of a communal capacity among transmigrants. Moreover, Patterson's simplistic approach excludes the cultural and political benefits associated with transnationalism. Migrants contribute to the political and cultural spheres in both the origin and receiving countries.

Guarnizo et al. (2003) provide a sense of the limits and potential of transnationalism based on individual and communal capabilities and characteristics. Classical theories of transnationalism analyse the level of assimilation of the individual on the basis of educational and socio-economic characteristics. Contemporary theories concerning the context of the immigration process explain how transmigrants maintain links with their homeland because of unfulfilled economic expectations and persisting cultural differences in the host country. Arguing this assumption, Lucassen reviews the experience of Western European immigrants in the US in order to define assimilation processes and the experience of migrant associations, thereby seeing transnationalism as a consequence of new migration trends rather than the absence of assimilation (Lucassen, 2004). In contrast, social network approaches examine the development of networks which support immigrants in the host country with social capital allowing them to maintain links with their communities by engaging in communal activities (Guarnizo et al., 2003). This latter theoretical framework has been used in the cases of Mexico and Morocco to analyse interaction between the diaspora and communities of origin (Massey et al., 1987; de Haas, 2006a).

A different approach is offered by the sociologist Portes. On the basis of research into migrants settled in the US, he seeks to identify the new components of transnationalism. First, he asserts that modern communications

have made it possible to reinforce ties with the homeland, resulting in an intensive exchange of cross-border activities. “New immigrants” experience dual lifestyles, cultures, citizenship, and social spaces which have been made possible due to technological and global change (Portes, 1996). The unit of his analysis is the individual rather than the community and he focuses on transnationalism from below as opposed to the transnational activities pursued by multilateral and governmental actors (Portes and Walton, 1976).

The potential and limitations of transnationalism have been widely explored. Waldinger and Fitzgerald criticise the assumption of Portes et al. that “regular and sustained” interaction is an intrinsic characteristic excluding the fact that the state is still in control of the borders inhibiting such bi-directional movement (Portes et al., 1999; Cited in Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1178) . The capacity and willingness to become involved in political or social activities related to transnationalism – particularly in the case of the Bosnian and Eritrean refugee population – are also analysed by (Al-Ali et al., 2001). They conclude that, regardless of their legal status as refugees, this cohort can be compared with economic migrants in terms of their transnational dynamic. In this way, transnationalism as a theoretical approach is currently defining the role of migrants in the process of migration as a link between host and receiving countries.

Several other case studies have been recently developed in order to characterise and define how transnationalism as a theoretical approach could be applied to understanding co-development (Cohen, 2001; Grillo and Riccio, 2003; Ceschi et al., 2005; Coslovi, 2005; de Haas, 2006a). The increasing participation of migrants in both host and origin countries allows us to explore the complexities of the role of migrants. This thesis draws on ideas of transnationalism to analyse the involvement of migrants in the co-development process and policy. If co-development as a policy can be translated into local development in the sending country and improvement of well-being in the receiving country, transnationalism is a core element for understanding the role governments, social organisations and migrants can play.

Central to transnationalism as an approach are transnational communities. Transnational communities are defined by Portes et al. as “groups based in two or more countries which engage in recurrent, enduring and significant cross-border activities, which may be economic, political, social or cultural” (Portes et al., 1999: 863).

According to Kivisto, the theoretical contribution of Glick-Schiller is the introduction of transnationalism as a phenomenon that needs to be revisited along with a description of its characteristics in current migration studies. Whether transnationalism appears as a new term in the literature or not, there is an identification of cross-border activities involving immigrants. From Glick´s perspective, the distinction between so-called “uprooted immigrants” from the beginning of the 20th century and “assimilated” immigrants in the 21st century lies in the depth and expansion of their transnational links. However, Kivisto remarks that there is no unit of analysis that can be assertively used to explain the transnational engagement experience for both categories of immigrants. Ethnic identity, political ties to the home country, remittances and all types of migration (permanent, circular and seasonal) are constant variables in the history of migration. Kivisto critically reviews the reductionist approach of assimilation used by Glick to explain the degree of transnational actions (Kivisto, 2001). In this sense, the current transnationalism process is enabled by the new technologies of transportation and communication that allow faster interaction across boundaries (Portes, 2003: 875).

From a political science approach, Faist and Ozveren focus on the transboundary actions of non-state organisations. They consider globalisation a catalyst that serves to reinforce ties between communities identifying themselves on the basis of cultural, religious or other common interests. The ties between members of these communities develop regardless of territorial boundaries since new communication technologies facilitate interaction and the mobilisation of joint actions. Even though state authorities may participate as mediators between host and sending migrant communities, the authors argue that the state is a non-intervening actor (Faist and Ozveren, 2004). In a further revision of the implications of transnationalism for development theory, Faist

highlights migrant communities and associations as agents of development. He points out how communities and the state function along with the market to boost remittances as the driving force for development in the new transnational paradigm (Faist, 2008).

Vertovec adopts an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the transnational aspect of migration. He agrees that the new conception and understanding of transnationalism is primarily concerned with new forms of engagements in a transnational social space. Along with the anthropological approach of Glick, Schiller et al. and the sociological perspective of Portes, he asserts that the difference between old and new transnationalism lies in the technological changes, which have made cross-border communications easier, and related changes in the scope and intensity of migrant relationships with their homeland. The extent of migrant transnationalism is demonstrated by the increase in non-state actors (such as home town associations), the increasing importance of remittances, the home state's policy for engaging with their diaspora, political engagement with homeland affairs, the dual belonging in terms of citizenship, cultural links, ethnic identity, and diaspora consciousness (Kivisto, 2001: 550; Vertovec, 2009: 15).

Guarnizo and Smith (1998) distinguish between two different forms of transnationalism: ¨transnationalism from above¨ and "transnationalism from below". In a critical review of the theoretical conceptualisation of transnationalism, they identify the local level as the spatial dimension for analysing cross-border relations between immigrants and their homeland. The other spatial dimension of transnationalism refers to all activities carried out by multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and even multinational corporations. They also assert that a common element in the process is the erosion of a state-centric system, where actors from "above" and "below" constrain the classic structural role played by the state. However, the state also plays an active role in this new transnationalism. Regardless of the political implications of incorporating the diaspora into national political and social arenas, sending countries have found

it economically expedient to include “transnational migrants” as part of a policy to reinforce links with migrants abroad.

In this sense, it is important to outline who the actors participating in a transnational activity are, while distinguishing their role in what is called co-development within a broader conceptual framework. A useful typology is that described by Alejandro Portes (2009: 876) where he establishes three categories of transnational actors: national states, global multicentre institutions, and private non-corporate actors. Following this typology, he also contrasts top-down action, related to national governments and multilateral organisations, with bottom–up action which is intrinsic to the immigrant. He has also made an important distinction by reviewing contemporary transnationalism literature centring on cross border activities carried out by civil society and immigrants (Portes, 2009).

The increase of migrant participation in both host and origin countries allows us to explore the complexities of the role of migrants. The spatial dimension, level of analysis and new trends in migrant participation in host countries and homeland affairs are determinant variables for the definition of how transnationalism can be used as a feasible mechanism for the promotion of co-development. The extent to which there is interconnection between the “above” and “below” analytical dimensions of transnationalism is a core question to be analysed using a multi-level approach. Focusing on the analogy of the level, Guarnizo and Smith “transnationalism from above” is broadly equivalent to the “top down” policies which are produced by actors at the macro level interacting across national boundaries. By contrast, his “transnationalism from below” is equivalent to those examples of “bottom-up” initiatives in which migrants are the main actors interacting at the micro level. Our multi-level approach enables us to explore these relationships both individually and in relation to their interaction with the state.

Empirical research on transnationalism ranges across various approaches – nation-state, ethnic identities or regions - which bring into the question who transnational migrants are and the nature of the spatial dimension they share. Thus, Levitt’s approach to transnationalism as a process by which both the

community of origin and the settlement country form part of the units of analysis represents a starting point for analysis of the different levels and different actors intervening in transnationalism. Cultural, political and social transformations affect both who stays and who leaves, with social networks serving as a mechanism to ensure the continuity of transnational communities (Levitt, 2001).

1.4 An Overview of the Issues.

So far we have outlined the state of the debate regarding the migration-development nexus (and co-development in particular), the nature of regional integration and multi-level governance and the phenomenon of transnationalism. In this section, we provide a brief overview of how these aspects converge in relation to our case studies.

The extent to which co-development as a policy is explicitly articulated varies in the two cases examined. The concept is widely promulgated in European contexts both in the policies of member states such as the French and Spanish governments as well as at the EU level. Indeed, the policy was articulated as part of the Barcelona Process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation which stressed the need to bring development to sending countries as a mechanism to reduce the pressure to migrate to EU countries(European Union, 1995). In contrast, the term co-development is not explicitly deployed in either the initiatives of NAFTA or other trilateral US-Canada-Mexico agreements. However, cooperation for development was mentioned in the Asencio Report[1] from the early 1990s. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), approved in 1986, provided for the creation of a bipartisan commission which also involved “Mexico and other sending countries in the Western Hemisphere” (U. S. Congress, 1990). The Commission’s report stressed the need to promote development as the most feasible and desirable instrument to stem migration from Mexico, Central America and Caribbean countries. Moreover, in other respects it is clear that, de facto, co-development policies have been applied with the aim of containing migration from Mexico and beyond.

[1] Commonly named Asencio after the Chair of the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development.

It is also worth noting that the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions are increasingly defined by security as well as economic concerns. This has had a significant effect on the way migration issues have been addressed and debated. The nature of cooperation on the migration issue has developed along the lines of security as much that of co-development. This "securitisation"[2] of migration issues has arguably strengthened the role of nation states and put greater emphasis on policies of border control. However, it is also clear that the emphasis on security potentially provided a wider space for dialogue on the way in which migration is handled in both regions. An important function of the research has been to highlight the intensity of such interactions in varied sectors at different levels in each region (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005).

The core issue in this thesis is a comparative analysis of the emergence of co-development mechanisms in Mexico and Morocco in the context of the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. In the first case, we address a complex of bilateral and regional arrangements, particularly US-Mexican relations in the first instance and the NAFTA and PPP agreements in the second. In the second case, we examine relations between Morocco and Spain as well as the broader framework of the EUROMED and MEDA. Within these two regions, the PPP and MEDA are analysed as policies designed to expand the economic benefits of integration while fostering economic growth to reduce the pressure to migrate. In this respect, we study the actors involved in the debate on migration in each region. On this basis, it is possible to develop an understanding of both the "top-down" and "bottom-up" dynamics of the debates on migration and development.

The thesis explores these relationships at the macro, the meso and the micro levels (see Table 1.3.). The macro level comprises the principal international organisations (notably the WB) and regional agreements (EU, EUROMED, NAFTA, ASPAN, PPP and IADB) which impinge on the migration-

[2] The term is used in the Theory of Securitization coined by the Copenhagen School, a group of scholars including Buzan and Waever. From this analytical approach, the securitisation process legitimises issues as security matters based on rhetorical actions. See Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998).

development nexus. In this regard, I analyse how these organisations and agreements have been involved in developing policies that are indirectly or directly designed to foster growth and alleviate poverty. The macro level also includes bilateral executive relations between national governments.

The meso level focuses on those national actors (principally governmental) in both receiving and sending countries that have been involved in pursuing policies that could inhibit international migration. These organisations are in turn constrained by political, administrative and other factors in the performance of their roles.

The micro level focuses on actors at the sub-national and community levels, including local authorities, migrant organisations and civil society groups in both sending and receiving countries.

Table 1-3 Economic and Political Units Working on Migration: Mexico and Moroccan

	NAFTA	*EU*
MACRO	Multilateral meetings working on development and Plan Puebla-Panamá NAFTA Executive Bilateral Meetings Treasury and Bank of Mexico Ministry of Economy Washington's IADB: Joint program between Southern local authorities Border States Governors	European Union (Council, Commission, Parliament) General Affairs and External Relations Council Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process (officials from the current and next presidencies of EU and from the 12 Non-EU Mediterranean (countries).
MESO	US Labour Department Department of Homeland Security: Customs Enforcements. Mexico: Secretary of Social Development Secretary of Transport Secretary of Labour Interior Ministry Secretary of Foreign Affairs Congress representatives Commission on Migration	Mediterranean EU Member States: Bordering country governments of Spain and Morocco. Spain: Development Cooperation Secretary of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica Ministry of Foreign Affairs Inter-Ministerial Commission for International Co-Operation Council for Development Co-operation (advisory body) Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Morocco: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Labour and Employment
MICRO	Municipalities of Southern Mexican States. Economic or social operators and NGOs.	Southern Spanish municipalities and Moroccan authorities in sending regions. Economic or social operators and civil society. Migrations and Development (Marrakech, Morocco).

Source: Elaborated by the author

1.4.1 Migration Policies and Regional Governance.

The aim of this project is to evaluate migration policies in the Euro-Mediterranean and NAFTA regions. The use of multi-level governance means analysis is conducted on three main levels which embed different processes of negotiation between participating actors. Transnational interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors is analysed from both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. But while sub-national entities are capable of shaping supranational institutions, they are in constant dialogue with other actors horizontally and vertically.

Transnationalism from above and from below, as described by Guarnizo and Fitzgerald, also implies a multi-level structure. However, the analytical framework used distinguishes interaction between central state and societal actors and non-governmental actors. Seeking to bring transnational politics into the multi-level decision-making process, Rosenblum (2004) explains how transnational politics at the regional level are influenced by transnational politics from the Mexican and Central American migrant population in the US which converge in a bidirectional interaction. Demands for the protection of human rights have created political pressure at the different levels of governmental structure within the central state, thereby raising the migration issue at the regional and binational level as transnational migrants gain political access in both countries.

The transnationalism of migrants is constrained by limits on the possibility to move between boundaries and activities that define them as transnational migrants. The multi-level approach allows us to untangle the decision making process to distinguish actors and interests as relevant factors in migratory policy outcomes. Therefore, assessment of the influence of transnational activities at the supranational level demands the deconstruction of the Nation State. Rather than detaching migrants from the Nation State, the multi-level approach allows us to detect bottom-up organisations that influence the state and see how the state's behaviour is conditioned by regional constraints.

At first glance, it might be argued that since the development of regional integration is much weaker in the North American context, the governance of

migration may be more under the control of nation states themselves. However, as we will see, the roles of regional arrangements overlapping with NAFTA members, of sub-national authorities within countries and of civil society have also been significant.

The wider literature on regional integration indicates a growing interest in questions of migration, particularly in the EU. There has been a debate within the EU, as identified in the policy literature, concerning the degree to which national immigration policies are converging with an emerging common policy at the EU level (Philip, 1994; Copeland, 2000b; Huysmans, 2000; Geddes and Wallace, 2001; Terri and Adam, 2004). This relatively underdeveloped initiative – at the time of my research – suggests that migration policies are not only shaped by national interests and conditions but also by the interests of other states and non-state actors. The state is a central actor in this process but it is not the only one; it plays its role in a context of supranational and sub-national agreements and actors. In the case of Southern European countries such as Spain, which lacks a "tradition of cooperative inter-governmental relations" (Benz and Eberlein, 1999: 344), I suggest that their own domestic politics are not easily accommodated by the EU or the Schengen Group in terms of controlling immigration from North Africa. A multi-level governance approach can potentially offer a better approach than one focusing on the nation state.

1.5 Methodology

The thesis focuses on the role of Mexico and Morocco as sending, transit and receiving countries within the North American and the Euro-Mediterranean regions. It centres on the issue of co-development and the way in which this has become an element in regional migration debates, particularly in Spain and the US. Thus, the primary sources of national information regarding regional migration issues are from these four countries. The data mainly comes from interviews with the different actors as well as statistical and official documents issued by international organisations and governments.

The research consisted of a set of 50 semi-structured interviews with different actors involved in the migration-development nexus debate at three

levels: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level, interviews were conducted with international development organisation researchers, officials involved in the administration of NAFTA/PPP and Euro-Mediterranean/MEDA, and foreign office representatives. The meso level comprises interviews with national officials from the Ministries of Labour, Social Affairs and the Economy, Congressional representatives, and Migration-related national officials in both sending and receiving study countries. Finally, the micro level is based on interviews conducted with regional and local authorities, development and migration-related NGOs, migrant-based associations, scholars and migrants. A list of interviewees is included in Annex I. In most cases, details of interviewees' comments have been provided in the text along with attributions. Most of the interviews were recorded and the material stored with the exception of those officials who spoke "off the record". In such cases, no direct attribution has been made and the details are anonymised in the Annex.

The fieldwork was divided into several phases. From October 2003 to February 2004, I conducted interviews and collected bibliographical and statistical data in Mexico. The central questions were for government officials, scholars and NGOs involved in the debate concerning Mexico-US bilateral relations with respect to the issue of migration and its links to the PPP. The next phase was to map out the equivalent actors and institutions in Spain for comparison with the information collected in Mexico. The institutions, political actors, scholars and NGOs were selected on the basis of their participation in the migration-development nexus debate, specifically focused on the Morocco-Spain bilateral relationship. This second phase took place from March to June 2004; I spent most of the time in Madrid, although the information provided led to the collection of information from the Andalusia and Catalonia regions.

On the basis of my research into the Spanish-Moroccan relationship, I was able to identify the key protagonists in the co-development debate. As a result, it was possible to conduct interviews with meso and micro level actors pursuing initiatives of cooperation for development in Moroccan sending regions. The information gathered during these interviews allowed me to identify co-partners in non-governmental initiatives and policies carried out in Morocco. I was

therefore able to develop a networking strategy for conducting my fieldwork in Morocco.

The third phase centred on Morocco with the holding of interviews with all those referred to as co-partners by Spanish governmental institutions and non-governmental organisations. A period of 4 months, from July to September 2004, was spent in Rabat visiting the Tangierian Peninsula and the Southern Region of the Souss Massa-Drâa. These regions were selected on the basis of their being influenced by development programmes financed by EU funds, as well funds from other European Members including Spain.

The final phase was divided into two visits, one to Washington, DC in the US and another to the state of Chiapas in Mexico. This period covered the last two weeks of September and part of October 2004. The objective at this stage of the fieldwork was to fill the information gaps after performing fieldwork in Mexico. In addition, it was possible to make contact with officials in the principal international development organisations as well as those involved in the development of policies affecting the North American region, thereby offering me a broader perspective of the ongoing debate on the migration-development nexus. The information collected complemented my analysis of the theoretical discussion on development and migration. Finally, the main purpose of fieldwork conducted in Chiapas was to identify the macro-policy of development at the local level. Using as a contrast the case of Veracruz, which is also a member of the PPP, these two cases were used as local instances for the discussion of co-development initiatives versus macro development policies.

It is important to stress that the fieldwork for this PhD thesis was largely completed in 2005, followed by an extensive period of analysis and writing-up. Therefore, while I have sought to develop my analysis in the intervening period, the events covered in the thesis reflect the period of my primary research. I have drawn upon secondary sources which have been published since 2005 but only insofar as they deal with the period covered by the rest of the thesis.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 describes the evolution of migration trends in the case studies of Mexico and Morocco. This section discusses, from the perspective of different authors, the factors leading to changes in the current characteristics of migration flows. It focuses on their role as sending as well and receiving and transiting countries and takes into account the geopolitical context. Chapter 3 reviews the link between conventional international wisdom on the migration-development nexus and the macro policies oriented towards the establishment of trade-based economic policies as a mechanism to stem migration. Chapter 4 analyses the application of mainstream development policy and its consequences for migration governance in the NAFTA and Euro-Mediterranean regions. It centres the discussion on how development policies within a regional agreement are intended to complement trade and market liberalisation in order to reduce emigration. The PPP and the MEDA programmes are analysed from a theoretical approach as instances of development programmes influencing migration at the regional level. Chapter 5 analyses the political and economic factors shaping the bilateral relationships between sending and destination countries. It centres on national politics as a driving force in the shaping of the bilateral relationship and the consequences for agreements reached to promote cooperation for development at this level of governance. Chapter 6 analyses bottom-up co-development initiatives - where migrant-based organisations and NGOs play a central role in spurring local development - and considers the role of subnational governments in both receiving and sending countries. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the main conclusions regarding the distinctive process of co-development.

CHAPTER 2 MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE NAFTA AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGIONS

2.1 Introduction

Theoretical frameworks that attempt to explain migration flows from Mexico and Morocco highlight the nature of sending-receiving country relationships in terms of geographical proximity, historical linkages, development standards, and differential wage and labour market conditions. The relative impact of these factors varies according to the theoretical approach adopted. According to the neoclassical paradigm, factors such as geographical proximity translate into low travelling costs while differential wages and a gap in development standards between sending and receiving countries increase the potential for migration (Borjas, 1989b; Martin, 1996; Schiff, 1996a: 215; Gordon and Spilimbergo, 1999; Borjas, 2000; Todaro and Smith, 2003). The historical–structural paradigm focuses on polarisation of the labour market caused by the struggle between labour and capital, resulting in the internationalisation of labour forces (Bustamante et al., 1992; Castles and Miller, 1993; Sassen, 1996; Portes, 1997; Hanson, 2005). The social capital paradigm considers the social network system developed by the diaspora as the driving force that perpetuates migration (Massey et al., 1987; Castles, 2000; Alarcón, 2006). While the different approaches help to explain continuities in the migration process, we also need to recognise that the phenomenon itself is becoming more complex with important changes in the composition of these flows and in the destinations of migrants over the last decade.

Of particular salience are the directional shifts in migration as countries that were classified as senders are now also receivers, and the way traditional sending countries such as Mexico and Morocco are becoming a transit point for “Southern” migrants in search of new labour markets. For almost a century, various authors have always referred to Mexico as the main exporter of labour to the US. However, less well studied is Mexico’s status as a transit country for Central American migrants moving to the US as a final destination, or its status as a recipient of migrants, primarily in the Southern states. Similarly, there has

been relatively little study of the growing role of Canada as a labour market for both highly skilled and unskilled Mexican migrants. Moreover, there have been significant changes in the demographic profile and geographical origin of Mexican migrants.

A similar pattern of long-term relationships and more recent changes can be seen in the Moroccan case. Morocco has strong historical migration links to specific countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. While these countries have been the primary destinations for the Moroccan migrant population over the last 40 years, it is worth noting there have been changes in terms of the destination of migrants over the last decade or so since they have shown a preference for Spain and Italy (King, 2001). Morocco, like Mexico, is part of a group of sending countries which are currently experiencing changes in the demographic characteristics of their migration flows.

The current chapter focuses on the evolution of these migration flows through a discussion of the factors influencing migration flow trends in these two specific case studies. The chapter compares economic, geographical and historical factors which have shaped Mexican and Moroccan flows and their current links to receiving countries. The first section of this chapter draws on existing literature to explain the historical development of migration from Mexico and Morocco. It also explores those factors that have shaped more recent changes in migration. The second section considers changes in the role played by Mexico and Morocco not only as sending, but also as transit and receiving countries for their “Southern” regional neighbours. The fact that their role is increasingly complex requires analysis of the effects these changes are having on their relationships with receiving countries on a regional basis.

2.2 A Historical and Economic Overview of Migration Flows in Mexico and Morocco

2.2.1 Mexican Migration, a Historical Overview

Initial studies of Mexican emigration adopted a historical perspective, explaining Mexican migration as a natural consequence of the division of Mexican territory after the war with the US in 1847 when it lost almost half of its national territory,

an area which remains heavily populated by people of Mexican-origin (Corwin, 1970). However, perhaps more influential in shaping the profile of Mexican-US Southern States are the economic dynamics in states such as California and Texas. This data is supported by the findings from the 2006 Survey on Migration at the North Mexican border,[1] which established that California was the most preferred destination for 37.4% of those surveyed, followed by Texas (17.2%) and Arizona (12.2%). The Mexican influence can still be perceived in the culture and architecture of the main cities of these states, whether in terms of Spanish colonial times or the more recent impact of Mexican arrivals. In addition, major industrial cities such as Chicago and Detroit have been significant destinations for Mexican migrants. Map 2.1 shows the concentration of the Mexican-origin population per county district with data from the Census held in 2000.

The study of Mexican emigration to the US over the last century is commonly divided into three historical periods: the first is related to construction of the railways and the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in the period 1910-1920. The second is related to the period following World War II (or the "Bracero" period), 1945-1964; and the third follows the Bracero Program, covering the period from 1970 to the present. Weintraub also highlights the southbound migration wave during the US Depression of the 1930s as a fourth period to be studied (Corwin, 1970; Weintraub, 1992). For Cornelius (1989), the dynamics of Mexican migration to the US in the post-industrial economic era is explained not only by supply factors, but also by the particular character of US demand for Mexican labour. He underlines the selectivity of this demand based on the preferences of specific sectors (Cornelius, 1989).

[1] The Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico is a sample survey of Mexican nationals age 12 and older encountered along the main crossing point along the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border. This survey has been conducted since 1993 on yearly basis and targeted the Southern migrants in transit to the US Further information on EMIF methodology is available on line: www.colef.mx

Map 2-1 Distribution of the Mexican Population in 2000



Source: US Census of Population, 2000

The history of Mexican migration shows that at the beginning of the 20th century there was significant mass migration to the US. This was created on the one hand by US demand during WWI, and on the other by the political turmoil and negative economic effects of the Mexican Revolution. Statistics from that period show that almost 10% of Mexico's population emigrated to escape the economic instability brought on by the end of the Mexican Revolution in the 1920s (Corwin, 1970). Despite the expected economic change when the Mexican Revolution came to an end in the early 1920s, as well as efforts to restrict Mexican migration flows to the US, low wages and misery in rural areas persisted as factors leading to emigration together with the demand for labour in the US (Bustamante and Cornelius, 1989).

Some authors indicate that during this period Mexico's federal government adopted a nationalistic policy towards Mexican migrants and considered them a lost labour force (Fitzgerald, 2006). At this time, immigration to the US was not yet restricted by American government policy. Early studies of Mexican immigrants therefore attempted to refute official statistics provided by the US government which claimed the number of migrants was at least one million up to 1929 (Durand and Massey, 1992b: 5).

This migration process stagnated temporarily during the Great Depression of the 1930s when a part of the population was deported and others returned voluntarily. The lack of demand for labour effectively curtailed Mexican immigration. At the same time, the Mexican Government enforced a restrictive emigration policy on the grounds that the phenomenon was having a negative effect on the demographic and workforce profile of Mexico. Massive repatriation was the principal characteristic of the period; 600,000 migrants were estimated to have taken part in the southbound wave (Weintraub et al., 1997). Therefore, repatriation, consular protection, and reabsorption of the Mexican population were the main concerns of the Mexican government during this period.

The role played by Mexico's Northern Central States in migration flows is traced back to the 1920s and 1930s by historians. Some historians report US requirements for labour extending from the population of Northern Mexico to the region of Northern-Central states such as Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán.

Accordingly, this region became a region of ongoing emigration throughout the century (Durand et al., 2001). Other authors explain how the active emigration policy of local authorities during the Cristero Wars shaped migration flows from Mexico. Emigration was inevitably from Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato and Zacatecas as they were involved in the civil war fought between the Catholic Church and the state. At this time these states were already contributing 60% of the total emigrant population (Fitzgerald, 2006: 268). Fitzgerald(2006) explains the policy contradictions between local authorities from these states and central government in the following way: the former regarded emigration as a safety valve given the struggle for resources prompted by the civil war while the latter sought to exercise a restrictive emigration policy. The central government proposed a full agrarian reform in order to retain the rural labour force while the main objective of local oligarchies was to avoid the creation of a class of landless workers who would target property owners in these states by demanding compliance with the Agrarian Reform initiated by the central government (Fitzgerald, 2006: 261).

The second historical period was defined by the Bracero Programme in 1942 which began as a response to US labour force demands during World War II and lasted until 1964. This was a temporary agreement between the governments of the US and Mexico which initially provided a work force to be employed in agriculture and railroad construction but which expanded into other sectors throughout the post-war period. According to Durand and Massey, who compared statistics on immigrants and deportees, there were officially up to 4.6 million bracero migrants during the course of the programme (Durand and Massey, 1992a).

Parallel to the “Bracero Program”, undocumented flows were also appearing. Mexican migrants started to be apprehended and deported and the numbers increased after the bilateral agreement came to an end. The reason for this increase lies in the unrealistic quotas established by the programme which failed to satisfy the demand for and the supply of legal and illegal migrant workers. According to Calavita, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) shaped immigration policy and “ignored the demands of growers when

those demands jeopardised agency priorities"(Calavita, 1992: 73). This fact established the model of an immigration policy whereby US demand for labour confronted a restrictive policy leading to a mixed illegal and legal migration system. The current period is therefore clearly defined by the legal status of the migrant: legal or illegal. The end of the Bracero Programme represented the end of a process of regularised labour force vis-à-vis ongoing non-regularised temporary migration. In the aftermath of the Bracero Programme it was clear that the demand for labour exceeded the total supplied; in 1973, 70,141 Mexicans entered the US, legally whereas 576,823 were apprehended as illegal entrants (Calavita, 1992).

The Bracero Programme has been studied as the pillar of Mexican migration in the US. Bustamante (1975) identifies the main reason for migration in the lack of economic opportunities in an unequal socio-economic system. In an empirical work conducted under the guise of a "wet back" worker at the beginning of the 1970s, he concluded that the demand for Mexican workers was a result of the unfair employment practices of US farmers combined with the supply of mostly unskilled men seeking an income to sustain their impoverished families (Bustamante, 1976b). The ending of migration or the repatriation of migrants was therefore regarded by authors such Bustamante as the result of the gap between the rural and urban dimensions which gave way to the study of rural-international Mexican migration (Bustamante et al., 1997).

2.2.2 The Profile of Mexican Migrants

Studies conducted by Mexican migration researchers in the early 1970s sustain a commonly accepted paradigm of the Mexican migrant profile (Bustamante, 1975). They indicated that these flows were composed mainly of temporary male workers from rural areas located in eight traditional states who were drawn to the US agricultural sector. Migrant workers were reacting to a combination of "push and pull" factors where wage differentials were the principal determinant shaping migration (Bustamante, 1975; Bustamante, 1976a; Cornelius, 1989; García y Griego, 1989; Jenkins, 1997). García y Griego (1989) previously identified an emigrant offer set based on a set age range and regional origin. He

concluded that the demographic and regional concentration of emigration has remained stable. Also, he identifies eight states with the highest emigration rates: these are Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas.

The classical assumption about the Mexican migrant profile refers to low-skilled young male migrants travelling alone from certain rural areas in Northern Central Mexico on a temporary and cyclical basis. Indeed, it was the Bracero Programme that established such a typology, as later confirmed by research performed in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in contrast to the conclusions provided by studies carried out by Cornelius and Bustamante (1989) referring to male predominance in migration, data offered by the US government show that women also strongly participated in this process. According to US statistics, women outnumbered men between 1964 and 1971 as well as in 1993 and 1994 (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997: 20).

The main destination for Mexican workers has traditionally been the US (though there has also been migration to Canada on the basis of a seasonal worker agreement between the two countries dating back to the 1970s). The US destinations where the population of Mexican origin is most highly concentrated are urban areas such as Los Angeles, San Antonio, the South Texas Rio Grande Valley, Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, El Paso, Fresno and Phoenix (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997). This pattern of destinations can largely be explained by the existence of social networks.

2.2.3 The History of Moroccan Migration

Analyses of the Moroccan case assume that the “massive” migratory flows from Morocco to Europe were a result of labour-supply agreements and colonial ties between the Moroccan and European governments (Stark, 1991; Mynz, 1995; Hollifield, 1997; Belguendouz, 1999a; Stalker and García, 2002; Charef, 2003). These agreements provided a supply of labour that was required for post-war reconstruction in Europe. Populations of Moroccan origin were the result of labour force flows to destination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and France.

There have been three main stages in Moroccan migration to Europe. The first era covered the period prior to 1960, when Moroccan agricultural workers were hired by French-colonisers settled in Algeria (including those mobilised to participate in both World Wars). The second period was characterised by massive migration to France at the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, a time when the post-war French economy required a fresh labour force to stimulate the economy (Belguendouz, 2000). The final period is known as the zero-immigration Western Europe policy after the oil crisis that led to the closure of borders to the foreign labour force. From this point on, undocumented migration along with family reunions have been the principal immigration trends (Belguendouz, 1999b; de Haas, 2003a).

As in the case of Mexican migration, some authors explain the existence of EU-Morocco migration links on the basis of a long established shared history. However, we need to distinguish between those population movements produced by historical events and migration flows produced by the demand for labour (Lahlou, 2005a). From this perspective, Moroccan migration began at the end of the nineteenth century when temporary workers moved to Algeria in response to colonial agrarian reform. This period marks the beginnings of international migration as France demanded more labour for industrialisation. An important stage in the development of mass migration was the First World War when 35,000 Moroccans were taken to France to participate in the war (Bennoune, 1975: 2). The period 1960-1974 was characterised by a major shift in the levels of Moroccan migration. The demand for labour from European countries was the principal factor stimulating the northbound wave (Tapinos, 1965a), as was the case in Mexico, although the labour supply created by changes in the demographic and economic factors also helps foster the phenomenon (Tapinos, 1965b; Berriane, 2004b).

The origins and destination of these waves of migrants were also a result of the history of their recruitment by French entrepreneurs and Moroccan emigration policies. The Moroccans recruited to participate in the First World War had their origins in the Southern region of the Souss (Atouf, 2003). The destination was primarily France where entrepreneurs employed them. In the

mass migration period of the 1960s, the region of the Riff was the principal sending region. It has been calculated that the number of Moroccans in France increased from 10,700 in 1954 to 33,300 in 1962 before reaching 247,000 in 1971 (Krotki and Beaujot, 1975). Both the Souss and the Riff were considered conflict zones because of the political problems provoked by opponents to the Monarchy (López García et al., 1996). As was the case in 1930s Mexico, the Moroccan government fostered emigration from those regions that would otherwise have been a source of socio-political instability. The history of Moroccan migration also shows how traditional sources of emigration were shaped by migrant networks. Migrants from regions such as Agadir, Chtouka-Ait Baha, Taroudannte, Tiznit and Ouarzazate are mostly settled in Belgium, Italy and Spain, while Tangier and Tetouan are the main sources for Moroccan immigrants in Spain (Berriane, 1996).

Map 2.2. was prepared by Mohammed Berriane and Bernabé López for the “Atlas de la inmigración Marroquí en España” (2004). It shows the sending regions by order of participation throughout the history of Moroccan labour migration. Both the Souss and the Rif Central and Oriental have been the main sources, followed by the Tangierian Peninsula.

Temporary migratory agreements between Morocco and its European partners produced a migrant profile similar to that of the Mexican Bracero: single men from rural areas mainly seeking to return home after a short period. Berriane explains how social networks reinforced the selective migration movement from rural areas in specific regions. This fact led to concentration of the Moroccan population in specific areas where they reproduced their cultural and social networks (Berriane and López García, 2004). Several studies therefore focus on the development of transnational communities which have helped to maintain migration flows (Massey, 1987; Lacroix, 2005: 36).

Map 2-2 Migratory Regions in Morocco



Source: Atlas de la inmigración marroquí en España (Berriane and López-García, 2004)

2.2.4 Patterns of Moroccan Migration

An emigration policy based on bilateral agreements established the pattern for Moroccan flows. Temporary guest worker agreements between the European and North African countries peaked in the 1960s, channelling these workers to specific industrial sectors (Fargues, 2005). During this period destinations were geographically limited to those countries with colonial, linguistic and cultural ties, primarily France and secondly Belgium. The French Census shows a presence of Moroccan workers in the post-war period. However, demand from industrialised Northern European Countries led to an extension of the Moroccan migrant presence to include the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Sweden and Germany (Belguendouz, 1999b; Berriane, 2004b). Accordingly, the number of Moroccan immigration rose in the period 1968-1973 as a result of Morocco's emigration policy. Part of its development was intended as a safety valve to prevent high rates of unemployment and social unrest.

There are further similarities to the Mexican case insofar as the international migration wave in Morocco was usually a rural rather than an urban movement with rural-international flows feeding the migrant labour force in European countries. Likewise, Mexico and Morocco experienced the development of social networks based on those previous rural-international flows (Lee, 2002).

2.3 Current Trends in Migration in Mexico and Morocco

2.3.1 The Mexican Case

The debate on the degree of continuity or change in migration patterns ranges from those such as Durand (2001),who argues that the “the typical migrant is a working-age male from western Mexico”, to Cornelius and Marcelli, who find that today the migrant comes from the centre or the south, often from urban areas and with more education, and is more likely to be female and to settle permanently (Cornelius and Marcelli, 2000).

The profile of the Mexican migrant offered by Bustamante in the 1970s – unskilled males from rural areas migrating on a seasonal basis – is no longer

applicable to that of current migrants (Canales, 2003). Characteristics such as gender, age and length of migration have changed, as have the geographical patterns. The destinations of migrants (legal or illegal) have shifted in response to labour market requirements: states such as Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, and North Carolina are now the main geographical destinations. At the same time, the sources of migration are also changing with non-traditional regions accounting for a greater share of migrant origins. Traditionally, the West Central states of Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Colima accounted for 38% of all migrants, according to data from 1992. Another important region is that of the Northern Border states with 21% and other Northern Central states with 22%, whereas Southern and South Western states represented 10% and Central states 9% (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997). They also showed increasing participation from Southern states such as Veracruz, Oaxaca, Puebla and Guerrero.

The rate of migration from Mexico to the United States intensified over this period. The US Census Bureau calculates that 4.7 million Mexicans migrated to the US between 1990 and 2000, between 277,000 and 315,0000 per year (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997: 63). Moreover, the trend continued in the following years. According to official Mexican statistics from the CONAPO (National Council for Population), the total number of people of Mexicans living in the US increased from 8.8 million in 2000 to nearly 11.2 million in 2005 (Consejo Nacional de Población. CONAPO, 2009).

An indication of the patterns of the destinations of the migrants can be obtained from the Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico carried out by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, Mexico (a research institute specialising in border issues). Map 2.3 and Table 2.1 show the origins of migrants and their primary destinations according to the survey of 2006. The survey shows particular concentrations in terms of the origins and destinations: for example, 66.4% of all migrants from Jalisco declared California as their destination whilst 55.9% of migrants from Guanajuato showed a preference for Texas and 68.6% of those from Sonora headed to Arizona.

Map 2-3 Source and Destination of the Sending Region of Migration



Total migration percent of migration rate per state of origin.

- Chiapas
- Oaxaca
- Guerrero
- Veracruz
- Puebla
- México state
- Michoacán
- Jalisco
- Guanajuato
- Sonora

Source : The Survey of Migration on the Northern Border (EMIF) El Colef. 2006.

Table 2-1 Origin in Mexico and destination in the United States of Mexican migrants 2006

	Origin State in Mexico	Origin State in the US										
		Arizona	California	Colorado	Florida	Illinois	Nevada	New York	North Carolina	Texas	Washington	Other States	Total
% Horizontal	Aguascalientes	12.5%	33.5%	8.5%	10.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	1.0%	15.9%	0.0%	15.4%	100.0
	Baja California	0.0%	62.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	21.6%	0.0%	7.3%	100.0
	Baja California Sur	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0
	Campeche	0.0%	12.6%	0.0%	7.3%	3.2%	0.0%	10.8%	29.2%	30.8%	2.4%	3.7%	100.0
	Coahuila	0.0%	6.0%	1.1%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	87.2%	0.0%	3.1%	100.0
	Colima	6.4%	52.2%	0.0%	5.9%	6.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.3%	17.4%	100.0
	Chiapas	9.9%	37.3%	0.5%	29.3%	2.7%	1.8%	0.7%	13.0%	0.9%	2.1%	1.8%	100.0
	Chihuahua	20.9%	6.8%	35.1%	3.1%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	19.1%	0.0%	14.3%	100.0
	Distrito Federal	7.4%	30.6%	1.1%	2.0%	2.0%	5.6%	7.4%	0.0%	36.9%	1.7%	5.3%	100.0
	Durango	19.4%	22.5%	5.3%	4.7%	0.2%	6.1%	1.0%	5.7%	14.2%	3.2%	17.7%	100.0
	Guanajuato	3.4%	19.8%	1.1%	5.2%	1.6%	0.5%	1.1%	2.5%	55.9%	1.4%	7.5%	100.0
	Guerrero	9.7%	45.3%	0.8%	12.2%	2.5%	3.7%	0.8%	0.8%	10.7%	5.1%	8.4%	100.0
	Hidalgo	4.7%	23.4%	3.0%	39.1%	3.1%	1.6%	4.4%	1.8%	9.7%	1.2%	8.0%	100.0
	Jalisco	5.3%	66.4%	0.5%	4.1%	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	1.7%	7.1%	2.6%	9.1%	100.0
	México	14.6%	47.1%	0.6%	5.3%	1.3%	2.1%	7.1%	0.5%	13.5%	1.8%	6.1%	100.0
	Michoacán	5.6%	52.1%	0.5%	8.3%	3.4%	3.4%	1.4%	2.7%	11.3%	3.8%	7.5%	100.0
	Morelos	10.1%	45.9%	1.2%	7.9%	2.9%	0.8%	18.0%	0.0%	8.6%	0.5%	4.1%	100.0
	Nayarit	22.4%	60.1%	1.4%	4.0%	1.4%	2.3%	0.6%	0.1%	2.8%	3.3%	1.6%	100.0
	Nuevo León	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	6.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	4.1%	76.9%	0.0%	8.3%	100.0
	Oaxaca	9.0%	57.3%	1.1%	8.6%	0.2%	0.2%	2.4%	12.2%	2.5%	2.6%	3.9%	100.0
	Puebla	10.6%	30.3%	10.7%	24.4%	3.2%	2.0%	3.5%	1.6%	2.2%	5.0%	6.5%	100.0
	Querétaro	2.9%	37.0%	2.7%	5.2%	1.3%	1.2%	0.0%	5.5%	37.6%	0.0%	6.6%	100.0
	Quintana Roo	0.0%	32.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	22.8%	0.0%	41.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	100.0
	San Luis Potosí	4.0%	12.0%	0.3%	2.4%	4.2%	0.0%	3.0%	8.6%	36.2%	2.6%	26.7%	100.0
	Sinaloa	70.0%	25.6%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	100.0
	Sonora	68.6%	23.9%	1.1%	0.1%	0.4%	1.0%	0.5%	0.3%	1.0%	0.0%	3.1%	100.0
	Tabasco	9.4%	39.0%	2.5%	10.0%	8.8%	0.0%	1.5%	1.5%	23.1%	3.0%	1.2%	100.0
	Tamaulipas	2.5%	6.9%	0.7%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	88.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0
	Tlaxcala	9.8%	59.8%	1.0%	3.6%	5.4%	0.0%	4.1%	0.0%	2.2%	9.5%	4.6%	100.0
	Veracruz	8.1%	43.4%	0.8%	17.7%	3.3%	3.6%	0.7%	8.2%	7.2%	1.3%	5.7%	100.0
	Yucatán	0.0%	73.2%	0.0%	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	100.0
	Zacatecas	6.7%	40.3%	13.3%	3.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	19.2%	3.9%	12.9%	100.0
	Total	12.2%	37.4%	2.1%	12.0%	2.0%	1.7%	1.9%	4.7%	17.2%	2.2%	6.6%	100.0

Source: Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2006.

2.3.1.1 Socio-Demographic Profile

According to Lozano (2002), emigration to the US became a source of demographic change in Mexico from the beginning of the 1980s. The number of migrants in the US increased from 760,000 in 1970 to 2.2 million in the 1980s. He highlights settlement and high rates of emigration as the main

characteristics of the changing migration pattern as reflected in the socio-demographic profile of migrants and their integration to the labour market. Moreover, illegal migration became the central issue for immigration stakeholders. Policy makers sought to halt migration by legalising undocumented settlers: in 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) permitted family reunification and regularisation of migrants. These changes modified the classical Mexican migrant profile in terms of both the numbers and the nature of migration flows. This section explores those demographic, economic, and geographical changes.

Geographically speaking, the regionalisation of migration flows can be classified according to the intensity and longevity of their participation in international migration flows to the US. The table below shows the rate of participation by state in terms of migration intensity (defined by Verduzco and Unger (Verduzco and Unger, 1998a; Verduzco and Unger, 2002) as the percentage of emigrants relative to the economically active population.

Table 2-2 Mexican Emigration: Indicators of Migration

States	*Degree of Migratory Intensity*
Zacatecas, Michoacán, Durango, Nayarit, Guanajuato.	Very High
San Luis Potosí, Guerrero, Jalisco, Colima, Aguascalientes, Morelos, Hidalgo.	High
Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Baja California, Querétaro, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Puebla, Sonora.	Medium
Veracruz, Nuevo León, Tlaxcala, México State , Baja California Sur	Low
México City, Yucatán, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and Tabasco.	Very Low

Source: National Council of Population, Mexico 2000

The differing levels of intensity are partly related to the longevity of sending regions. Lozano divides the migrant-origin states into the traditional (nine states: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas) and the non-traditional (the other 22 states). Durand (1992) offers a different geographical classification based on sending-regions. Drawing on ethnographic interviews conducted for the Mexican Migration Project in a number of Mexican states, he classified them

into three main cohorts: a “historical” region (Western-Central Mexico) comprising Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Durango, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí, and to a lesser extent, in terms of migration intensity and territory, Colima and Aguascalientes; a second region focused upon the Northern Border Region, comprising Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California, as well as two other non-border states Sinaloa and Baja California Sur; and new sending and receiving regions, comprising Mexico City, Querétaro, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Mexico State, Guerrero, Morelos, and Oaxaca.

Overall, it appears that there are at least nine states (Zacatecas, Durango, Michoacán, Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, and Sinaloa) which are clearly recognised as traditional sending regions. These states of origin have participated in migration1 trends for almost a century. The Border states have become a more important source of migration in recent times (many of those who were unsuccessful in crossing to the US have been obliged to settle in the border towns).

It is in the 1980s that border cities started to be populated by Mexican migrants in transit or migrants attracted by the maquiladora industries[2] However, even before then the settled population had become a potential labour force for cities on the US side of the border. Transborder workers are not considered in these statistics, but their numbers are estimated as being in the region of 7 million (Del Castillo 2001). These workers commute between twinned border cities on a daily basis. Given these characteristics, the Border states could be regarded as a transnational space where regional economic integration is embodied in the development of twin assembly plants and transnational flows of commuters (Border Conference of Governors, 2009). According to del Castillo, researcher from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, transborder workers represent a very flexible labour force that responds to the demands of the local

[2] Maquiladora refers to factories, mainly built along the border, which import materials on a duty free basis and then assemble and re-export the finished products. The maquiladora were in a range of industries, with manufacturing on the Mexican side of the border and storage and distribution on the US side.

Californian economy (del Castillo Vera, 2001). As an example of the growth of twin border town, are the San Diego-Tijuana area (where the total population is 2.4 million) and El Paso-Cd. Juárez (which accounts for up to 1.8 million) (Hagan and Rodriguez, 2001).

The states surrounding Mexico City are considered as new sending regions. Interestingly, this is a highly urbanised area which attracts internal and intra-regional flows from all over Mexico. Rural-urban and urban-urban internal migration occurred in central Mexico for over half a century due to industrialisation (Fussell, 2004).

Finally, the Southern region is characterised in these typologies as a non-traditional region, only emerging as a source of migration since the 1990s, and accounting for the lowest share of the Mexican-origin population residing in the US. It should be noted that the typology of the Binational Commission Study about Southern states and that of Durand both include Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla and Morelos as recent participants with low shares of total migration. By contrast, Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo are considered the least important in terms of their share of total migration according to the Binational Commission emigrant offer set (and, in his analysis, Durand did not consider them as new sending regions) (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997). As Table 2.2 showed, these states show a low level of emigration intensity. However, since the 1990s their significance has increased.

In terms of the characteristics of migrants it is worth contrasting the experiences of unskilled and highly skilled Mexicans who have migrated to the US and Canada (often the same destinations). In his doctoral thesis, Rafael Alarcón(1995a) explains continuity of migration in the high-tech era as a result of the polarisation of the market in the US (Silicon Valley attracts both skilled and unskilled migrants) and the contribution of social networks which according to Alarcon constitute a driving force that make foreign employment increasingly accessible. However, these new destinations in the US, along with a growing demand under the seasonal workers bilateral agreement with Canada, have been explained as being fundamentally driven by labour market demands rather

than social networks. More specifically, the Government of Canada has been increasing its annual quotas while the Mexican Government has played the role of a job centre.

At the same time, US detention statistics appear to indicate the supply of cheap labour from undocumented migrants is not diminishing. According to US border authorities, illegal migrant detentions reflect an increase in the total number of migrants (US Government, 2000). However, the data provided by the Mexican government shows a decline in deportations as noted in Table 2.3. Quantitative indicators such as the number of deportations provided by both governmental border control institutions are not reliable indicators of undocumented illegal entries because they include all crossing attempts by would-be migrants. National Population Census Statistics perhaps offer a more realistic number of undocumented migrants residing in the US The Pew Hispanic Centre has calculated that the undocumented Mexican population in the US is steadily growing by up to 500,000 per year, reaching 5.9 million in 2004 (Passel, 2005: 1). Although Mexican statistics also show an increasing emigration rate, by 2001 the undocumented population had increased to 3.4 of 8.5 million Mexican migrants living in the US while the INS estimated that 4.8 of 9.1 million were undocumented (OECD, 2004).

Table 2-3 Total Number of Mexican Migrants Deported from the US

Year	1995	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total Mexican migrants deported by the Border Patrol	853,000	791,000	583,000	559,000	514,000

Source: National Migration Institute, Mexican Government, 2004.

2.3.1.2 The Mexican Southern States: their emergence as sending regions

This leads us to consider how recent and how intensive the trend of “South East Mexican flows” is. It also raises the question as to why they had not participated at the same time as other states and why they have begun to

participate recently. According to a study by the World Bank analysing the correlation between poverty and international migration, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Chiapas represent the new patterns of migration from southern states since they also have the highest levels of poverty in Mexico (Wodon et al., 2003). The Bank's research has also sought to explain the correlation between poverty, low productivity, and international migration (in the process providing a basis for the design of a regional development programme for Southern Mexico which included the Plan Sur (PS) and the PPP). Deichmann et al. (2002) identify and explain sub-regional differences, defining Southern states as spatial poverty traps based on low levels of productivity where the lack of infrastructure and resources inhibits access to education and social and economic opportunities. Here, "out-migration" and its local development benefits are ignored while public investment is recommended as a means to stimulate private sector growth and bring improvements in employment and welfare.

Regional differences are clear when comparing Mexico City and the states of Mexico, Jalisco, and Nuevo León, on the one hand, and the Southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca, on the other: the former account for nearly 50% of domestic production while the latter scarcely reach 5%. Per capita income in the Southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca is just 62% of the per capita income in Nuevo León (a leading industrial-export state) (Pastor, 2005: 51).

Even so, international migration rates from these richer states are comparable to those from the South. In this sense, migration is a broad based phenomenon in Mexico, regardless of geographical location. Moreover, emigration cannot simply be attributed to levels of poverty. Other factors such as the demographic pressure on unemployment rates as well as the lack of resources to produce enough jobs for young people are likely to be causes of migration.

In order to understand the economic characteristics of Southern Mexico, the well-being indicator shows that while the percentage of the population in poverty at the national level is between 42% and 45%, the levels in Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero are closer to 68%, and CONAPO's Marginality Index

shows that Chiapas ranks first in the country (Wodon et al., 2000: 1). Migration flow data indicates that Guerrero and Oaxaca are the states of origin for international migration whereas Chiapas supplies the intraregional labour force in a rural-rural or rural-urban direction. This simple correlation seems to support the theoretical assumption that it is not the poorest people who migrate since travelling costs are beyond their means. Nevertheless, the case of Guerrero and in particular Oaxaca's international migration cannot be exclusively explained on such an economic basis. Networks and well-organised communities might be the reasons for their having settled in the fields of California for more than a decade.

In the Mexican Census of 2000, data showed an important increase in migration from Mexico City and Veracruz as sending regions while traditional regions indicated high return rates. The explanation for this seems to be related to changes in the demographic profile of the population, low productivity in the rural sector, and a lack of incentives for social mobility (Wodon et al., 2003: 4). Looking at the case of Southern Mexico, we cannot talk of traditionally homogenous characteristics aside from it being an area which is rich in natural resources. Veracruz, Tabasco and Campeche, states along the Gulf of Mexico, are the main producers of Mexican oil, agricultural products, and fish. Guerrero, Chiapas, and Oaxaca (where the Acapulco, Huatulco and Puerto Escondido beach resorts are popular with North American and European tourists) are diverse also in terms of their natural resources, but important tourist resorts are concentrated in these areas which makes the tourist services sector the most import source of employment. Yucatán and Quintana Roo are also southern states with very prosperous tourist industries, such as Cancún and the Riviera Maya, and this account for the important role of services in the region's economy.

Veracruz and Chiapas have more recently experienced migration flows to the US even though neither of them belongs to the group of high migration regions traditionally studied by many scholars. Verduzco and Unger (2002)when examining migrant participation rates classified by municipality, show that the South East (Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Tabasco and

Campeche, all of them states participating in the PPP) had an emigration rate of 34.5%, whereas central states (Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Querétaro, State of Mexico and Morelos) averaged 66.6%. They establish that "in the country as a whole, the states with the least participation are Tabasco, Chiapas, Veracruz, Yucatán and Quintana Roo" (Verduzco and Unger, 1997: 403). From their previous research, they concluded that the highest emigration rates per municipal participation are mainly from Zacatecas, Michoacán and Jalisco states (Verduzco and Unger, 1998b: 208). The authors argue that the "intensity of migration does not occur throughout the length of the republic, but is limited to only 4.5% of the country's municipalities, and of these half are found in only three states: Jalisco, Michoacán and Zacatecas" (Verduzco and Unger, 1997: 403). They add that those municipalities with the highest rates are rural, although urban migration is growing in importance for international migration flows. Other migration researchers such as Cortina et al. (Cortina et al., 2005) question the causal relationship between poverty and migration given that Veracruz has the lowest share of migration as well as the lowest economic performance indicators. In the same sense, according to the former President's Office for Mexicans Abroad, only Ocosingo and Chenhalo in Chiapas are recognised among 90 micro regions[3] with high rates of emigration and marginalisation levels.

However, all Southern Mexico has been identified as a potential and in some cases a new source of migrants; in particular, Veracruz has become one of the new principal origin-states along with Mexico City's metropolitan area (Wodon et al., 2000). Here, the causes of migration are not fully explained by unemployment or poverty, or by the existence of social networks facilitating the migration process. Instead, wage differentials and a lack of social mobility for both the skilled and unskilled labour force are perceived as the main reasons for emigration. Employment opportunities for the economically active local population in the rural sector of Veracruz are limited by very low agricultural

[3] Micro-region is the unit representing a cohort of municipalities that share socio-economic characteristics (linguistic, cultural, productive activity, geography and climate among others). Mexico was divided into 263 micro regions in order to apply the development policy launched by President Fox during the period 2000-2006.

productivity while urban employment has been affected by the poor performance of the industrial sector. Researchers highlight the neoliberal policies of recent presidents, specifically since President Salinas de Gortari signed the NAFTA agreement (which came into force in January 1994). This agreement emphasised an export-led policy based on maquiladoras, privatisation and macroeconomic measures which restricted wages, consumption and savings. In the specific case of Veracruz, neoliberal policies are regarded as the main cause of increased unemployment rates and the disappearance of the "uncompetitive" industrial sector. The oil industry experienced the loss of 24,000 permanent jobs and witnessed a decrease in terms of average annualised rates of employment by enterprise from 13.7% in 1988 to 7.4% in 1993 and 6.5% in 1998 (Chávez Lomelí et al., 2002: 5). The traditionally pivotal agricultural sector has seen production and employment affected by world prices for coffee and sugar. The decline of the agricultural sector has led to the rise of the tertiary sector, a tendency apparent across the Mexican economy.

Canales (2000) points out the constant demand caused by, "a strategy of labour flexibility and deregulation (which) seems to provide the basis for a fresh supply of jobs for the migrant population" (Canales, 2000: 413) in the US economy. This statement offers an explanation for continuing migration linked to changes in the socio-demographic profile, such as polarisation of the employment structure whereby the new information economy creates a gap between high and low skilled jobs, both of which are attractive to different segments within the origin-country migrant population. Sassen argues that globalisation shapes the US labour market which strongly differentiates levels of pay, qualifications and forms of contract regulation and maintains the demand for migrant labour (Sassen, 1998). The other factor highlighted is the degree of change in the Mexican economy provoked by the 1982 financial crisis, something which led to the impoverishment of a large section of the population (Canales, 2003: 752).

While urban areas have also contributed to the emigration trend, this more skilled labour force is seeking employment in highly industrialised labour sectors

with the aim of improving their wages and quality of life. Therefore, unemployment per se cannot be seen as a reason for migration when we consider skilled migrants who are finding better opportunities in terms of wages or related-jobs in the Northern maquiladora states or in the US and Canada.

Statistical data provided by the Mexican Census of 2000 shows that, in terms of the share of migrants in the population, Veracruz ranked first alongside traditional sending regions such as Guanajuato or Michoacán and in second place if we look at the net international migration rate (Chávez Lomelí et al., 2002: 17; Tuirán Gutiérrez et al., 2005). Northern border cities are also attracting Southern flows to the maquiladora industry. A weaker regional economy such as that of Veracruz, with high rates of unemployment among the young, became a source not only for international migration but also for internal migration. Whether the migrants stop at the Northern farm labour states or not, agricultural workers are migrating from rural to rural areas or participating in rural-international migration (Canales, 2003). It is also true that rural and urban migrants from Southern states like Veracruz use border cities as a transit point on their way to the US or Canada. The migration rate doubled in the 1990s, with Veracruzans accounting for 41.9% of migrants in Northern Border states (Chávez Lomelí et al., 2002: 14).

2.3.2 New Trends in Moroccan Migration

From the early 1990s, North African migration trends changed as destinations were diversified in the face of increasingly restrictive immigration policies in traditional European destination countries. Southern Europe became one of the more accessible destinations for North African migrants. According to Lopez, there was a small, but progressively increasing, migration to Spain by Algerian and Tunisian workers throughout the 1990s (López García et al., 1996). Moroccans formed a part of this more general Maghrebian migration to Southern Europe, representing the largest number during the course of the 1990s, with around 400,000 by the early 2000s. Moreover, Spain was itself becoming one of the principal locations for Moroccan settlement in Europe. By 2004 the distribution of Moroccan emigrants by receiving country was as follows:

France led the list with 1,125,000 and Spain followed with nearly 400,000; the Netherlands had 300,000; Italy 280,000; Belgium 220,000, and Germany 110,000 (Berriane, 2004b: 25). The major shift in Moroccan migration to Spain came in 1997 (Belguendouz, 2002). These figures contrasted with the distribution of Moroccans obtaining citizenship in Europe: of the almost 300,000 Moroccans acquiring citizenship in European destinations during the period 1990-1999, 42% were resident in France, followed by the Netherlands with 29%, then Belgium with 15% and Spain with 3% (Lee, 2002: 20).

France remained the main destination country for the Moroccan diaspora after increased restrictions on migration were introduced in the 1970s, and their political, social, and cultural links reflected a very special bilateral relationship based on their colonial history (Lamchichi, 1999). Nevertheless, Belgium and the Netherlands are also important destination countries for Moroccan settlers, as well as other members of the Maghrebian-origin population (Refass, 2004).[4] However, the shift in destinations routes to Southern Europe, specifically Spain and Italy, was marked in the early 1990s by two main factors: the establishment of a visa system to restrict "Southern migration" and changes in Spanish labour market demand. Spain introduced a visa quota to show that this illegal migration caused by EU visa restrictions had been dealt with while also providing cheap labour for its growing agricultural and service sectors (Muus and van Dam, 1996).

Destination is also determined by the origins of flows. Migrants from Nador have the most diversified destinations, while most of those found in France are from the Souss region (Tiznit). Khénitra has a tendency to be the supplier of Moroccan flows to Italy and France, while migration to Spain seems to be preferred by those from Larache (Lee, 2002: 59). As in the case of Mexico, different researchers noted the preference for specific destinations based firstly on the regional labour market which led to the settlement of migrants who

[4] For instance, in 2004, the Belgian-Moroccan communities were celebrating 40 years of the Convention signed by the Government of Belgium and Morocco in 1964 which allows the immigration of "travailleurs a l'etranger".

developed links as transnational communities and perpetuated migration (Lee, 2002: 82).

The social networks subsequently developed not only support an increasing number of migrants, but also forge links to support transnational communities from a strong communal organisational perspective as is analysed further in subsequent chapters .

The case of Moroccan immigration to Spain challenges some of the main explanations for migration, whether based on push-pull factors or social capital theories. Spain's shift from being an emigration to immigration country is intrinsically related to changes in its economy and labour market (Commission Européenne et Eurostat, 2000). According to López[5], there has been a major shift in the migratory position of Spain. The country has moved from a position where many in Spain sought to escape the Franco regime and/or economic underdevelopment (whether to Latin America or other parts of Europe) to one where it is a destination country as a result of returning migrants or the arrival of migrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

The Spanish Government has recognised the link between immigration flows and labour market conditions. From this perspective, historical links between Spain and Morocco or Latin America cannot fully explain new migratory trends. In response to increasing labour demand, Spain issued 10,575 permanent work permits and 13,672 temporary work permits in 2002 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2002). Economic research has highlighted growth as the main factor influencing the increased presence of a foreign labour force in Spain. Alonso stresses the country's relatively high growth rate and the labour market absorption capacity as well as the immigrants' availability to take jobs that are unattractive to Spanish workers, specifically those categorised as "triple D jobs": dirty, degrading and dangerous.[6] According to Munarriz, the empirical and statistical data reflects a segmented labour

[5] Interview with Dr. Bernabé López, Autonomous University of Madrid, June 2004.

[6] Interview with Dr. Jose Antonio Alonso, Director from the Center for International Affairs, in the Complutense University, June 2004.

market concentrated in particular sectors. Agriculture, as an activity mainly developed in Mediterranean Spain, represents one of the main sectors for Moroccan migrants while in the Atlantic coastal regions the informal sector is important (Munárriz Guezala, 2004: 367).

The assumption that Spanish labour market changes are a factor creating demand for specific jobs in the agriculture, service, and construction sectors and driving new trends in Spanish immigration flows is highlighted by Bernabé López's research from the mid-1990s. He argues that the Spanish Government established quota agreements to recruit and regularise the immigrant labour force, indicating that demand was not fully satisfied by the local workforce (López García et al., 1996).

Emigration flows to Spain were considered to originate primarily from the Northern Mediterranean Provinces, such as Tangier, Tetouan-Larache, Al-Hoceima-Tza-Taounate, Grand Nador, Chefchaouen, and Berkane Oujda. However, some data collected by Spanish non-governmental organisations researching clandestine flows indicates that the Centre-South as the main province of origin for these flows rather than the North. This apparent inconsistency is difficult to resolve in the absence of accurate statistical data from either the receiving or the sending country. Nevertheless, linguistic, historical, and geographical closeness may be influential factors facilitating the decision to emigrate. Northern Morocco has strong links with Spain, not only because it was a Protectorate in the recent past but also because four-hundred years of Andalous rule in Spain shaped Southern Spain and Northern Morocco as a unique bi-cultural unit (albeit one divided culturally by religion and geographically by the Mediterranean Sea).

Exhaustive fieldwork performed by a Moroccan and Spanish research team led by López and Berriane has identified North-Eastern and Central Morocco as the main sources of the Moroccan-origin migrant population in Spain (Berriane, 2004b; Berriane and Refass, 2004: 128). The research study carried out by the Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos (TIEM) at the Autonomous University of Madrid describes and analyses the evolution of Moroccan immigration in two different stages. It demonstrates changes in

Moroccan immigration in Spain, where numbers have increased five-fold in one decade. This influx notably increased from 70,000 registered in 1991 to a Moroccan origin population of nearly 400,000 throughout Spain in 2003. The registered population includes both regular and irregular immigrants (Izquierdo, 1996: 216). These numbers represent an increase in the share of the Moroccan-origin population from 13.76% of the Foreign Resident Population in Spain in 1991 to 21.35% in 2002 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2002).

Moroccan immigration evolved from being comprised of a minority group of Jewish Moroccans settled in Barcelona to an extended phenomenon linking a wide spectrum of origins and destinations. As described by the previously mentioned research work, the Moroccan community established in Barcelona was the product of Morocco's political turmoil that expelled diverse groups as well as the closure of European Community borders in the early 1970s. These two factors transformed Spain from being a transit country for migrants expecting to re-enter European Community countries into a destination country. Those settlers were the pioneers of a growing social network which comprised the biggest foreign origin group in Barcelona and up to 37% of the total Moroccan-origin population in Spain (Aubarell, 2004).

The composition of the Moroccan migrant community relative to other migrants in Spain is rather different. In terms of gender, there are relatively more males amongst the Moroccans, whereas women prevail in the Colombian group and Europeans are distributed in equal terms. Regarding age, there is a notable difference between Europeans on the one hand and Africans and Latin Americans on the other: the former are grouped in the range 45 years and over, whereas the latter fall into the range of 25 to 44 years old (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2003).

Sex, age, unemployment, and social status differentiate North Africans from other migrants in other European, American, or Arab destinations. Data collected by the European Commission in 2000 concerning Moroccan immigrants settled in France described international migrants as predominantly men in their 20s and 30s, more often single than non-migrants, and more often

living with their parents before leaving to go abroad (Fadloullah et al., 2000). In addition, their level of education was at the level of primary school or lower while the motivation to migrate was triggered by unemployment conditions at home. In Spain, 40% of Moroccan migrants had not received formal education; if the numbers having only a primary education are included their share of the migrant community rises to 70%, leaving a small proportion that had studied at secondary school or university (López-García, 2004: 217). In addition, in terms of destinations the Moroccan community is highly concentrated in Catalonia (especially Barcelona), Madrid, and Andalusia, (See Fig. 2.1)(Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2004).

Figure 2-1 Total Moroccan Population in Spain. 2004



Source: Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Yearly Statistical Book, Spain 2005.

According to Berriane and López, the distribution of Moroccan migrants in the economy is differentiated on the basis of gender. Men are equally distributed between agriculture and construction, followed by industry and services in terms of importance; women, however, are mostly to be found in domestic and commercial services (Berriane and López García, 2004: 217) Regarding the age and sex of foreign workers, data based on the Spanish Population Census of 2001 shows greater participation by women, nearly 40%

of the total Moroccan population (López García, 2004). The phenomenon of women's immigration in Spain is one of the most significant changes in Moroccan trends. According to Ramirez (Ramírez, 2004), Moroccan women in the 25-27 age range are attracted to "feminised" economic activities and regions in Spain. Most of the women are not married (73%) and are employed as housekeepers (86.3%) principally attracted to cities such as Madrid and tourist resorts. The sources of emigration are the cosmopolitan region of the Atlantic Garb (43.7%) and the Tangier Peninsula (33.7%), which means they come from urban areas (although they might have migrated from the rural areas in the first place).

Berriane and López (2004) highlight a noticeable shift from Morocco as the main sending country to Ecuador, a development which some scholars argue was a consequence of a favoured migration policy towards Ecuadorians after the terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Morocco (in May 2003) and Madrid, Spain (in March 2004). At the national level, compared to 2004 figures we can see that at the end of 2003 Moroccans formed one of the largest groups of legal residents with 333,770, followed by Ecuadorians with 174,289, Colombians with 107,459 and the British with 105,479 (See Table 2.4). In 2004 the number of Moroccans increased to 386,958 and Ecuadorians to 221,549, which maintained Morocco as the leading Non-EU foreign group of residents (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2004).

Table 2-4 Total Migrant Population holding a valid permit of residence in Spain by country of origin and year. 2000-2004

Country	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*
Morocco	199,782	234,937	282,432	333,770	386,958
Ecuador	30,878	84,699	115,301	174,289	221,546
Colombia	24,702	48,710	71,238	107,459	137,369
Peru	27,888	33,758	39,013	57,593	71,245
Cuba	19,165	21,467	24,226	27,323	30,738
Argentina	16,610	20,412	27,937	43,347	56,193
Dominican Republic	26,481	29,314	32,412	36,664	42,928
Romania	10,983	24,856	33,705	19,933	83,372

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Immigration 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Government of Spain.

Nevertheless, the fact that the municipal census registered a difference in numbers with those migrants holding a resident card explains the changes in the share of Latin American migrants in Spain versus the North African, mostly Moroccan migrants. Table 2.5 indicates that in 2004 the number of Ecuadorians registered by the municipal census rose from the 137,185 registered in 2001 to 463,737 in 2004, while the number of Moroccans increased from 216,470 in 2001 to 388,046 in 2004. The difference between those registered in the municipalities at the end of the year and those migrants, who were granted a residence permit at the beginning of the following year, can be regarded as the irregular population. This is explained by the fact that all migrants independently of their migratory legal status are required to be registered in the municipality (Recaño and Domingo, 2005).Thus, this methodology is commonly accepted as a way of calculating the levels of irregular migration in Spain.

Table 2-5 Municipal Registration of selected non-EU immigrants by Nationality. 2001-2004.

	2001	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2004%*
Total	137,0657	1,977,946	2,664,168	3,034,326	100%
Total European	557,600	728,746	965 217	1,079,555	36%
Total EU	442,679	520,285	622 085	676,286	22%
Total non EU European	114,921	208,461	343 132	403,269	13%
Romania	31,316	66,226	134 811	203,173	7%
Total nonEuropean	813,057	1,249,200	1,698,951	1,954,771	64%
Morocco	216,470	286,333	352,452	388,046	13%
Cuba	24,936	32,383	39,060	40,501	1%
Dominican Republic	30,312	36,898	43,270	46,878	2%
Argentina	37,625	66,296	128,757	157,323	5%
Colombia	86,927	190,226	242,540	246,243	8%
Ecuador	137,185	255,350	382,169	463,737	15%
Peru	34,690	44,488	55,773	68,591	2%

Source: National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE)

While undocumented Moroccans are not included in this data there is a strong perception of massive illegal flows towards Spain as the gateway to Europe, a concern for both Morocco and Spain. Sub-Saharan migration has caused greater alarm in terms of tackling illegal migration while Moroccan migration is being controlled by both the sending and receiving country

(Belguendouz, 2002; Belguendouz, 2003). Readmission agreements between Morocco and the EU are addressing these flows as well as bilateral agreements between Morocco and Spain to control the maritime border (Botsford, 2001). While migratory policies are discussed in further chapters, it is important to understand how southern flows are placing stress on the control of borders further south of Morocco. The role played by Morocco as a transit country is intrinsically related to the analysis of cooperation for development policy as a mechanism to negotiate stricter migration control.

2.4 The Roles of Mexico and Morocco as Receiving and Transit Areas

An important development in the dynamics of migration is the way in which both Mexico and Morocco have come to play the roles of sending, receiving and transit countries. Geography situates Mexico as the link between the North American region and Central and South America. Morocco is also a pathway linking Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. The borders between Mexico and the rest of Central/South America on the one hand, and between Morocco and the rest of Africa on the other, have become part of the migration control issue for Southern US and European borders. These borders have effectively moved south as the attempt to halt would-be immigrants is taking place on the northern and southern borders of Mexico and Morocco. According to border control authorities, moreover, drug flows coincidentally share traffic routes with migrants, often a justification for tightening border control by the US and European authorities (European Union, 1995; Governments of US and Mexico, 1997).

Irregular migration across the Northern Mexican border has commonly targeted specific crossing points; Tijuana and Matamoros were well known as strategic gateways for both Mexican and South American immigrants. The routes through the Gulf of Mexico are mostly used by Central American migrants, while migrants from further South have attempted to cross by flying to Mexico City as a point of transit to Tijuana in Baja California. The extension of the border fence, however, has now forced flows to be diverted towards more

risky crossing points meaning that California's ports are now being displaced as the main source of migration flows by the Sonora-Arizona border points.

Increasingly, however, the enforcement of border controls by Mexican authorities starts further down at the border with Guatemala. This reflects the perception that migrants from south of Mexico are able to enter the country. The south has a traditionally porous border and migrants from Central and South America are easily confused with similar looking Mexican indigenous groups. The states of Veracruz and Chiapas have been identified as a corridor for these Central American migrants. Moreover, they are also receiving a percentage of Central American flows and sending their own origin population. According to the National Institute of Migration, which is part of the Secretaría de Gobernación (the equivalent to the US Office of Homeland Security), Mexico receives between 40,000 and 50,000 visiting agricultural workers from Guatemala, some of whom try to stay in Chiapas, while the rest attempt to reach other Southern states. This population is composed mainly of people in the age range 15 to 48 years old (89%) and mostly male (87.8%) (Centro de Estudios Migratorios, 2005). One third of this population is of indigenous origin and is without formal education. There is both documented and undocumented migration; some of them are commuting to work in the agricultural fields or construction services. Meanwhile, indigenous women participate in this labour force as domestic workers in the Mexican border city of Tapachula (Angeles Cruz, 2002; Angeles Cruz and Rojas Wiesner, 2003) .

Not all those who cross the border have the intention to go further north. Those Central American refugees who arrived in the 1990s are now regularised as residents in Mexico, especially in Chiapas. Guatemalan and Honduran nationals lead this group according to the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM): in 2004 Guatemala received 1,335 resident permits and Hondurans 1,092 out of 4,608 resident permits. Of the 1,552 registered in Chiapas, most were of Guatemalan origin. The figures contrast with the high levels of refugees from the Guatemalan civil war (10,686 in the period 1996-1999, and just under 5,000 in 2000 and 2001) (INM, 2005). In more recent periods they have received work

permits from the Mexican government (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, 2002).

Mexico received 10,686 Guatemalan refugees in the years 1996-1999, a number that has decreased more recently with 4,951 in 2000 and 4,725 in 2001, mainly due to the civil war being officially declared over. This removed their chances of claiming legal status and meant that they have had to settle for work permits issued by the Mexican government. It is worth noting that in 2000, of the 4,951 refugees considered documented migrants in the Southern states of Chiapas, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, 4,471 held resident permits. More important is the increasing number of agricultural migrant workers that have settled in the southern states and which are now replacing the Mexican workers (Cortez Pérez et al., 2005). The Mexican government, through the National Institute of Migration has issued the Migratory Form for Agricultural Workers (FMVA) as a temporary working permit to allow Central American migrant to work in Mexico, mostly in Chiapas. On average, there were 40,000 agricultural workers formally hired in the last decade (Centro de Estudios Migratorios, 2005).

It is clear, however, that some migrants from Central America may settle only temporarily in Mexico. Once they can cover the financial costs, they may seek to cross the Northern border. An example of such behaviour was encountered during a fieldwork trip near the southern border of Chiapas. The bus was full of returning migrants apprehended in the city of Veracruz, a filter point for Central American migrants. One woman seated next to me started to explain her trip from Chiapas to Matamoros, the Gulf of Mexico route to the US; she was coming back from leaving her husband at the Matamoros border. Her family had been settled in the Chiapas rural area for some years already and her husband had decided to migrate, following his brother who had already migrated to the US and had sent back enough money for the journey. This Guatemalan woman was not being guarded by immigration officers on the bus and the reason was that she was holding her voter's card, official Mexican ID that can only be granted to citizens or permanent residents as a form of national identity card.

From the perspective of a Central American refugee in Chiapas, civil war rather than poverty was the original reason for fleeing her home country. However, her family's economic condition in Mexico failed to reach minimum living standards. Once the possibility existed to finance a trip and use well-established social networks, the migration option became feasible. Without these resources, the degree of poverty faced by Guatemalan migrants and Mexican indigenous communities settled in Southern states, as well as by the national population living under the poverty threshold, would serve as an economic constraint on international migration.

A similar pattern of transit is apparent in the Moroccan case where sub-Saharan migration flows are known to cross the country's territory. The Moroccan government faces a problem in terms of integrating these flows and controlling its Southern borders. The migrants come from Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria, among other African countries, and try to reach Tangier and cross the Mediterranean Sea. However, they often do not reach this crossing point due to a lack of resources, police controls or smugglers who take them to the Canary Islands and tell them they are in Europe. According to Belguendouz,[7] the Moroccan Government has been reluctant to provide meaningful statistics regarding Sub-Saharan migrants captured by Moroccan police. Figures are therefore taken from newspapers, and in his opinion, they may be inexact and exaggerated. Accordingly, 15,000 illegal immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco are believed to be in transit, waiting to pass to Spain (Angola Press, 2006). In most cases, they will attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea from the Northern coast, heading for the Iberian Peninsula, or from the Atlantic coast in Southern Morocco towards the Canaries. Newspapers usually report dramatic deaths. Another 1,000 immigrants, approximately, are held at a state-run internment centre in Melilla (Wilkinson, 2005). Moroccan authorities have deported several more by leaving them on the Northern border with Algeria. As in the case of the US-Mexico border, there are Moroccan commuters between the Melilla-Ceuta Spanish territories and African Morocco. In Melilla the Spanish

[7] Interview with Dr. Abdelkrim Belguendouz, Rabat, Morocco. July 2004

population accounts for 69,000 inhabitants while commuters total 30,000 (López Guzmán et al., 2007: 13-14).

According to local Moroccan researchers, Sub-Saharans in Morocco find themselves in a difficult situation vis-à-vis the rest of the Moroccan population and try to remain out of public sight given police persecution (Alvarado, 2005). While the government is channelling resources to control the border, it is arguable that those resources will never be enough when the border itself is porous. It is therefore easier to detain illegal migrants at the international airports of Rabat or Marrakech, where even African students whose purpose is to attend University in Morocco are being detained. As Belguendouz explains, this is part of a migratory policy responding to Moroccan-European Agreements to control “Southern” flows (Belguendouz, 2003).

2.5 Conclusions

From a research perspective, Morocco and Mexico offer an interesting comparison in terms of the characteristics of their migration flows. Both share an emigration rate of almost 9% of the population and a history of migration spanning more than a hundred years. Geographical location and socioeconomic differences with their respective Northern neighbours serve to shape the geopolitical dimension of the migration issue. The "push and pull" framework explains the migratory history between Mexico, the US and Canada, and also between Morocco and its European counterparts. This approach can also explain diversification of destination countries along with polarisation of the global market: low skilled migration supplies those productive sectors that are not attractive for natives in terms of wages and working conditions while highly skilled migrants are welcome since they are required to support the highest stage of production in a globalization process which mainly favours the high-tech economic sector. However, various authors argue that the persistence of migration is the result of a growing social network structure.

From the perspective of sending countries, emigration is also a source of development and a safety valve for high unemployment rates. On the one hand, disparities between the rural and urban sectors explain internal migration,

although in the two cases analysed rural sectors were also a source of international migration. The need for a low-skilled labour force to sustain competitive agricultural and service sectors in the receiving country is combined with the supply of a young population with high rates of unemployment.

Given the persistence of migration, a policy of migration control appears to be a core issue for receiving countries. The demand for labour in the case of Spain needs to be shaped according to the needs of integration policies. Moreover, illegal migration has been declared an emergency for migration control policies in both cases. "Frontiers" are therefore moving further south as migration flows attempt to move further north. Central America for Mexico and Sub-Saharan countries for Morocco, have become central to the migratory policies of receiving countries. There is increased pressure from these northern neighbours which are seeking to enforce stricter migratory policies.

It is also important to differentiate the driving factors behind Mexican and Moroccan migration. The phenomenon is a response to economic factors as well as social networks developed through time. Moroccan immigration in Spain and Mexican migration in the US represent flows interconnected by labour markets. In sum, those changes identified by various research studies carried out in both regions show a specific socio-demographic profile that has been transformed over time as a consequence of immigration policy measures such as the reunification of families which in some cases allow the participation of women in these flows. However, changes in the labour market on the one hand and economic interdependence on the other have led to an increase in the number of immigrants in the US and created a new receiving country in the case of Spain. On the other hand, Mexico and Morocco are playing a three-dimensional role as sending, receiving and transit countries.

In the following chapters, we examine how the policies governing migration have taken into account these characteristics of the migration processes in both regions.

CHAPTER 3 THE MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM AND MIGRATION: DIAGNOSING CONDITIONS IN MEXICO AND MOROCCO

3.1 Introduction

Following our review of the theoretical debate on the possible interactions between development and migration in Chapter 1 and our overview of migration trends in Mexico and Morocco in Chapter 2, it is clear that the migration-development nexus is highly complex. In this chapter, we focus on the development aspect, examining the two countries' economic conditions and the reforms which they have introduced in recent years, drawing upon the analyses of international development organisations such as the World Bank.

The pursuit of economic reform has been part of a wider trend in development debates – the embrace of neoliberal economic policies as advocated by the mainstream global development organisations. In recent years, the World Bank (WB), as the most influential of these organisations, has led a debate on the nature of that relationship. This chapter examines the way in which these institutions have diagnosed the development problem in general terms and with regard to the cases of Mexico and Morocco. It also examines how migration has emerged as an issue in these analyses. While the inequalities produced by the economic gap between neighbouring countries (such as Mexico-US, and Morocco-Spain) have been considered as causes of migration within the classical theoretical debate, the complexities of the migration-development nexus were not fully taken into account in the mainstream perspective. More recently, however, international organisations such as the WB have given more attention to migration issues and the role of remittances in development policy at the macro level and the development of businesses at the micro-level (Adams and Page, 2003; Wodon et al., 2003; Taylor and Mora, 2006). This represents a shift from trade and aid to remittances-based initiatives which target the migrant as an agent of development, one of the core principles of the co-development debate (Lucas, 2004b: 1).

Indeed, there has been an evolution in the way in which migration appears in the programme statements of the multilateral organisations regarding the development plans for high-migration rate countries. At this point, it is worth reiterating the need to differentiate the concept of co-development from mainstream aid-development cooperation. Both concepts share the central element of incorporating the migration-development nexus, but differ in their treatment of migration. The theoretical debate surrounding co-development as a practice refers to a “transnational” process affecting the migrant population in both receiving and hosting countries, whereas co-development policy focuses primarily on the effects of migration solely in the sending country and it is related to return migratory policies. This chapter focuses on the development priorities and programmes advocated and carried out by the mainstream development institutions, exemplified by the WB, and the changing treatment of migration within their thinking.

The chapter is divided in three main sections. The first part describes the "conventional wisdom" on development as promoted by the international economic and finance institutions, primarily the WB. It looks at the suggested mechanisms for boosting economic development and their impact on poverty. Some critics argue that their diagnoses focus mainly on endogenous factors such as the countries' own “Southern” economic characteristics. Those critics claim that the economic problems affecting these countries might be more a result of exogenous factors imposed by the multilateral organisations´ recipes for reform. In other words, the economic policies followed by these less developed countries are shaped by an international orthodoxy which stresses economic liberalisation. However, these neo-liberal policies do not contain adequate instruments for addressing the socio-economic inequalities which are one of the main drivers of migration out of countries such as Mexico and Morocco.

The chapter then examines how these general principles are applied in practice by comparing the WB documents focusing on Mexico and Morocco. We consider the economic diagnosis provided in these documents and critically assess how far they address these countries’ problems of poverty,

unemployment and social inequality as well as the regional and sectoral challenges which they face. We also discuss the steps taken by these countries to open up their markets, as recommended in the WB reports. Although the effects of globalisation may clash with national economic needs, export–led policies have been promoted as the most effective instrument for boosting economic growth and diminishing unemployment, (thereby addressing one of the reasons to migrate).

The final section considers the way in which migration has been treated in the mainstream development paradigm, focusing in particular on the changing attitudes towards the role of remittances. We also follow up the way in which this changing perspective was reflected in the analysis of the Mexican and Moroccan economies.

3.2 The International Development Orthodoxy and the Migration-Development Nexus

Nowadays, Morocco and Mexico are considered as economies open to international capital, privatisation, and trade liberalisation, economic reforms adopted by political elites in line with the priorities of the international financial institutions. In the same context, migration was seen as a result of the "failure" of development as well as consequence of poverty that perpetuates the phenomenon. Increasingly, however migration is perceived as a mechanism bringing development in the sending countries as well as economic benefits to the host countries (Lucas, 2004a: 26; UN General Assembly, 2006b; DFID, 2007).

Understanding the shift from a negative to a positive perspective on migration and its relationship with development requires an analysis of the conventional wisdom on development and the role of migration. The "Washington Consensus" on development was for many years highly influential, particularly in the principal international economic organisations, but was equally blamed by critics for failing to eradicate – or even for causing – poverty (Rosser and Vcherashnaya Rosser, 2001; Thompson, 2002). The Consensus referred to the strategies designed by the Washington–based financial institutions (such as the WB, the IMF, and the IADB), for reforming economic

policies in “emerging” or “developing” economies. [1] It was regarded as part of a worldwide policy shift following the coming to power of the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the 1980s and has been highly criticised because of its neo-liberal orientation. This concept was initially used to refer to a common set of policies applied to the Latin American countries, but was also increasingly applied to other developing countries. [2] Leaving aside the question of whether the economic policies implied in the Washington Consensus gave rise to more crisis and negative consequences (Saavedra, 2003; Rodrik, 2006), migration and development were implicitly related in the argument: negative economic growth, low productivity, and hence high unemployment rates were seen as factors contributing to high rates of emigration in developing countries .

For much of the last 25 years, a central component of the Washington Consensus has informed policy debates: the assumption that trade would boost economic growth and that poverty reduction would follow from integration into the global market. A number of countries, which have undergone the reform process and became members of regional trade agreements, were successful in their aim of reducing the existing trade barriers (especially non-tariff ones). However, many argued that such trade would help to reduce poverty only if there were also mechanisms which mitigated the impact on the most vulnerable groups and allowed them to participate in the global market. Indeed, some institutions were conscious of the cost and benefits from trade. As was noted by the Global Poverty Report 2001 (a working paper prepared for G8 Genoa

[1] John Williamson characterised the financial institutions’ formula for boosting development as including such policies as competitive exchange rate to provide an incentive for export growth, import liberalisation, the generation of adequate domestic savings to finance investment (primarily by tightening fiscal policy), and cutting back the bloated role of government to allow it to concentrate on the provision of core public services and a framework for economic activity.

[2] Although many countries carried out this economic formula, economic growth goals were not always reached, giving rise to increasing criticisms of the economic policy recommendations. Williamson defends those reforms recommended especially on Latin America, arguing that slow and even negative economic growth in cases such as Argentina and Mexico were the result of limited economic reforms, which diverted from the original approach. However, Williamson subsequently recognised that the Washington Consensus required amendment: see Kuczynski, P.P. & Williamson, J. (2003) After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America Washington: The Institute for International Economics..

Summit), “the benefits and costs of trade reforms do not flow simultaneously (...and...) adjustment costs are often borne over the short term while the benefits of reform are realised over the long run” (G8. Genoa Summit, 2001: 1). On the same note, the report underlines trade as the most important mechanism to increase economic growth and reduce poverty, but only if a proper environment is created to offer opportunities to the poor. Moreover, it asserts that it was mainly the already-established export-leading businesses that might be able to export, marginalising those medium and small enterprises incapable of participating in a “global” market.[3]

Despite the recognition of the potentially negative effects from forced market openness on “non-developing countries”, the international consensus has continued to argue for the pursuit of free trade as the ultimate means of diminishing poverty. Equally, immigration has been diagnosed as a result of underdevelopment and poverty though there is some recognition that there might be a link between trade liberalisation and inequality. The Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development presented by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to the United Nations Development Summit in Monterrey in 2002 (also known as the Zedillo Report), described a world polarised into the wealthy and the non-wealthy which would be characterised by “lack of markets for one’s product, illegal immigration, pollution, contagious disease, insecurity, fanaticism, and terrorism” (United Nations, 2002e: 3). It continued by stressing the need for a commitment to the Millennium Declaration which aims to halve extreme poverty by 2015.

This report also stressed the importance of foreign capital for investment in productive sectors, with privatisation highlighted as one way of attracting such investment. Another important strategy was to encourage fair trade policies which would reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, a topic that has been at the heart of negotiations within the WTO meetings. Unfortunately, the latter

[3] Apparently, the US Government had previously taken this into account when it created the US Community Adjustment and Investment Programme (USCAIP), a loan programme administered by the NADBank and addressed to the private sector that might be affected by the negative impacts from NAFTA.
http: //www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra99-1/page3.html.

recommendation has not been fully addressed, given the fact that world-trade arrangements are driven by the interests of the world's leading economies, rather than the needs of the developing and least developed countries.[4]

However, the factor which undoubtedly marked out the Zedillo Report from previous statements on development was the high profile given to migration as a systemic issue, which required cooperation between the host and sending country, and as a factor in development. The Report's proposal for "liberalising of migration" (United Nations, 2002b: 10) was based on two central factors: the ageing population in developed countries, and the growing rate of remittances flowing to developing countries. While the report did not identify a venue or a timetable for serious discussions on migration at the global level, the fact that remittance flows could be considered as more than a source of short-term foreign exchange for developing countries indicated a change in the perspective of the international institutions. At the same time illegal migration, increasingly perceived as a problem affecting developed countries, was recognised as resulting from conditions in their underdeveloped neighbours in the "global village" (United Nations, 2002d).

3.3 The Country Strategy Papers for Mexico and Morocco, the mainstream development perspective

These notions of development and the appropriate policies for encouraging growth have informed the analysis and recommendations of bodies such as the WB. What was the Bank's view of the particular problems of Mexico and Morocco? In this section, we review the two countries' economic conditions and difficulties, drawing upon the WB´s own analysis as presented in its Country Assistance Strategy documents.

Mexico and Morocco have been classified as emerging economies with the WB defining them as "Middle Income" Countries (MIC)[5] and amongst the

[4] See the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, where ministers agreed to start negotiations to further liberalise trade in non-agricultural goods. Nevertheless, negotiations ended in a deadlock in the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, September 2003 and negotiations failed to meet the specified deadline of 1 January 2005.
Http: //www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief05_e.htm#mandate

[5] Middle Income is a broad category. Mexico is High Middle Income and Morocco Low Middle Income.

top emigration countries. A comparison of macroeconomic indicators shows significant economic problems, as reflected in such indicators as the rates of poverty, migration and economic performance (See Table 3.1.)[6.]

Table 3-1 Mexico and Morocco Macroeconomic Indicators 2004

Economic and Demographic Indicators	**Mexico**		**Morocco**
Emigration rate (migrants as % of population)		8.50%	8.60%
GDP (average annual growth)		3.50%	3.50%
Growth rate of Population (annual rate)		1.44%	1.80%
Country Income Category		Upper middle income	Lower middle income
Population		106.4 million inhabitants	30.1 million inhabitants
GDP (US$) FY		683.5 billion	43.7 billion
GNI per capita (US$)	$7,310.00		$1,730.00
Total % of Population in Poverty	Rural	46.08%	22%
	Urban	8.45%	7.9%
Total % of Population in Extreme Poverty		20.30%	40% poor and vulnerable
Total %Rural Population		24%	45%
Urban Population		76%	55%
Unemployment		3.79% (Nat. average)	11% (Nat. average)
Urban Unemployment		18%	18.40%
Rural			*3.2%

Source: WB Country Strategic Papers for Mexico and Morocco, 2005, Direction of Statistics of INSEA Morocco, CONAPO Statistical Database, Mexico, SEDESOL(United Nations, 2002d).

This data is collected as part of the WB's CAS and Governmental Statistics Units in both Morocco and Mexico. These CAS reports give us a good understanding of the Bank's priorities and how it considers poverty reduction can be achieved as well as providing a perspective on the political factors shaping policy. As an expression of how the Bank defines the development

[6] As regards this data, it is worth noting that international organisations are generally working with national sources of statistics to assess the link between poverty, trade, and migration. Even though poverty and unemployment statistics are key indicators of socio-economic conditions in a sending country, they are gathered on the basis of different national methodologies and these may lead to diverging reports of the levels of income. On migration in particular, moreover, such information is difficult to verify: the United Nations Reports recognise the problems of identifying migration trends given that the information is “diffused among Government bodies as well as among international organizations" and that "in many countries the information is neither available nor produced on regular basis “Williamson, J. (2002) Did the Washington Consensus Fail?. Outline of speech at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Institute for International Economics November 6, 2002 Washington, DC Center for Strategic & International Studies, The lack of detailed evidence of migration dynamics and its causes and effects, limits the development of an economic policy that not only assures the incorporation of vulnerable communities into the productive sectors, but also reduces migration pressures.

agenda, the CAS also indicates how the WB's guidelines for development are designed in conjunction with other international agencies, although the latter are intervening to differing degrees. In the case of Morocco, for example, the WB is focusing more on the analytical work while the EU and its financial affiliates are the main actors in overseeing the application of the program. The CAS for Morocco has established that WB funding is being reduced, as the EU has become the main source of funding. In the case of Mexico, the IADB, the IMF and the USAID are the main protagonists.

Comparing the Morocco's CAS 2001-2004 and Mexico CAS 2000, it appears that both countries are in economic and political transition, achieving major goals in terms of macroeconomic stability, financial system, education, and democracy. Nevertheless, poverty and infant and maternal mortality are common problems and their governments are struggling to fulfil the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2002a). In addition, the analyses take into account the political risk factors associated with the degree of democratisation and have made funding conditional on the development of democracy. Mexico is presented as a country which has already reached a democratic political stage while Morocco is presented as a country still facing the challenge of democratisation. The assumed lack of democracy is linked to the degree of corruption; a more democratic country is associated with greater transparency in terms of administering development resources.

Morocco "faces challenges..(such as).. restraining government spending, reducing constraints on private activity and foreign trade, and achieving sustainable growth" (USAID Morocco, 2005). As a consequence of this diagnosis, the Moroccan CAS recommended the implementation of a structural adjustment programme supported by the IMF, the WB, and the Paris Club.[7] Reforms included making the Dirham convertible for current account transactions and encouraging trade and foreign investment through a free-trade

[7] The Paris Club is an informal mechanism to reach agreements between creditors and debtor countries, and it is called so since 1956 when Argentine agreed to meet its public creditors in Paris. See on line http: //www.clubdeparis.org/sections/qui-sommes-nous.

agreement with the US and the privatisation of the state telecommunications company and the largest state-owned bank.

Overall, the report noted a mixed economic performance, highlighting that in the period 2001-04 the budget deficit averaged 5.2% of the GDP, because of substantial increases in wages and oil subsidies, along with extraordinary expenses in infrastructure and security related projects after the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attack (World Bank, 2005: 3). Thus, one of the main concerns was to decrease budget deficit through civil service and budget reforms in the very short term. The long-term challenges included preparing the economy for freer trade with the US and EU, improving education and job prospects for Morocco's youth, and raising living standards. It also noted that Morocco is due to receive support from the EU to improve its infrastructure for export services (including highways, ports, railroads, etc.) as part of the MEDA programmes (these programmes are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).

The report identified economic reforms as an important catalyst for development and argued that rural and social programmes were important for improving the quality of life and reducing the social inequalities between the rural and urban areas (the “two Moroccos” as defined by the CAS 2001-2004) (World Bank, 2001: 1). Interestingly, the subsequent CAS, for 2005-2009 gives greater attention to tackling pockets of poverty in both the urban and the rural areas. As the Bank established, this shift was due to an upsurge in terrorist activity, notably the suicide attack on the “Casa España” in Casablanca in 2003. One of the sources of support for radical Islam was the urban slums where levels of poverty are high (World Bank, 2005). Social tension is expected if economic growth is not sustained. Since 40% of the population is categorised as “poor” or “economically vulnerable”, the WB sought to identify the major areas of poverty in order to support “specific economy wide reforms” and the “design of sustainable local infrastructure", encouraging economic opportunities in poor areas and improving access to health services (World Bank, 2005: 16).

The report also highlighted the problem of absorbing the fast growing labour force. It attributes the causes of unemployment to the low level of economic growth and increases in the economically active population, and

argues that, as a consequence, there may be an increase in “unmanageable social tension”. However, it does not take into account international migration in this analysis, though it does emphasise the role of emigration from rural to urban areas as a factor for unemployment, particularly among the young and educated (34% and 26% respectively). Despite a favourable combination of falling rates of population growth (1.5%), high rates of employment growth (3.1%), and the increasing participation of women in the labour market, there is a need for higher investment that could create employment for the country’s educated youth (World Bank, 2005). According to Moroccan scholars, rural-urban migration – along with a deteriorating wage in urban areas - has accelerated the international migration process (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003; El Aoufi and Bensaïd, 2005; Kachani, 2005).

In sum, the Country Assessment Strategy documents for 2001-2004 and 2005-2009 indicate the WB’s priorities for the Moroccan economy. They highlight development aims in line with the Millennium Development Goals for 2015.[8] They also claim to address those endogenous factors such as the high rate of unemployment and young population which intensify the pressure to migrate (World Bank, 2005). The Bank’s recommendations focus on programmes designed to improve the economic and political environment for foreign investment by encouraging the pursuit of economic and political reforms. Furthermore, the strategy is seen as operating within a cooperative framework with other financial institutions as the EU and the African Development Bank

Overall, the WB’s CAS 2002 for Mexico highlights the well managed macroeconomic policy after the Mexican Economic Crisis in 1994 as well as the democratic changes which occurred with the 2000 Presidential elections (World Bank, 2004). Democratisation in Mexico facilitated closer relations between senior officials in the Bank and the Mexican government and raised the Bank’s expectations that economic performance would improve on the basis of less

[8] Official Development Assistance was recognised as the main source of development and the members established to donor 0.7 per cent to support a world development program, which aims to reduce poverty and increase development aid.

corruption. According to the CAS report, there were signs of improvements in development and this was attributed to the strategies suggested by the Bank.

Though the CAS 2002 report is broadly positive in its analysis of the Mexican economy, it highlights the challenges for Mexico in diminishing socio-economic inequalities and unemployment. It underlines the fact that 51 millions of people live in poverty despite the important decrease in poverty levels as well as the regional, gender and ethnical inequalities inherent in Mexico's historical development(World Bank, 2002: 9). Table 3.2 describes an overall decrease of poverty at the national level, but a continued gap between the rural and urban level of poverty. While 8.5% of the population were in extreme poverty in the urban areas, the equivalent figure for those in rural areas was 46.1%(World Bank, 2002: 7).

Table 3.1 Indicators of Poverty in Mexico 1989-2000. Share of the Population in Extreme and Moderate Poverty in Mexico (%)

Extreme Poverty[9]						
	1989	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Urban	18.1	16.8	10.9	18.2	16.3	8.5
Rural	41.4	44.7	49.8	60.5	57.0	46.1
National	27.0	24.4	21.5	29.7	27.3	18.0
Extreme and Moderate Poverty						
	1989	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Urban	50.7	49.1	40.6	53.2	49.1	36.3
Rural	69.3	73.3	78.8	84.8	82.1	73.3
National	57.8	55.7	51.0	61.9	58.7	45.7

Source: World Bank, 2002

Critics of the Mexican Government and the WB have focused on the methodology used for measuring poverty, challenging the reliability of the data and accusing them of conveying a false impression as regards the extent of poverty reduction. According to an evaluation done by Cortés et al. (2007),the central question is on the definition of poverty and its measurement. Based on those different categories of poverty classification, poverty alleviation

[9] World Bank staff estimates based on the ENIGH surveys. The poverty measures are based on a comparison of total per capita current consumption (not adjusted to the national accounts) with poverty lines representing the cost of basic needs and computed following the INEGI/CEPAL method.

programmes designed by the WB are focused on food poverty only, without taking into account capabilities and patrimonial poverty, thereby making it possible to assert that there was a decrease in poverty levels. Moreover, the cycle of poverty produced by lack of educational capabilities and infrastructure are not addressed by the programmes.

Subsequent reports, such as the CAS for Mexico in 2004, have underlined the need to create at least 1.5 million new jobs per year and contrasted this with the lack of employment opportunities. The report also raises the issue of migration in relation to poverty alleviation challenges. Migration here is still seen as a safety valve for poverty. Also, the remittances were, in this report, considered as an important determinant of development:

"Migration to cities and abroad will continue to be a major route out of poverty for some areas; continued efforts to develop a more efficient formal system to reduce the cost of remittances and make them more transparent, as well as measures to facilitate rural financial services, would harness the development potential in worker remittances" (World Bank, 2004: 10)

The CAS 2004 also highlighted the country's agricultural problems, the lack of competitiveness of the Mexican industry, and questions of health and education (though its main concern was with the environmental issues affecting Mexico). It did not explore the link between these problems and the high rates of migration (aside from the increased attention given to remittances). While it might have been expected that such an important economic and social issue would have been addressed in the CAS reports, migration was not integrated into the heart of the Bank's analysis of the country's economic problems.

The Bank has supported Mexico's efforts to increase trade as a motor for development in the Southern Mexico and Central American Countries, a source of increasing migration flows towards the "North". Research documents released by the WB emphasise the need for economic policies for Southern Mexico, where the levels of poverty are seen as related to their growing migration rates (Wodon et al., 2000). However, despite highlighting the lack of human capital, infrastructure, health services and the extreme poverty being suffered by this population, the Bank emphasises an economic policy based on

trade and the development of transport infrastructure. However it is debateable whether such a policy addresses the problems facing such economically backward regions which are unable to attain market competitiveness.

3.4 Changing Perceptions of Migration and Development

The shift to the inclusion of remittances as tool of development in the mainstream worldwide spheres was established in the Monterrey Consensus on Financing Development as the Agreements from the UN International Conference on Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. While the main conclusion is that financial aid for development will continue to provide the main mechanism for reducing poverty and hence migration, there was increasing attention paid to the role of migrants' remittances as a factor which can facilitate development and thereby stem migration. From this point, the question addressed by such organisations has been how to channel remittances effectively so that they benefit the productive sector instead of solely goods consumption. The Monterrey consensus called for mechanisms "to reduce the transfer cost of migrant workers´ remittances and create opportunities for development-oriented investments, including housing" (United Nations, 2002c: 8).

Along with the United Nations, the Institute of Migration (IOM) also highlighted the relative absence of international migration on the development agenda. The IOM's Peter Schatzer (2005) has emphasised the need to bring up the migration issue in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Common Country Assessments and Country Strategy Papers, suggesting that remittances should complement rather than replace Official Development Aid (ODA) with the latter being used as a key tool for poverty reduction (Schatzer, 2005).

In this section, we consider the changing stance of international organisations such as the Bank on the relationship between migration and development. Initially the Country Assessment Strategy, the diagnosis and guidelines which the WB Group agreed with national Governments, did not explicitly mention migration as an issue, even though they focused on poverty

and unemployment factors which are considered by many neo-classical authors to be linked to the migration phenomenon. In the previous CAS for Mexico (2002-2005), there was no clear link between migration and development; instead, projects such as the PPP were highlighted and supported in collaboration with the IADB “to expand integration to the south as a way to fight poverty in both Mexico and Central America” (World Bank, 2002: 40). Overall, the emphasis of the programme was on addressing the regional development differences between the North and the South. Still, in the same document, remittances were mentioned as part of a strategy to promote micro and small business funded with migrants’ savings along with subnational and state government in a joint programme with the World Bank. In the CAS 2005-2008 for Mexico, however, the link between migration and development is more explicit. The report identified poverty as a cause of urban and international migration, and considered remittances as a source of development. It noted that programmes to expand labour incomes are being addressed in different sectors, formal and informal and agricultural and non-agricultural. Improving competitiveness by offering better quality infrastructure and financial services to small firms, regulatory reform to reduce costs of doing business and technical assistance to micro and small enterprises were also seen as ways of boosting job creation. In an effort to connect remittances with development, the CAS also recommended improvements and cost reductions in the provision of rural financial services, a reform which would also make such transactions more transparent (it has been said that laundered drug money has been mixed with remittances) (World Bank, 2004).

Why did the WB come to recognise that migration was a consequence of poverty, and needed to be alleviated through specific programmes? It seems that there was a greater political willingness for cooperation between the Bank and the Mexican government. However, it may also have been part of a wider change in attitudes in international organisations. As noted, the United Nations was also emphasising the relationship between migration and development and

stressed the importance of poverty-reduction programmes (UN General Assembly, 2006b; UN General Assembly, 2006a). [10]

By contrast, in the case of Morocco, even if it is recognised that there are social and economic inequalities between and within the urban and rural areas, migration was not recognised as a consequence of these inequalities and there were no programmes to address development specifically using remittances. Taking into account the changing treatment of the issue by the WB and the IADB in the case of Mexico, the EUROMED still lacked a strategy to channel the investments produced by remittances. Nevertheless, the benefits of such funds were clear for the Moroccan government, insofar as they helped to limit the country's balance of payments problems.

The importance of remittances at the macroeconomic level is stressed in the recent Country Assistance Strategies for Mexico and Morocco. Mexico relies on remittances – along with oil revenues – to maintain macroeconomic stability as they reduce the country's external deficit. In the case of Morocco, remittances accounted for nearly $3.4 billion in 2001, representing almost 9% of its GDP, compared with tourist receipts which account for 7.4% (World Bank, 2005: 3). Moroccan migrants are participating in their home country's economy by helping their government to tackle the current account deficit. It has been said that remittances are not considered highly productive since they are not invested in productive activities but in consumer goods, festivities or, in the best cases, agriculture. Yet it is also clear that such investments have benefited other sectors, such as construction, and thereby have stimulated development to some extent (Boughba-Hagbe, 2004).

[10] In this sense, Schatzer (2005) emphasises the need to bring up the migration issue in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Common Country Assessments as well as in the Country Strategy Papers, although he suggests not replacing official development aid with remittances while applying the latter as a key tool for poverty reduction. Conference paper "Migration and the Millennium Development Goals" presented by Peter Schatzer Director, Regional Office for the Mediterranean, International Organization for Migration, Conference 1st International Conference on Migrations and Development Madrid, 30th November 2005.

3.5 Conclusion

The definition of development in terms of international financial institutions focuses on the goal of poverty reduction. Migration as a development issue was for a long time excluded from the analysis given the assumption that the poorest were the most likely to remain in their countries because of the lack of financial and network resources to migrate. As was analysed in this chapter, economic reforms such as trade liberalisation were regarded as the principal drivers of development, in the process contributing to poverty reduction. Since poverty was not linked to migration according to the institutional and academic neo-liberal development approach, inequalities shown by the gap between the highest concentration of wealth and the extreme poverty levels in both rural and urban areas were not considered to be significant causes of migration. The assumption that migration and development were not related was called into question by the emergence of remittances as both a factor of development and a financial resource to support would-be migrants' travel costs. The link between migration and development started to emerge as a topic in the worldwide financial institutions.

Over time the WB Strategic Assessments for Mexico and (and to a lesser extent) Morocco analysed in this chapter show a shift in the goals addressing poverty and the emergence of remittances as a development-driving factor. Even though trade liberalisation is still regarded as the main mechanism for development, the factors involved in the migration are now considered as part of the financial instruments to reduce poverty. The inclusion of remittances in their analysis marked a new phase in the migration-development debate. Development in the sending regions as a factor to halt an emigration pattern is now seen as feasible based on international financial institutions' cooperation with sending countries.

Unemployment in both rural and urban sectors rather than solely poverty needs to be at the centre of the development-migration nexus debate. The cases of Mexico and Morocco have shown an important change in terms of their economic policies; however, it is the lack of opportunities for their young population which continues to be a factor for emigration. The changes in the

profiles of their migrants show a more expanded phenomenon in both countries. Trade liberalisation is only helping to increase the inequalities and dislocate the labour force at the regional level. The question that needs to be tackled is how to create jobs for the 20% of the Moroccan population - mainly male under 25 year olds in Morocco, who are seeking employment (World Bank, 2001: 4). It should also tackle the consequences of agricultural fields abandoned by their owner, who migrate to urban areas and abroad to escape from poverty.

Economic as well as political cooperation is central to the design of mechanisms to reduce the emigration pressure. Thus, the willingness of international institutions to expand the financial benefits of remittances requires the involvement of migratory policies harmonised with the economic goals. The next chapter analyses the limits and opportunities for achieving such economic and political cooperation on the migration-development issue at the regional level.

CHAPTER 4 REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS AFFECTING THE MIGRATION DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: NAFTA-PPP AND EUROMED-MEDA.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes and analyses the regional frameworks in North America and the Euro-Mediterranean as they impact upon trade, development and migration issues. In each region, there is mix of programmes which aim to facilitate economic integration and foster development. The chapter compares NAFTA and EUROMED as Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) designed to facilitate trade, examining their origins and institutional arrangements and the PPP and MEDA as the principal development projects which emerged either as part of or as complementary to those RIAs. In the course of this analysis, we highlight how these trade and development arrangements impacted upon migration, whether directly or indirectly. While their principal objectives were trade-oriented, they had consequences for migration.

Given our interest in understanding the regional aspect of the migration-development nexus, particular attention is paid to the development aspects of these regional frameworks. The main assumption in this chapter is that both the MEDA and the PPP share the goal of carrying out a development programme based upon an open market-oriented policy (European Commission 2001; Gobierno de México, 2001). The financial provisions of the agreements have been designed principally to support the infrastructure required to increase the exchange of goods and capital, which would arise from the construction of a free trade area, and to alleviate the imbalances created in the short term by the economic transition. The MEDA envisages the construction of highways and port improvements in Morocco while, the PPP also proposes the construction of a Mexico-Central America transborder highway (Union Européenne, 2003; Inter-American Bank of Development (IABD), 2003b). While the question of the link between development and migration receives relatively little official attention in the agreements, other policy documents and statements of regional leaders indicate a concern to promote development as the means to stem migration.

Moreover, in both cases there is an attempt to cooperate with sending countries on migration control: both projects assume that trade will deter migration in the long run, but in the short term, cooperation on migratory control instruments is required.

After a brief review of the way in which trade and migration issues have been debated in the regional integration literature, the chapter is divided in two main sections, each one addressing the broader regional integration framework and the associated development programme: the NAFTA and PPP and the EUROMED and MEDA. In each case, I outline the main characteristics of the regional integration framework and discuss the way in which migration has or has not been a part of those agreements. I then examine the associated programmes for economic development, noting their institutional origins and achievements and the way in which they integrate the regional migration issue. While both the PPP and MEDA were primarily envisaged as mechanisms to expand trade, they have, to some extent, evolved into mechanisms for dealing with migration control.

Indeed, in each case the evolution of the trade and development agreements in each region has been matched by the emergence of regional migratory regimes which are arguably at odds with the principles of trade openness and regional integration. I focus on the fact that policies of migration control have emerged in both the North American and Euro-Mediterranean contexts. Over time, and given the growing impact of migration, a range of dialogues and contacts have developed which have created a framework in which migration is discussed between sending and receiving countries in both regions. However, the focus for such regimes has been largely on migration control, a tendency reinforced by increasing security concerns. Yet the emphasis in these policies on strengthening security at the borders interferes with the much-sought smooth transit of goods and capital and arguably contradicts the development goals of integration. Migration issues are seen primarily as security rather than economic issues and in the process the relationship between migration and development has been to some extent marginalised.

4.2 Regional Agreements: The neoliberal paradigm of development and migration

Although migration is often a characteristic of regional economic interaction, intrinsically linked to questions of trade and investment, most Regional International Agreements (RIA) have "dealt with movements of capital and labour asymmetrically" (Serra and Stiglitz, 2008: 60). In the cases examined in this chapter, migration was only an implicit or at most, an indirect consideration: neither NAFTA nor the EUROMED directly addressed free movement of labour as part of their agenda. Instead, such issues have arisen in an array of venues and agreements between the participating states. Amongst the members of NAFTA, aside from an agreement for the free movement of specific high-skilled professionals, the migration issue has mainly been addressed in collateral agreements linked to security or economic dimensions. In the case of the EUROMED, the Association Agreement for trade liberalisation with Morocco identifies border control, readmission and regional security as being predominant concerns.

NAFTA and EUROMED are at the heart of wider interdependent regional relationships which address migration as well as trade. According to integration theory, it can be argued that regional integration is the logical consequence of shared borders and increased trade (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Bustamante et al., 1992; Morata, 1997). Both Mexico and Morocco have experienced an increase in this economic interdependence with their corresponding neighbours. In 2004, 65% of Morocco's imports came from the EU, while 70% of the Moroccan exports go to EU (European Commission, 2002b). Mexico has increased its commercial exchange with the US and Canada after signing NAFTA, with the US remaining its most important trade partner: 54% of Mexico's imports come from US while 86% of its exports go to the US (Secretaría de Economía, 2005).

It might be argued that such economic interdependence is equally reflected in immigration rates and the transfer of remittances. Yet attempts to exploit the benefits of geographical closeness between regional partners seem to focus on the flow of capital and goods, whereas migration flows are seen

more in geopolitical terms. Along with drug trafficking, migration became a source of tension in both regional relationships and in recent years, there have been further complications due to concerns about terrorism and security. Thus, the regional context has to take into account both economic aspects of trade and integration on the one side and political issues of stability and security on the other. Increasingly, therefore, the regional treatment of migration has focused on the control of borders and restrictions on migration.

4.2.1 The Neo-Classical Approach to Development and Migration.

As noted, the Washington Consensus centred on the need for economic reforms which included domestic and international liberalisation. Shifting away from protectionism to free trade was of particular importance. Such an objective of course had implications for migration. The neo-classical migration theory assumes the existence of income disparities between host and sending countries (Todaro, 1986). At the micro level, maximising income is the migrant's main motivation. It is a rational decision, selected from a range of options which offers an optimisation of the potential migrant's capabilities as reflected in a higher wage in a more productive regional market (Borjas, 1989a; Borjas and Ramey, 1993). From a macro perspective, the neoclassical approach assumes that wage differences between countries will lead to competition between the non-skilled in the immigrant and the native workforces, where the former gains an advantage on the basis of lower wages than the latter one. Hence, a continuing deterioration of wages affects the less skilled and economically vulnerable workers in the receiving country (Briggs, 1999: 8). Therefore, slowing down immigration should be the priority for the host country's migratory policy. [1] On this basis, one motivation for policy makers to adopt trade agreements would be to pre-empt an influx of migrants from poor neighbours (Briggs, 1999: 7). Along with the global financial institutions, regional agreements such as NAFTA and the EUROMED have been a focus for a free trade based programme of cooperation for development.

[1] See the debate and articles presented by the CIS research group based in Washington, DC, a conservative public think tank advocating restrictive US immigration policies. www.cis.org.

Different economic perspectives have considered the role of trade as a substitute (Taylor et al., 1996; Johansson de Silva and Silva Jáuregui, 2004; Taylor, 2006: 14) or perhaps a complement to migration (Tapinos, 2002; Martin, 2003b: 11) and these views have influenced mainstream economic policies. The goal of a free trade policy is to improve the population's overall welfare (Friedman et al., 2007). While there may be transitional costs to trade liberalisation, as labour is dislocated from protected sectors and firms adjust to tougher competition, this view considers that over the medium term, employment gains are achieved, and unemployment rates fall. Thus, GDP growth expands and the benefits of trade liberalisation are spread throughout society (See Papageorgiou et al., 1991). Wages in open economies are higher than in others, it is claimed, due to the access to – and more aggressive adoption of – new technologies as well as to the demand for higher skill levels in the labour force. New jobs being created in economies that are more open tend to be "good" in the sense of demanding more of workers in terms of human capital (International Labor Organization (ILO), 2001: 6). However, the benefits from the liberalisation of the markets between asymmetrical economies, as in the case of NAFTA, could harm those sectors with less technological adjustment capability. Research on NAFTA's impact raises doubts about the benefits of liberalisation given the fact that Mexico's expected rates of employment were not accomplished, leading to an increase in migration (Bean and Lowell, 2004). Moreover, the agricultural sector was one of the most affected after the liberalisation of the markets, increasing the poverty in the rural Mexico which is the source of 44% of the Mexican emigration to the US (Burstein, 2007: 9).

North Africa has followed a similar pathway to solve its economic problems (Cogneau and Tapinos, 1995). Development policy was based upon the liberalisation of the market, with the aim of "combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states" (European Union, 2000: 9). The EUROMED as a RIA, served as a platform for achieving political as well as economic and financial goals within the region.

These regional agreements consolidated a process of liberalisation which had already begun. In the case of Mexico, there had been an earlier move to liberalise as demonstrated by its accession to the GATT in 1986 (del Castillo Vera 1987). In the case of Morocco, a liberalisation of its market was initiated in 1983 by the Structural Adjustment Programme followed by its accession to the GATT in 1987 and continued with the Additional Protocols signed with the EU in 1998 which was antedated by the Cooperation Agreement from 1976. A trade agreement with the EU was signed in 1988 as a short-term instrument to foster market liberalisation (Escribano, 1994; Royaume du Maroc, 1997).

Despite the increased trade liberalisation, it is evident that the forecast benefits for Morocco and Mexico were not achieved. Overall, the results from a decade of NAFTA in the case of Mexico should have included a reduction in poverty and unemployment. However, so far these economic conditions have not been met (Weintraub, 2004a). The economic growth produced by this trade agreement is negatively correlated to the increasing poverty rate; instead, greater socioeconomic inequalities were the consequence of neoliberal policy (Scott, 2004). Therefore, the anticipated reduction in the immigration rate was not realised given the demographic pressure, the structural reforms in the economy, and the vulnerability and non-competitiveness of unprotected sectors facing market liberalisation.

By the same logic, the Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco was expected to foster economic growth and financial structural changes which could diminish migration flows from this country. Nevertheless, the benefits of this Trade Agreement are already in question given the unequal terms of exchange between the two partners. Moreover, the diagnosed negative impact from an economic liberalisation of markets, was supposed to be alleviated by additional funds in the form of European aid to Morocco to cope with structural changes.

Nevertheless, one could argue that a neo-liberal export-led policy would lead to poverty reduction as a result of increased trade. An abundant and cheap labour force would constitute a competitive advantage in this trade-driven approach (an expectation which the Mexican government shared) (Szekély,

2003: 3). Investment in developing countries should be directed towards boosting exports. From this perspective, the cases of Southern Mexico and Northern Morocco could be regarded as trade zones which require development through economic policies that increase international trade.

In any case, it might be argued that the political benefits have proved to be more tangible than the economic ones. From a political dimension, RIA can play a more inclusive role of positively influencing the relationships between member states, since they promote a more intensive communication. This is based on the idea that trade can lead to an increase in the institutional and informal interaction among policy makers. Therefore, the fact of being member of a RIA can create trust in the relationship between sending and hosting countries which could be a useful element to reach cooperation in the migration management field.

4.3 NAFTA: Trade liberalisation, cooperation and the migration Issue

NAFTA was the result of an approach from President Salinas de Gortari seeking to expand trade with its North American neighbours. It was part of an on-going process of regional integration established by the US and Canada FTA in 1988. NAFTA was designed to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers between the three member countries, thereby facilitating trade and investment and, ultimately economic development. The agreement was portrayed within Mexico as the country's best option, promoting trade liberalisation and foreign investment and leading to increased employment and reduced emigration (López and Schiff, 1995). US policy makers broadly supported the proposal with the US Congress approving a fast-track process to secure the agreement, despite opposition from labour unions, agricultural organisations, and NGOs. Fears in both countries about the negative consequences for employment in vulnerable sectors were marginalised by claims about the overall benefits of the Agreement, notably the expected reduction of immigrants from Mexico. After a decade of NAFTA, however, it is possible to conclude that the positive predictions were not correct (at least for Mexico): employment growth did not

improve to the extent that was expected, wage disparities increased and emigration continued (Bean and Lowell, 2004).

Even before these agreements were signed, however, the North American region had long been characterised by a high degree of economic integration (Weintraub, 1998: 169). Indeed, it could be said that a borderless economy had been taking shape in the region prior to NAFTA. In the mid-eighties, the population in the Northern Mexican border towns increased abruptly due to a growing inland migration towards the "prosperous" border, mostly attracted by the employment opportunities in the maquiladora export zones located in the area straddling the US-Mexican border (Hilker et al., 1989; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001; Martin, 2001). The Mexican government's economic policy envisaged that these labour intensive assembly activities would become the pivot for economic growth that could help to absorb an expanding labour force. The establishment of the maquiladora along the Northern Mexican border drew upon a cheap labour force, absorbing the migration coming from other parts of Mexico. However, the maquiladora's capacity to absorb internal migration had limited results and was unable to halt Mexican emigration (Martin, 2001: 95).

The pattern of interdependence created by this integration can be seen in the case of the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo border area. It accounts for most of the US-Mexican trade that passes through Texas (the state's overall share is 38% of total trade between the two countries)(1999 figures) (Papademetriou and Meyers, 2001).[2] Hagan and Rodriguez (2001) identify four levels of economic activity in the integration of the border economy. The most visible is trade of manufactured goods coming from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo where 1.6 million loaded trucks crossed the border in 1999 (Hagan and Rodriguez, 2001: 98). Another level of interdependence is created by the maquiladoras located in Nuevo Laredo which have office, distribution, or manufacturing facilities in Laredo. There are also businesses in Laredo that import low-to moderately priced merchandise from Asian countries to sell to Mexican customers who then

[2] See details on border towns engaged in active transnational trade. http: //www.businesssouthtexas.com/stories/story-0708c.htm.

resell merchandise in Mexico. A fourth level of economic interdependence consists of those involved in a wide range of informal economic activities between the two cities such as the selling of used clothing to Mexican vendors in Laredo, and the daily crossing from Nuevo Laredo into Laredo to work in construction and domestic service.

The expansion of the economy in the border cities had a variety of cultural, social, environmental and economic consequences. The increase in trade was matched by greater interaction in a variety of settings at different levels (Ganster, 1998). Indeed, following the signing of NAFTA there has been a proliferation of interactions amongst political, social, and economic actors (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001). The NAFTA negotiations had themselves accelerated transnational cooperation among non-governmental organisations which led to the inclusion of a side agreement on environment (Hogenboom, 1996). Changes in the border region have been intensified as a result of an internal migration with people seeking a better life in these relatively prosperous cities. Their rapidly growing and increasingly diverse population present environmental and urban planning challenges in the cities themselves and the border regions more generally. These challenges are sources of conflict and cooperation amongst the authorities on both sides of the border. Thus economic interdependence is reflected in more intensive interaction at the various levels of government.

4.3.1 The mechanisms and institutions of NAFTA

In other respects, the process of integration resulted in greater political interdependence and a variety of frameworks for cooperation. NAFTA itself is relatively uninstitutionalised. While there is a small Secretariat to coordinate activities between the states, it is not equivalent to the EU's European Commission; instead, the main mechanism is bilateral and trilateral meetings of national officials. Such institutions as exist – for example the NADBank and the Dispute Settlement procedure – are quite limited in their scope. However, whereas there is very little in the way of a formal structure there is an extensive network of other arrangements. NAFTA has favoured the multiplication and strengthening of channels of communication, both institutional and non-

institutional which have sought to address a variety of common problems such as the environment and labour. A striking early example of this interdependence was the financial assistance from the Clinton administration following the 1994 Tequila effect, as was the Clinton-Zedillo initiative for a “New Border Vision”, a binational programme that would transform the border into a model” of bilateral cooperation (US General Accounting Office, 1999: 3).

Table 4.1 shows the different instruments developed within the NAFTA framework. The main institutions of NAFTA are the Commission created in by the NAFTA side agreements on environment and labour. The central institution is the Commission of Free Trade jointly with the NAFTA Secretariat and working groups that were created to carried out the NAFTA’s implementation (Storrs, 2005).

4.3.2 Regional Cooperation on the migration issue: from trade liberalisation to security

There is a contrast between the economic dynamism at the border and increased restrictions on migration from the South. These concerns were reflected within the NAFTA’s negotiation process, especially those regarding the environmental and migration field. Free movement of labour was largely outside the NAFTA’s scope aside from an agreement to establish a “NAFTA visa” to facilitate the exchange of certain high-skilled professional migrants. More generally, however, and in contrast to other policy areas such as the environment, the fact that Mexico and the US shared a border did not guarantee cooperation on managing migration beyond the issue of border control (where the increasing number of Central American refugees as well as low-skilled Mexican workers presented a growing political problem). For example, the Conference of Border Governors, a long-standing bilateral forum, has not in the past addressed the issue (these bilateral issues are discussed further in chapter 5).

Regional cooperation on migration issues increased after 9/11 with security concerns increasingly informing the management and control of

migration. The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)[3] revives the trilateral relationship among NAFTA's members, centring its agenda on security and trade issues. In March 23rd 2005, the Prime Minister of Canada Paul Martin, US President George W. Bush, and the Mexican President Vicente Fox signed this treaty in Waco, Texas. The state's executive-level offices from the three member countries were appointed to coordinate nine Ministries (three for each country) to follow up the trilateral agenda (Governments of US Mexico and Canada, 2005).

Two main objectives are sustaining the regional agreement: economic development and trade, and regional security. It was under the Fox and Bush administrations when Mexico was called to secure borders against terrorism as a matter of bilateral cooperation as well as an issue to remove obstacles to regional trade provoked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2005). An evaluation of the results of SPP's first phase would centre primarily on its role in encouraging bilateral cooperation on security rather than its role in enhancing NAFTA's prosperity.

4.3.3 The Impact of NAFTA on the Mexican Economy and Migration

There is an extensive literature on the effects of NAFTA on the Mexican economy and regional integration, highlighting positive and negative effects. From a positive perspective, some studies show an increase in trade between member countries, particularly in terms of the growth of Mexican exports to the US. Weintraub explains that NAFTA followed a unilateral move by the Mexican government to open up its markets and that this delivered benefits in terms of direct and portfolio investment and of Mexico's GDP (Weintraub, 1998).

[3] In Spanish : Alianza para la Seguridad y Prosperidad de América del Norte (ASPAN)

Table 4-1 Institutional Dimensions of NAFTA

Trilateral US–Mexico-Canada Summits	NAFTA Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) Free Trade Commission (FTC) NAFTA Working Groups and Committees Committee on Trade in Goods Committee on Trade in Worn Clothing Working Group on Rules of Origin Customs Subgroup Committee on Agricultural Trade Working Group on Agricultural Grading and Marketing Standards Working Group on Agricultural Subsidies Advisory Committee on Private International Disputes regarding Agricultural Goods Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: SPS Technical Working Group on Animal Health SPS Technical Working Group on Plant Health SPS Technical Working Group on Dairy, Fruits, Vegetables and Processed Foods SPS Technical Working Group on Meat, Poultry and Egg Inspection SPS Technical Working Group on Pesticides SPS Technical Working Group on Food Additives and Contaminants SPS Technical Working Group on Fish and Fishery Products SPS Technical Working Group on Veterinary Drugs and Food Working Group on Emergency Action Committee on Standards Related Measures Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee and its various working groups: Driver and Vehicle Standards Vehicle Weights and Dimensions Traffic Control Devices Rail Safety Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Transportation Telecommunications Standards Subcommittee Automotive Standards Council Subcommittee on Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods Working Group on Government Procurement and Small Business Investment and Services Working Group Financial Services Committee Working Group on Trade and Competition Temporary Entry Working Group Chapter Nineteen Operation Working Group Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) North American Leaders Summits ASPAN North American Security and Prosperity Partnership Initiative (SSP)

Source: NAFTA webpage. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexican Government.

From the same positive perspective, there are studies claiming the positive effects of NAFTA by comparing the differential impact at the regional level in Mexico that explain the backwardness of Southern Mexico due to its lack of global market integration (Wodon et al., 2000). Less positively, Pastor et al.(2005b) examine the increase of total Mexican exports from $51 billion in 1993 to $166 billion in 2000 (Pastor, et al.2005b: 9). The outcome is explained by the greater access to the North American market and partially to the maquiladora participation in the exports. Moreover, according to their estimates, there was an increase in non-maquila exports from $30 billion to $86 billion in the same period. In contrast to the conventional view that the export-led maquiladora have been a driver of economic growth, Pastor et al. consider its contribution is less important compared to the non-maquiladora industry given that 85% of the growth in exports was based in different sectors(Pastor et al., 2005a: 15). Taking into account that the maquiladora imports most of the assembling parts to export the final product, they calculate that maquila value-added increased from under $4 billion in 1990 to $18 billion in 2000(Pastor et al., 2005a: 16). Despite a positive trade balance, Pastor et al. argue that the rate of economic growth is not sufficient to close the development gap with its fellow NAFTA members. Further criticism regards the link between migration and development in Mexico as a vicious circle created by neoliberal policies. According to Raul Delgado Wise, emigration to the US increased to a major degree after the signing of NAFTA. The model of development since then has been the exportation of labour to the US in exchange for remittances to balance macroeconomic levels[4].

Whether the findings were positive or negative, analyses of NAFTA have highlighted migration as a central issue. From a pessimistic perspective, migration is expected to continue for as long as there is no real attempt in Mexico to develop a framework which could tackle the unemployment and socio-economic and regional inequalities which have increased since NAFTA entered into force (Pastor et al., 2005a: 16). Audley et al., consider how far

[4] Conference “Migración y desarrollo: lecciones de la experiencia mexicana” held at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, June 16, 2008.

NAFTA has been responsible for the increase on migration. They argue that "historical migration patterns, the peso crisis, and the pull of employment opportunities in the US provide better explanations for the increase in migration than NAFTA itself" (Audley et al., 2004: 7). Even so, they consider that inequalities at the levels of regional output, household income and the wages of skilled and unskilled workers increased as a result of increased trade. Highlighting similar effects, Pastor proposes to close the development gap between Mexico and the United States by following the example of the European Union's system of Structural Funds support for poorer regions (Pastor, 2005).

4.4 The Plan Puebla Panamá (PPP)

Nonetheless, it was clear that the mainstream view of NAFTA was broadly positive. Indeed, its apparent success triggered interest in expanding the scope of free trade in the region. In 2003, the US began negotiations on the development of the Central American Free Trade Agreement. From a Mexican perspective, the poor economic conditions in the South of its country and the potential for exploiting its natural resources provided a justification for extending trade-based integration and providing financial aid to develop its infrastructure as a support for such integration (Dávila et al., 2002). However the prospect of closer integration also raised questions of regional migration and security. Investment in infrastructure and communications would facilitate not only the movement of goods but also the migration of labour and illegal commodities. Thus, the PPP replicates the Northern border paradigm of increasing trade relations, reproducing it at the Southern border with consequences for international migration and regional security.

The Mexican National Development Plan presented at the Executive Level in 2000 emphasised a policy of regional development to address the country's regional inequalities (Gobierno de México, 2001). Those regional disparities were starkest in the contrast between, on the one hand, Northern Mexico - which represents the most integrated and well-developed industrial region, politically supportive of President Fox's policies - and, on the other hand, the

Southern region which was poorer and politically more diverse and even antagonistic to the centre-right government.

In this period, moreover, there was an overriding political consideration which motivated investment in Southern Mexico: the Chiapas revolt and the Zapatista movement were regarded as a political threat to be tackled economically and politically. The region was also important as a trade as well as a migratory pathway. These political and economic factors raised the importance of addressing the development problems of the Southern region of Mexico after many years of the conflict, starting in 1994, and the subsequent pacification process.

The origins of the PPP can be traced back to the Tuxtla Summit of Mexican and Central American governments, held in El Salvador in 2001. The Joint Declaration of the Summit of the member countries of the Tuxtla Dialogue and Coordination Mechanism was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Panamá, Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Accordingly, the PPP was regarded as a key element of the Mesoamerican Sustainable Development Initiative (IMDS) (Declaración Conjunta de la Cumbre Extraordinaria de los Países Integrantes del Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla, 2001). The main objective was to coordinate and finance regional projects in the areas of sustainable development, human development, energy inter-connection, trade facilitation, the prevention and mitigation of disasters, and the integration of roads and telecommunication systems. The regional agreement focused on the development of Southern Mexico and Central America, given their similar economic background, and was based on the assumption that more communication infrastructure would increase trade which would foster integration and in the process deliver development (President Vicente Fox, 2001).

The sources of the region's underdevelopment are contested. According to one researcher in the IADB, "the backward stage in the Southern Mexico can be explained by the lack of infrastructure. Its indicators show a deficiency in the quality of institutions' performance as well as (in the) level of violence and corruption, whereas the North has the advantage of closeness and

infrastructure allows it to integrate easily to the US. Therefore, a FTA does not bring automatically the benefits to the signing countries; it should come along with a series of internal policies". [5] An alternative explanation for this "backwardness" is given by other scholars who consider that Southern Mexico and Central America have remained in a post-colonial regime where most productive sectors –particularly natural resources - are held by a monopolistic group (Bartra, 2001). Land distribution is still an issue between government and the indigenous population. The lack of democratic institutions and equal representation for indigenous groups has created a governmental administration with little legitimacy and unable or unwilling to manage equitably an infrastructure-led economic policy. Civil turmoil, moreover, has prevented government from taking control over local resources, thereby undermining the injection of further investment. According to interviewed Mexican officials, the lack of political consensus among the different political actors, rather than the lack of resources to boost development in the Southern states, has been the main factor inhibiting economic growth and possibly contributing to emigration. Local autonomous indigenous governments claim that the problem lies in the lack of political spaces in which to negotiate with central and state authorities.

Organisationally, the IADB has acted as the financial and technical institution where the guidelines for the PPP's economic policies are designed and implemented. This is a complex process; the participating actors are not only the institutions, but also the technical and political representatives of the countries. As a political process, it involves different levels of governmental institutions from member countries leading to constant discussion on how to implement the economic plan. To the extent that NGOs were involved in consultations over the Plan, they conflicted with the government (Villafuerte Solís, 2002). [6] According to the interview given by Gabriela Rangel,

[5] Interview with Ernesto Lopez, IADB. Washington, DC

[6] See the Americas Program´s notes on cross-border citizens' demonstrations and NGOs challenging the Plan Puebla-Panamá.http://americas.irc-online.org/citizen-action/series/02-ppp.html.

representative from REMALC, [7] the Mexican NGOs were opposed to the economic and political orientation of the PPP.[8] They saw it as being shaped by the so-called “neoliberal” Fox administration and reflected US policies in the region. In addition to this general hostility, there were specific local social movements halting projects developed by the central and local administrations. Given its difficulties, therefore, the PPP was primarily pursued by Mexico in a less visible way through local programmes rather than as a high profile project.

The economic and political objectives of governments were largely shared (and shaped) by the main international organisations such as the WB. From the perspective of a technical advisor in the lending branch of the IADB, it is responding to the proposals of the member countries in developing the PPP. The IADB does not impose an economic plan, but reacts to the credit needs identified by the partner countries.[9] From his point of view, migration was not an issue in the working meetings held in the IADB's Washington Office.

An Advisor to the Sub-Secretary of Latin American Foreign Affairs from the Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Office argued that the PPP was a Mexican initiative based on obtaining "a financial instrument of the Tuxtla Agreement[10] in order to boost the economy in the Central American Countries”.[11] In order to promote their integration, and the integration and development of the South of Mexico, there needed to be greater investment in infrastructure. To pursue this,

[7] Interview. México, DF, 2004. REMALC represents the following NGOs Asociación Latinoamericana de Micro, Pequeños y Medianos Empresarios (ALAMPYME) Centro de Acción Laboral y Asesoría Sindical (CILAS), Centro de Apoyo Comunitario Trabajando Unidos (CACTUS), Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria (CIEPAC) Centro de Derechos Humanos Tepeyac del Istmo de Tehuantepec A. C. (CDH Tepeyac), Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social A.C.(CENCOS), Colectivo Bia´lii, Asesoría e Investigación, A.C, Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco (CEJ) , DECA Equipo Pueblo, A.C. (Equipo Pueblo), FIAN México, A.C., Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), Frente Democrático Campesino (FDC) , Mujer y Medio Ambiente, Otros Mundos, A.C., Red Nacional Género y Economía (REDGE), Sindicato Democrático de Trabajadores de Pesca y Acuacultura de la SAGARPA.

[8] According to Onésimo Hidalgo from CIEPAC, their acitivities in Chiapas were jointly agreed by the organizations integrating REMALC. The opposition to the PPP was regionally organised by every NGO and focused in specific projects at the local level. Interview with Onésimo Hidalgo, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas. September, 2006.

[9] Interview with Alejandra Vallejo, IADB, Washington., DC.

[10] Officially named The Dialogue and Consensus Mechanism of Tuxtla. (Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla in Spanish).

[11] Interview to the Advisor to the Sub-secretary of Latin American Foreign Affairs. Mexico City, June 2005.

President Fox as President of Mexico invited the Central American countries to engage in a joint effort to facilitate economic integration which could promote investment and trade (Ruiz, 2004).

4.4.1 The Plan Puebla Panamá as a mechanism of the Mexican Foreign Policy.

In addition, the PPP needs to be seen in terms of the Mexican government's diplomatic goal of increasing political and economic closeness with its North American Partners. For example, the expansion of the free trade zone towards South America was an American foreign policy priority, along with Security in the Western Hemisphere, even though the issue had been a point of conflict at recent Summits of the Americas (Torres, 2005).[12] The Mexican government sought to act as the intermediary between the US and South American governments to achieve a political consensus regarding the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA), believing that deeper integration across the region was needed at a time when there were growing concerns about regional security and border control.

The PPP is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The role of the Foreign Ministry is important because, while the PPP lacks an explicit policy towards Southern migration, administratively it is part of the same foreign policy agenda. The migration issue involves several institutions such as the Sub-Secretariat for Central and South American where the PPP is coordinated. According to an advisor to the Sub Secretariat for Central and South America, the PPP is managed in the context of a "continuous and well structured migratory policy towards the Central and South American flows".[13] Coincidentally, Senator Cecilia Romero, President of the Commission for Central and South America (the equivalent of a US Congressional Committee), declared she had an intensive and regular communication with the PPP´s Coordination office in terms of exchanging information on migratory flows and

[12] In the last America Summit, the Mexican President was lobbying to reactivate the negotiations for the Latin America FTA, a project rejected by leading Latin American economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and also Cuba.
http: //www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/131706.html.

[13] Interview with the Advisor to the Subsecretary of Latin America, Ministry of Mexican Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, 2004

international trade. Senator Romero refers to the protection of human rights of migrants in transit from Central South American as one of the main concerns of the Commission of Foreign Affairs at the Senate.[14]

Therefore, while migration was not formally included as an issue in the PPP, it is a long-standing issue on the bilateral agenda between Mexico and Central American countries (Sandoval Palacios, 2001). Moreover, in practice, the issue is considered in high-level meetings of PPP member governments along with such issues as energy privatisation projects and (more recently) security.

4.4.1.1 Objectives and mechanisms of the Plan Puebla Panamá

Accordingly, the PPP pursues a programme of sustainable development as outlined in the Mesoamerican Sustainable Development Initiative (IMDS). The main objective is to coordinate eight main initiatives in the field of financing regional project in the areas of sustainable development, human development, energy inter-connection, trade facilitation, the prevention and mitigation of disasters and the integration of roads and telecommunication systems (Inter-American Bank of Development (IABD), 2003a).

The implementation of the PPP involves local, regional and central governments in the participating countries. Private sector and civil society actors were also to be involved but the rejection of the plan by the latter has undermined this aspect of the PPP's implementation (Velasco Yañez, 2001; Ruiz, 2004). The participating states from Southern Mexico in this development plan are Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, and Guerrero. At the multilateral level, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá and Colombia, are participating countries in the PPP. Given the complex nature of the political coordination between governmental and non- governmental actors, the Mexican government created an Executive Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organisational structure includes: the Presidents' Summit which includes

[14] Interview to Senator Cecilia Romo, member of PAN's political party and President for the Commission of Foreign Affairs, for Central and South America. The Mexican Congress has to approve international agreements. Mexico City, 2004

meetings under the Mechanism of Tuxtla; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commissioners' Conference which meets before the Summit takes place; the Executive Commission which coordinates the PPP through regular meetings, having the Co-Presidency permanently settled in Mexico and a Pro-temporé Presidency rotated among the members countries; and a Executive based in El Salvador (VI Cumbre Ordinaria del Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla, 2004).

According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the financial assistance to the PPP had as a priority to support the regional strategy led by Mexico – the Plan Sur. In 2001, the IADB agreed to finance the Executive Office operations for US$ 1 million annually until 2006, although it was prorogued until 2008. The main reason for supporting this initiative was the IADB´s policy to encourage regional development based on South-South trade (Devlin and Castro, 2002). Thus, the Mexican government's economic and political interests coincided with those pursued by the IADB such as the development of regional markets which requires infrastructure and market access.

The projects covered a wide range of economic sectors at the local and state levels, necessitating coordination between the intra-governmental bodies and the Congress. However, this task was made more complicated by the different political affiliations of the Presidency on the one hand and the subnational authorities on the other.

4.4.2 The Political Dimension of the Plan Puebla Panamá

Responsibility for the PPP has shifted across the Mexican government. Given the foreign and national affairs agenda defined at the start of the Fox Administration, the PPP was initially a project coordinated from the President's Office itself. Given its market–oriented approach, however, the coordination of the PPP was then placed under the charge of the Ministry of Economy, Luis Ernesto Derbez. When Derbez took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coordination of the PPP followed him to his new ministry. The fact that the Coordination of the PPP moved across different Institutions, from the President's Office, then the Economy Ministry, and currently the Foreign Affairs

Ministry, is explained by the involvement of political actors rather than Institutions. The then Foreign Affairs Minister sought to pursue a more active foreign policy. The main priority for the Fox Administration was to improve relations with the US. Since the migration issue was at the top of the political agenda between the US and Mexico, it became an issue within the context of Mexico-Central American relations and the FTAA initiative (Pellerin, 1999a).

However, as noted, programmes such as the PPP risk failure given the lack of consensus among political actors within the country. Mexican NGOs – along with groups in Central America and the US as well as academic experts - have been very critical of plans such as the PPP on the grounds that they were informed by a neoliberal economic model. Ironically, the NGOs were supposed to be an active actor through their participation in consultations on the PPP. Yet, given their opposition to the PPP, these NGOS were effectively excluded from the formal debate in order to prevent an escalation of public opposition to the regional plan (Bartra, 2001). In their view, a neoliberal right-wing government was attempting to eradicate poverty by launching mega projects that were designed to favour transnational exploitation of the vast natural resources in this zone while displacing vulnerable indigenous groups from their traditional settlements and productive activities. As the author Daniel Villafuerte argued in his assessment, the only response from NGOs to this Plan was the “total rejection of the PPP as the new demon for NGOs, the one to combat in order to avoid that souls condemned on earth go straight to hell” (Villafuerte Solís, 2002)

According to one of the main organisations in Mexico opposed to neoliberal economic policy, Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC), the dissemination of information and demonstrations organised by civil society have been the main tactics of protest. These organisations have been able to halt the progress of projects directly affecting local groups. Interviewee Gabriela Rangel, a representative of RMALC, describes the case of a group of “campesinos” that were able to halt construction of a road which had been planned as a part of the Puebla Millennium Plan (part of the PPP); this project required the purchase of agricultural land owned by the local “campesinos”. She also explained how the Zapatista movement in Chiapas and

its support organisations were effectively able to prevent any progress in the construction of infrastructure that could affect ecological reserves, displace the population, or lead to the privatisation of public services. In this sense, one high ranking official was right to indicate the power of the “Zapatistas” to delay “progress” in the South. Overall, therefore, the positions of NGOs involved in development issues in states such as Chiapas have been largely those of opposition and rebellion (though they have also been criticised for not providing alternatives to the PPP).

The political rejection to the PPP by civil society led the Calderon Presidency to rename the programme as the Mesoamerican Plan in 2006. A political strategy was launched to avoid the problems of opposition which emerged in the previous period. The Mesoamerican Plan sought to achieve 20 projects rather than 100 and target three main pillars of the Plan: Transportation, Telecommunications and Energy.

4.4.3 The Economic dimension of the Plan Puebla Panamá

The projects of the PPP are financially supported by from the IADB in combination with private investment. PPP member countries use these loans to attract private investment from companies to develop projects in transport energy and telecommunications infrastructure. Table 4.2 shows how the budget in 2002 was distributed by Ministry, highlighting the concentration on the transport and communications sectors.

Map 4.1 shows the plan for modernising the highway system in Mexico as projected to 2006. The red lines correspond to those highways that were already reconstructed in 2001, while the blue and the green ones are the on-going and planned highways within the PPP as part of the transport projects.

Table 4-2 Plan Puebla Panamá´s Annual Budget. Chapter Mexico. 2002 in Millions of Dollars

Government's Office	Budget in Millions Dollars*
Executive Office of the President	$ 1.3
Ministry of Transport and Communications	$625.1
Ministry of Economy	$10.7
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	$32.5
Ministry of Social Development	$17.7
Ministry of Tourism	$50.8
Plan Integral Projects	$5.0
Total Budget	$745.7

*Exchange rate in 2002 US$1=10.0

Source: Executive Office for Plan Puebla-Panamá, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico.

Map 4-1 High-Way Construction under the Plan Puebla Panamá

Source: Office for the Plan Puebla Panamá, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Mexico

4.4.4 Impact of the Plan Puebla Panamá

According the Executive Office of the PPP in Mexico, 33 projects with budgets of totalling up to US$ 4,500 million have been funded. The bulk of the investment has been concentrated in the development of physical infrastructure in the sectors of roads and highways, energy and telecommunications. At the regional level, the total budget accounted for US$7,900 million as of 2008. The main beneficiary of the funds was the transport system with the design of the International System for Mesoamerican Highways with 13,000 km along the Pacific and Atlantic corridor of Mesoamerica. Regarding the distribution of electricity, nearly 2,500 kilometres of transmission lines were developed as part of the Electrical Interconnection System in the Central American countries. In terms of the telecommunication project, the Mesoamerica Communication Highway was designed to reach marginalised regions along with the system of electrification in the region (Martí Ascencio, 2008). Investment in other areas such as environment, health and natural disasters was on a much lower scale. Indeed, while such human development initiatives were supposed to take priority over infrastructure development in the Plan's original design, in practice this was not the case. Instead, the PPP emphasised the strategic importance of developing ground, aero and maritime transport infrastructure to create the conditions for regional competitiveness. Following the objective of linking the Central American markets to the NAFTA, the PPP projected the International Network of Mesoamerican Highways, paving 1,820 kms. with a budget of US$ 993 million and the maintenance of 4,565 kms. with a budget of US$ 66 million (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla Panamá, 2005).

An important part of the PPP was to improve the integration of business activities across the region. As part of that process, the PPP included projects to support the construction of a "round the clock" customs gate, and measures to facilitate the issuing of business visas on a "fast track" basis. The regional banking system is also an important actor to provide credits to the regional business (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla Panamá, 2005: 13).

The table 4.3 describes the main budget lines per project, showing that transport (80%) and energy (8.95%) accounted for most of the estimated

investments, while human development remained low. Moreover, the PPP reports to have accomplished by 2006 6.1% of the total of projects, 47 projects were under implementation (47.5 % out of the total) and 27.3% were seeking funds and 19 were under planning (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla Panamá, 2005: 11).

Table 4-3 Summary of the Plan Puebla Panamá Projects 2005-2006.

Initiative	Total of Programmes and Projects	Programmes and Projects	Programmes and projects on development	Administrative Projects	Projects to be designed	Estimated investment (US Million)	Allocated budget (US Million)
Human Development	12	3	6	3		$402.61	$163.87
Sustainable Development	25		9	16		$322.03	$111.78
Prevention of Natural Disasters	4		2		2	$25.87	$13.08
Transports	22		16	Most done	6	$6,167.85	$3,302.3
Telecommunications	7			1	6	$61.5	$0.750
Energy	14	2	6	3	3	$688.45	$479.62
Commerce and Competitiveness	8	1	4	1	2	$21.88	$21.28
Tourism	6		3	3		$3.197	$1.397
ICP	1		1			$1.13	$1.13
TOTAL	99	6	47	27	19	$7,684.52	$4,095.26

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexican Government 2006.

It is clear that the implementation of the PPP has been problematic with very few projects being fully completed. According to the IADB, only 3 investment projects funded by the Bank have been completed, accounting for US$136.1 million out of the PPP's initial budget of $8b. (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), 2008).

Overall, therefore, the PPP has been highly contentious in its origins and highly problematic in its implementation. Nonetheless, from our perspective it is significant as a component of the regional integration framework. The PPP's

primary goal is to increase trade by integrating Central America into the North American market even though, in contrast to the Euro-Mediterranean case, it is outside of the NAFTA's institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, there is arguably an indirect relationship between PPP and NAFTA. As the CAS 2002 for Mexico establishes, "since the integration of Mexico with the rest of North America through NAFTA is proceeding satisfactorily, IADB support in this area would be for the PPP which seeks to expand integration to the south as a way to fight poverty in both Mexico and Central America" (World Bank, 2002: 40).

To some extent, therefore, the PPP aims to extend NAFTA's model in the Central American region by integrating the so-called Mesoamerica or Isthmus region (Southern Mexico and Central America). Moreover, the US made the Central America-US FTA conditional on the regional integration of these countries which would allow them to increase their potential to achieve an export-based economic growth (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), 2008: 13).

4.4.5 The impact of the PPP on the governance of migration in the region

How does the PPP address the migration issue? Regarding the migration phenomenon in Southern Mexico and Central America flows, the PPP's coverage of migration is limited to a provision for the exchange of information on migration flows. This statistical exercise, involving the member states' National Directors of Migration (World Bank, 2002: 40), is a project partially financed by the IOM under the Puebla Process.[15] According to its original objectives, the Puebla Process entailed a range of activities to manage migration at the regional level, covering activities such as the safe return of migrants, research on migration trends, human rights protection and mechanisms for the promotion of development in the sending regions (especially Central America). As part of these projects, the Statistical Information System on Migration in Central America (SIEMCA) launched in 2001 within the Regional Conference on Migration, evolved into the Statistical

[15] See Puebla Process Programme on line http: //www.rcmvs.org/plan_accion.htm

Information System on Migration in Mesoamerica(SISMM) after its incorporation in the PPP (Development, 2004). As part of the IOM initiatives in the region, it was approved by the 11 member-countries of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) to support the exchange of information on the migration from and towards Central America (Hakim Simón, 2003). The initial budget was US$ 1,684,848 to support the collection of data at the Southern Border of Mexico and within the Central American countries (Inter American Bank of Development, 2004).

Trade and migration in the Southern Mexican Border gained relevance in the meetings of the Tuxtla Mechanism, the setting in which the Mexican government had originally presented the PPP. The architects of the PPP consider that this porous border requires better monitoring and control of the transit of goods and persons. While only some of the Central American countries are strongly involved in the migration flows, the border as a receptor and a transit point for Central American migration has made the issue of border control very sensitive.

This sensitivity is reflected in the political discourse of high-ranking officials from Mexico, who constantly related migration to the PPP. Moreover, migratory policy towards the Central American countries was a central point in all on-going multilateral meetings. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Derbez, called for the inclusion of the issue of migration in the 2004 Americas Summit(García, 2004). Certainly, Southern Mexican and Central American flows were the focus of a geopolitical strategy associated with the PPP as well as in Northern Border Plan 2025 announced by President Fox in 2003. Fox contrasted the role of the PPP - as a development programme which would inhibit emigration - with the Northern Border Plan 2025 which would address its efforts to the limiting of further transiting and settling of Southern immigration to the US (President Vicente Fox, 2003).

4.5 The EUROMED

The history of the EU's policy towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbours is one framed by geopolitical and economic considerations. The

geopolitical aspect was driven by the international context of the 1970s – the cold war. North Africa was regarded as strategically important for Western Europe but was also seen as a politically volatile region which needed to be stabilised. Even after the end of the cold war, moreover, the area remained strategic and the EU's foreign policy maintained the objectives of strengthening relations and ensuring stability, particularly in the light of the emerging "Islamic threat". Economically, the region was seen as important as a market for the EU in terms of trade and investment opportunities.

The EU has therefore sought to develop frameworks for economic and political cooperation over the years beginning with its 1972 Global Policy for the Mediterranean. This was followed by bilateral Cooperation Agreements with countries in the region (the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 1976 and the Mashreq countries of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1977). These agreements were intended to foster access for Mediterranean exports into Europe as well as to provide aid for development (the latter on the basis of five-year renewable financial protocols). Despite these agreements, there was no strong coherent policy towards the region for many years. However, the emergence of immigration and drug trafficking as security issues became a source of tension between Southern Europe and Mediterranean countries, prompting Spain and France to re-emphasise the strategic importance of the region. Developments such as the political instability in Algeria in 1992 highlighted the need for a reformulated EU policy toward the region (Parfitt, 1997).

The EU's Mediterranean policy entered a new phase with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), also known as the Barcelona Process, in 1995. This sought to foster economic liberalisation between the EU and 12 of the Mediterranean countries and to promote political, social, and economic cooperation (European Union, 1995). The Barcelona Process set up a mechanism of political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners (see table 4.4). From the very beginning, issues of migration were high on the agenda. At the Barcelona Conference, held on the 27-28th November

1995, the need to halt illegal immigration as well as to encourage political stability and combat terrorism were major issues of debate.

Table 4-4 Euro-Mediterranean Key Summits, 1995-2005

Milestones of the Barcelona Process	
27-28 November 1995	1st. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona
15-16 April 1997	2nd. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Malta
1 July 1997	Entry into force of the Interim Association Agreement between the EU and the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian Authority
1 March 1998	Entry into force of the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement
3-4 June 1998	Ad-hoc Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Palermo
28-29 January 1999	3rd. Euro-Mediterranean Conference on regional co-operation, Valencia
15-16 April 1999	Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Stuttgart
1 March 2000	Entry into force of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement
25-26 May 2000	Euro-Mediterranean Think Tank Meeting, Lisbon
1 June 2000	Entry into force of the EU-Israel Association Agreement
15-16 November 2000	Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Marseilles
5-6 November 2001	Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Brussels
22-23 April 2002	Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Valencia
1 May 2002	Entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement
26-27 May 2003	Mid Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Crete
2-3 December 2003	Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Naples
5-6 May 2004	Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Dublin
29-30 November 2004	Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, The Hague
30-31 May 2005	Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Luxembourg

Source: European Union website.

Following the establishment of EUROMED, new bilateral agreements – so-called Association Agreements - were negotiated between the EU and the Middle East and North African (MENA) states. The Association Agreement between the Moroccan Government and the EU was signed in 1996 and entered in force in 2000 (European Commission, 2000b). The terms of such Agreements vary from country to country depending on the economic and political circumstances. There are, for example, clauses that refer to the domestic political system regarding their respect for human rights and democratic principles. Given that economic and political openness and democratisation are defined as “essential elements” of the agreement, they may set conditions on the financial benefits received from the EU (Gillespie and Whitehead, 2002).

The balance of effects from these agreements varies. In the case of Morocco, for example, there have not been the same benefits as there were in

other cases where much closer ties have been established (e.g. with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey). Whereas those countries have secured membership or a customs union, Morocco obtained few concessions. On the contrary, it faced a quota import restriction in the case of tomatoes and was unable to renew its Fishing Agreement with the EU.

4.5.1 The economic dimension

The Euro-Med envisaged a trade and employment-boosting project to create the economic conditions that would in the long run increase the attractiveness for the native community of staying in their country of origin.[16] The most important aspect of the EUROMED has been the economic package of trade and aid arrangements. However, from the Non-EU Mediterranean countries' perspective, the impact of such policies has been quite limited.

The trade agreements have been restricted in their scope: primary (particularly agricultural) products faced many obstacles due to the interests of local producers within the Community and, while manufactured products coming from the non-EU Mediterranean countries were allowed to enter the European market, they were generally at a competitive disadvantage to the EU's manufacturing products (Kaditi and Swinnen, 2006: 147). According to the EuroMed's Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (European Commission, 2002b), the liberalisation of the markets in the Mediterranean countries would attract investments from EU member states which had primarily been targeting their foreign direct investment towards the Eastern European or Latin American markets. Given the assumption that more FDI would translate into economic growth, the EuroMed tended to emphasise "private sector supporting policies" (European Commission, 2002b: 10). By contrast, policies which might have strengthened the region's industrial capacity to manufacture products which could be competitively exported, or which would have provided concessions

[16] Nevertheless, the Mediterranean countries are treated distinctively under a geo-economic division. They could be divided according to their geopolitical criteria into North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, Jordan) the Middle East (Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine) and the likely to be EU members. In terms of South-South cooperation, the EU also boosted the Agadir Process, which ended up in the Agreement on a Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, signed on Feb 25, 2004.

regarding trade in sensitive sector such as agricultural and fisheries products were not primary objectives of this open-market oriented policy.

Indeed, from the point of view of some scholars, the development strategy implicit in the agreements, being based on free trade, was more beneficial for the EU member states than for the MENA countries. According to Sami Nair, before he was appointed to the French administration (1997-1999), the Barcelona Process attempted to expand the trade area for the European Community in response to the process of globalisation. He argued that the liberalisation of the markets for manufactured products would be more beneficial to Europe than Morocco whereas the latter's comparative advantage in agricultural products was not included in the final agreement (Naïr, 1996). Nonetheless, the injection of foreign capital and the possibility of gaining access to the European market were of economic interest to the Southern Mediterranean economies. With this in mind, the Moroccan authorities have strengthened the liberalisation and privatisation of state owned companies (such as telecommunications) as an attractive foreign direct investment opportunity which according to the WB was vital to the Moroccan economy.[17]

The provision of aid for development has been the other major component of the EU's economic relationship with the Mediterranean economies. It is worth noting that the EU was traditionally the largest provider of Official Development Assistance to the Mediterranean countries. However, the nature of the aid relationship has been coloured by debates within the EU on the priorities for such aid. While the Northern member states have tended to favour aid focused on alleviating poverty, the Southern states have taken a more political approach in targeting aid. In that respect, questions of migration have become bound up with the provision of aid, particularly to North African countries.

Another important contrast in the attitudes of EU member states regards their respective geopolitical preferences. Regional competitiveness, migration and security have been the principal driving forces defining the relationship with the Non-Euro Mediterranean partners. For example, at the beginning of the

[17] See the Country Assistance Strategy paper discussed in the previous chapter regarding the economic policy recommendations issued by the WB in the case of Morocco.

process, the Southern member states perceived the Northern member states as the source of financial funds to invest in the Mediterranean, while the Northern members had an interest in a more liberalised agricultural sector notwithstanding its potentially detrimental impact on the Southern members (Gillespie, 1997). Over the evolution of the policy, moreover, the balance of preferences amongst the EU member states effectively downgraded the position of the Southern Mediterranean states. In the words of a European official interviewed in Morocco,[18] EUROMED was a political tool to foster closer relations with the Mediterranean countries; assisting development was the means to this political end. From his perspective, the fact that the EU's policy is tending to favour the integration of the Eastern European[19] rather than the Euro-Mediterranean countries indicated a greater interest in development in one region than the other one. Comparing the total budget per capita allocated during the period 1996-1999 in the Mediterranean and in the Eastern European countries, it is estimated that the latter received up to four more times the amount of aid as the former (Gillespie, 1997; King, 1998: 121). In other words, if the priority had been to develop the Euro-Mediterranean countries, then aid and even structural funds would have been deployed to bring these Mediterranean economies into the EU regime. Instead, it was the Eastern European countries which received the bulk of the economic support and which emerged as the principal target for the expansion of European Markets and investment.

The seventh meeting of experts on economic transition in the EUROMED held in April 2003 highlighted the contrast in conditions which favoured integration of the Eastern neighbour partners rather than the Southern Mediterranean ones (Berriane, 2004a). The EU's Regionalism sought to extend membership towards those countries which shared its values and complied with the EU's membership criteria whereas the MENA countries' attempts to develop

[18] Interview with the Director for Commercial Exchange in a European Embassy, Rabat, July 2004.

[19] It refers to Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.United Nations (2002b) International Migration Report 2002. ST/ESA/SER.A/220. Washington.

closer relations (such as Morocco's proposal for membership in 1987) were rejected.

4.6 The MEDA

At the heart of the Barcelona Process have been the MEDA programmes. These constituted a significant part of the EU's financial aid programme. The Commission reported that in 2000 "the share of aid granted by the European Union to the Mediterranean countries, primarily under the MEDA programme (B7-410), represented 11% of the overall volume of external aid commitments from the general budget" (European Commission, 2000d: 4; Berriane, 2004a). These funds sought to bring about structural economic transformation of the region. An important component of the policy was a series of projects to modernise the region's infrastructure. The programmes' main objectives have been to improve the transport, energy, and telecommunications sectors, with the aim of interconnecting them to accelerate the transit of goods. In this first phase, projects like the Mediterranean Rocade (see Map 4.2), a road link designed to improve communications with rural areas in the North of the country, were designed to foster infrastructure to underpin trade and development (European Commission, 2000a: 37).

The first MEDA programme was intended to address questions of development as well as facilitating trade but there was a lack of clarity with regard to the way in which development was to be supported. In particular, there was no real linkage between migration and development considerations in the multi-sectoral programme. The question of migration was identified in the programme: according to the Council of the European Union's regulation on MEDA, one of the objectives was the "cooperation and technical assistance in order to reduce illegal immigration, drug trafficking and international crime" (European Council, 1996: 9). However, resources for migration control were only deployed in the second phase of the programme (MEDA II).

The European Commission's MEDA Regional Strategy Paper provides an economic plan for the Mediterranean Basin Region including Morocco, drawing on the European Community's MEDA assistance programme, the latter

comprising an overall budget of €8.75b (1995 to 2006) (European Commission 2005: 6). While MEDA was intended to support the range of objectives addressed by the Barcelona Process, its main goal was to prepare the Mediterranean zone to become a Free Trade Area by 2010 and thereby to foster stability and prosperity in the region. Moreover, although the agreement was established as an arrangement to strengthen relations within the region, bilateral cooperation predominates over multilateral cooperation: 12% of the total budget is directed to regional activities shared by the 12 Mediterranean countries and 86% is allocated on a bilateral basis.

From interviews with different officials from the Spanish Office for Technical Cooperation in Rabat and Spanish scholars, there appears to be a consensus that the multilateral aspect of MEDA is less important than the bilateral aspect. Morocco was one of the main beneficiaries of this bilateral cooperation, receiving €670 million in the period 1995-2004 (European Commission, 2000a). As Table 4.5 shows, out of the total budget, the value of commitments was slightly smaller: under MEDA I, covering the period 1995-1999, €3.06 b. were committed for bilateral agreements of which Morocco was to receive €656m (European Union, 2007: 17).

Table 4-5 Budget for MEDA I and II, total of Commitments and Payments, 1995-2004

Year	***Commitments million €***	***Payments million €***	***Ratio P/C***
1995	173	50	29%
1996	370	155	42%
1997	911	208	23%
1998	809	222	27%
1999	797	240	30%
TOTAL *MEDA I*	3,060	875	29%
2000	569	315	55%
2001	603	318	53%
2002	612	454	74%
2003	615	498	81%
2004	698	801	115%
TOTAL *MEDA II*	3,097	2,386	77%

Source: The European Commission, 2005.

In the case of Morocco, the total budget allocated was €656m., but only 127m.was translated into payments in the period 1995-1999 (European Commission 2005: 20). Political considerations meant that priority was given to the Northern provinces of Morocco, receiving 77% of the MEDA budget for the country, as the European Commission decided to concentrate resources to alleviate poverty in an area which was perceived as a major source of migration and drug trafficking. One of the most important projects was the construction of the previously mentioned Mediterranean Rocade (€ 80 million) which was intended to facilitate communication between the Northern rural communities (European Commission, 2000a: 38). The project was also designed to facilitate trade between the Eastern and Western sides of the country, coinciding with the transit pathway for southern migration (see Map 4.2). As noted in the table, the Tangier-Ceuta and Ras Kebdana – Saidia were funded by the Moroccan Government. The commitment can be seen as reflecting the efforts of the Moroccan government to increase its control over areas that were considered to be sources of migration and drug trafficking.

Table 4-6 Description of the construction project for the Mediterranean Rocade Road.

Road sectors	*(Km)*	*Funding Partners*	*Totals (Mdh)*	*Projected Date to end construction road*
Tangier - Ksar Sghir	30	Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport	100	February 2002
Ksar Sghir - Fnideq	30	Agency of Northern Morocco	120	August 2002
Autoroute Fnideq - Tetouan	28	National Society of High-Ways of Morocco	1,200	2006
Tetouan - Jebha	120	JBIC (Japan)	1,980	2009
Jebha - Ajdir (Al Hoceima)	103	European Union (MEDA)	1,330	2007
Ajdir (Al Hoceima) - Ras Afrou	84	Government of Italy	780	2006
Ras Afrou - Ras Kebdana	92	Foundation Abu Dhabi	600	2005
Ras Kebdana– Saidia	2	MET + ADN	60	2001

Source: Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Kingdom of Morocco, 2004.

In its initial phase, implementation of MEDA was marked by a number of problems. In particular, there were significant delays to payments, with only €860 million disbursed out of the total €3.06b. committed for the programme (European Commission 2005: 13). In the case of Morocco, the budget in the period 1995-2000 was €796.6 million and of this amount actual payments accounted for just €166.8 million. The main problems encountered in the implementation of the MEDA programmes under the EUROMED framework can were primarily political and administrative.

Politically, the primarily inter-governmental nature of the EUROMED relationship is reflected in the low degree of institutionalisation and the limited development of informal interactions at the governmental level (Toplu, 2004). The way in which the EU defined its policies towards the MENA countries created tensions between the parties. Moreover, the scope for a coherent EU policy was undermined by the distinct and quasi-colonial bilateral relationships between Spain and France, on the one hand, and Morocco on the other.

At the administrative level, there were a number of problems with support from MEDA, most notably relating to delays in payments for projects planned under MEDA I. This is because the diverse projects differed in their period of duration and the procedures for payment. The 1999 Annual Report from the European Commission explained that prolonged negotiation over many projects had delayed their implementation. The most delayed projects were those relating to economic transition and structural adjustment. The Commissioner for Migration in the Office of the EU in Morocco explained that one problem has been the inefficient administration of the Moroccan bureaucracy and that this problem was being addressed through the so-called “Green Circle” initiative, an inter-governmental programme to reduce administrative obstacles[20]. The lack of favourable conditions for the development of the private sector and for further trade liberalisation contributed to a slow economic transition.

[20] Interview with Louis Dey, EU’s Delegation in Morocco. Rabat, June 2004.

Map 4-2 Road Construction Programme for the Mediterranean Rocade

Source: Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport, Kingdom of Morocco. 2004

4.6.1 MEDA II: Cooperation with Third countries

In September 2000, the Commission issued its proposals for "Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process", subsequently endorsed at the Foreign Ministers meeting held in Marseilles in November 2000 (European Commission 2001). The MEDA programme was designed to make the link between MEDA funding and the Association process "more explicit; improving the delivery of MEDA through reforms involving the Commission, the Council and the Mediterranean partners in a more strategic approach; co-operating on human rights and democracy; introducing regional cooperation on the critical issues relating to justice and home affairs and raising the visibility of the process" (European Commission, 2000d: 2). The budget for MEDA II was set at €5.4 billion for the period 2000-2006, compared with €3.4b. under MEDA I (European Commission, 2000d: 2; European Union, 2007: 17).

An important difference between MEDA I and MEDA II was the increased emphasis on migration control in the projects supported by the Agreement. While migration had been identified as an issue in MEDA I, it became much more salient in the following years, increasingly being seen as a security issue. As a result, substantial resources were allocated to migration control as part of MEDA II and of subsequent EU initiatives. To understand why this was the case it is necessary to look at how the EU's migration policy was developing in this period and how migration was informing EU-Morocco relations.

4.7 The EU's immigration policy: From Cooperation on Development to Cooperation on Control of Illegal Migration.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU's priority regarding migration was to establish the rules of belonging based on EU citizenship and legal residence. The principle of the free movement of labour had been incorporated into the original Treaty of Rome, but applied primarily to citizens of the member states. Questions of citizenship and migration remained largely national responsibilities though they clearly had consequences at the EU level which could ultimately only be addressed by EU rules. The inclusion of justice and home affairs in the Title VI, also known as the "3rd Pillar" of the Treaty on European Union, opened

the way for a much broader EU responsibility in these areas (European Union, 1992: 50). European policy in this area was relatively slow to develop, given the sensitivity for national sovereignty of immigration questions and the fact that decisions in the “3rd Pillar” were taken on an inter-governmental basis in which all member states enjoyed a veto (Monar, 2004).

Nonetheless, over the following years, it became clear that such a policy would uphold the principle of mobility of labour for European citizens and legal residents while establishing a restrictive migration policy, in effect a “Fortress Europe” (Miller and Stefanova, 2006). From this Euro-centric perspective, migration had to be controlled in order to secure the EU from external security threats, and even economic and socio-cultural threats (Black, 1996: 64; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000).

At the same time as the EU was seeking to formulate a migration control regime, the Union and member states were already engaged in a policy of using foreign aid to address the root causes of migration (Baldwin Edwards, 2006). As a reflection of the influence of the “root causes approach” in the 1990s, the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the 1999 Tampere Conclusions both addressed migration in the context of development (Stocchiero, 2005). Both initiatives envisaged the provision of aid which, it was hoped, would address migration as a phenomenon caused by the lack of development. Such a policy could be pursued at the same, as a common migration policy was developed to control the EU’s external borders. The Council Summit at Tampere was the first forum where the term co-development was explicitly used by the EU to link the control of migration and development (European Council, 1999; Baldwin Edwards, 2006). Over subsequent years, however, the emphasis in political rhetoric shifted from making the link between migration and development – and identifying the need for associated policies of co-development – to making the link between migration and security related to concerns about terrorism.

4.7.1 The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) and Action Plans.

The different strands of EU policy were apparent in its relations with countries of migration such as Morocco. In 1998, on the basis of a Dutch initiative, the General Affairs Council agreed to the creation of a High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration. Its initial task was to prepare “Action Plans” for Morocco, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Albania which would be approved by the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Gent, 2002). These action plans were designed to address the root causes of immigration by providing a “comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit” (European Council, 1999). However, the plans were criticised for being unilateral measures which had been drawn up without consultation with the sending countries. This was the case for the Moroccan Action Plan, the contents of which were only passed to the country’s authorities at the end of 1999.The Moroccan response was highly critical: they considered that “the Action Plan as presented to them lacked balance, particularly in its emphasis on the security dimension" (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999) . At the same time, they stressed the need to work in partnership with the Union in order to enhance the content of the Plan in the framework of the European Union-Morocco Association Council. Hence, one of the consequences of this dispute was a decision to include third countries in the design of the Action Plan by creating spaces for dialogue (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). Given that the Association Agreement was about to enter into force in 2000, the EU’s approach was to go further in bilateral cooperation by integrating the migration issue (European Commission, 2002a).

The first meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council took place in Luxembourg on October 9, 2000 and provided a bilateral dialogue mechanism between the EU and Morocco. More significant is the fact that the meeting was chaired by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish diplomat Javier Solana as Secretary/High Commissioner for the CFSP, representatives

of the two member states with the closest relationships to Morocco (European Commission, 2000c). The Association Council was intended as a forum to discuss the components of the Agreement including the commitment to further cooperation in the fight of illegal migration and Moroccan concerns such as greater liberalisation of agricultural trade and an improved fisheries agreement. The Council was also used as a forum for discussing the question of financial aid needed to address the socio-economic causes of migration (European Commission, 2000c).

Co-development was an important part of the EU's rhetoric but it primarily referred to those programmes supporting the development of infrastructure to increase trade. Along with the MEDA resources planned for "development", resources were directed towards aspects of migration control. For example, it was agreed by the HLWG that in 2001 €3 million would be directed to institutional support for migration issues as part of the MEDA II Programme budget (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). More significantly, aspects of the Action Plan were funded under the budget lines for MEDA (budget line B7 410) and Cooperation with Third Countries (B7-667) with nearly €120 million allocated to these tasks over the period 2001-2005. The actions performed by different governmental agencies in the Southern Mediterranean countries covered a wide range of activities, including research into the causes of migration, the allocation of resources for development projects, support for human rights associations and cooperation on training to combat illegal migrants and smugglers in third countries (European Commission, 2002a).

Table 4-7Budget for EU-Morocco cooperation on migration

Financial resources programmed for external aid 2000-2006 and linked to the migration (Heading 4 of the financial perspective)					
Amount €	Budget Line	Years	Theme	Action	Description
70,000,000	B7-410	2002-2004	Roots	Development	Support for economic development of regions with high emigration such as Province du Nord, support for reintegration
5,000,000	B7-410	2002-2004	Migration Management	Migration Management	Organisation of legal emigration via creation of a migration centre
40,000,000	B7-410	2002-2005	Migration Management	Fighting illegal immigration	Fight against illegal immigration by supporting improvement of management of border control
376,276	B7-667	2001	Migration Management	Fighting illegal immigration	CGED-DPG(Spain): Technical equipment and training for border control , fighting illegal immigration an detection of falsified documents
1,500,000	B7-667	2001	Migration Management	Migration Management	AFD (France): development of the country or origin by Moroccans residing in France and through rural tourism and the creation of SME
450,241	B7-667	2001	Migration Management	Migration Management	Int Ent (Netherlands): support to entrepreneurs of Moroccan origin residing in Europe in setting up economic activities in Morocco
665,980	B7-667	2001	Migration Management	Fighting illegal immigration	French MI/National police: financial and technical assistance for combating illegal migration
1,055,315	B7-667	2002	Migration Management	Migration Management	IOM-socio economic development of migration prone areas
889,316	B7-667	2002	Migration Management	Migration Management	COOPI- il migrante Moroccochino in Italia come agente di sviluppo Cooperazione

Source: The European Commission. (European Commission, 2002a)

4.7.2 A shift from root causes to the security policy paradigm.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the principal reason for a shift in the emphasis of EU policy from tackling the root causes of migration to seeking cooperation for the control of the EU's external borders and anti-terrorism policies. Justice and Home Affairs became a central component of EU legislation, accounting for nearly 40% of new proposals in this period. At the European Council's Laeken Summit, the matter of strengthening border controls in the face of external terrorist threats was the main concern. In the summit's conclusions, the Presidency noted that "better management of the Union's external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism" (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). This aim was later reinforced

in the Valencia Action Plan issued at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Valencia in 2002 which aimed to foster further regional cooperation among members (European Council, 2001).

An important part of the border control strategy was the development of return and readmission policies. Readmission agreements forming part of the EU objective to achieve cooperation with third-countries were already a priority for the Commission (European Commission, 2001), and were covered by the High Level Migration Group's Action Plan and subsequent discussions with Morocco (Pastore, 2003: 113).

Such plans were embraced by the EU along with the provision of financial aid to reinforce cooperation with third countries. The European Commission's Green Paper on a Community Return Policy for Illegal Residents recommended the inclusion of readmission agreements and the return policy as a central component of a common migratory policy. The document stressed cooperation with third countries and underlined the fact that "Community return policy has to fit in and to complement the existing Community policies on immigration and asylum as described in the relevant Communications from the Commission" (European Union, 2002: 3). Co-development was seen as part of this approach, with return policies being geared towards promoting development in the home countries. For the Commission, "voluntary return of migrants, both temporary and permanent, brings back accumulated amounts of financial, human and social capital into developing countries. Traditionally, return has therefore been seen as an essential aspect in ensuring a positive relationship between migration and development" (European Commission, 2002a: 20).

The policy was already being pursued by a number of member states. In France, "co-development policy" aimed to promote development of the sources of emigration as well as financial aid to promote voluntary return. Both Denmark and the Netherlands approved repatriation legislation which made assisted return possible (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). In the case of Southern Europe, countries such as Spain also adopted voluntary returns as part of international cooperation aid thought micro-credit programmes

carried out by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID).

However, at the same time as it was supporting co-development projects, the EU was increasingly directing financial resources towards migration control. According to the Commission, the budget for "Financial Resources Programmed for External Aid 2000-2006 linked to the Migration Issue" which describes actions for combating illegal migration under the section of Management of migration flows, combating illegal immigration and management of the border, accounted for €442m.while the budget destined for development was €121m. out of a total external aid budget for 2000-2006 related to the migration issue of €934m(European Commission, 2002a: 50).

Table 4-8 EU's Budget for Cooperation with Third Countries on Migration Issue 2000-2006

Financial Resources Programmed for External Aid 2000-2006 and Linked to the Migration Issue.					
Heading 4 of the Financial System					
		Community budget €	EDF[1] €	Total €	%
Management of migration flows	Management of border	321,971,760	0	321,971,760	34.5%
	Combating illegal migration	65,042,256	2,720,000	67,762,256	7.25%
	Management of migration flows	51,367,336	1,250,000	52,617,336	5.63%
Total management of migration flows		438,381,352	3,970,000	442,351,352	47.34%
General JHA programmes		96,500,000	0	96,500,000	10.33%
Link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)	Refugees and displaced persons	42,750,000	37,688,000	80,438,000	8.61%
	Voluntary return of refugees from other third countries	157,018,459	36,591,000	193,609,459	20.72%
Total LRRD		199,768,459	74,279,000	274,047,459	29.33%
Development (sources of emigration)		71,569,477	50,000,000	121,569,477	13.01%
Grand Total		806,219,288	128,249,000	934,468,288	100%
		86.30%	13.74%	100%	

1European Development Fund
Source: European Commission. (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999)

4.7.3 The AENEAS Programme: 2004-2006

The shift in emphasis towards migration control coincided with a redefinition of the EU's relations with MENA countries and Morocco in particular. The pursuit

of the EU's Mediterranean Policy was reconfigured in 2003 as part of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP sought to clarify the terms of cooperation with third countries on the EU's borders with particular reference to the effects of Eastern enlargement. The Commission presented the new strategy to the European Council in 2003 (European Commission, 2003).

In this context of redefined relations and new strategies on border control, the framework for EU-Moroccan relations on migration was also revised. The Action Plan for Morocco considered aid for border security and the management of migration with Morocco as part of the MEDA Programme which assigned €40 million for the management of irregular flows (European Union, 2004a). A Commission report on the use of financial resources to address migration related issues – made at the request of the European Council at the 2002 Seville Summit – indicated the scale of cooperation with third countries based on budget line B7-677 (a resource which funded cooperation with third countries on migration issues). This noted that the Commission had provided funds to "combat illegal immigration by supporting improvements to the management of border checks adopted in cooperation with Morocco for the period 2004-06, with a budget of €40 million" (European Commission, 2002a: 39).However, after considering these funds as insufficient, the Aeneas Programme[21] replaced the original budget under B7-667 with €250 million for the period 2004-2008 (€120 million were spent the 2004-2006 years) (European Union, 2004b: 4; Geddes, 2005: 798; European Commission, 2006a). The scheme applied to all potential countries of migration including Asia and Latin America.

[21] In March 2004 AENEAS was approved by the European Council and Parliament as a broader programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum (AENEAS) European Union (2004b) Regulation No. 491/2004 of th European Parliament and of the Council of March 2004 establishing a programe rogramme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum (AENEAS),. OJ L 80. Brussels.

Table 4-9 AENEAS Programme: Projects completed in the period 2004-2006.

Action lines	*Total EU Contribution*	*% per action*
Asylum and Protection	€ 21,024,186	17.24%
Border management	€ 4,979,532	4.08%
Irregular migration	€ 22,877,303	18.76%
Labour migration	€ 12,053,712	9.89%
Labour migration, smuggling and trafficking	€ 1,989,559	1.63%
Legal migration	€ 5,791,699	4.75%
Migration and asylum management	€ 535,598	0.44%
Migration and development	€ 12,700,824	10.42%
Migration management	€ 14,589,326	11.97%
Migration, asylum and border management	€ 1,307,898	1.07%
Readmission	€ 2,859,642	2.35%
Return and reintegration	€ 9,999,268	8.20%
Smuggling	€ 1,310,005	1.07%
Trafficking	€ 7,039,561	5.77%
Other	€ 2,875,000	2.36%
Grand Total	€ 121,933,113	100.0%

Source: European Commission (European Commission, 2006a: 39).

The European Mediterranean Conference at The Hague in 2004 brought up the matter of cooperation with Third Countries, in particular Morocco due to its role as a transit country (European Council, 2004b). It requested joint efforts for the support of monitoring activities and the provision of technical assistance. At this meeting, regional programmes covering justice, police, and migration were proposed for the Maghreb countries. In the case of the EU-Morocco action plan's objective of increased financial support, the Commission made a commitment to propose a New European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and also covered the key issues of cross-border and transnational cooperation between Morocco and the European Union (European Commission, 2003). The priorities were the management of flows and readmission agreements with the EU.

Later that same year, the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Affairs was held in Dublin from May 5-7. The main focus was on the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and Istanbul and Madrid in March 2004 and there was a call for "cooperation on tackling common security threats" (European Council, 2004a: 2). The Commission therefore agreed to provide financial support for sub-regional cooperation in the field of infrastructure and judicial cooperation especially with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Among the

main objectives highlighted at the meeting, EU members identified careful management of migration, intensified cooperation regarding the root causes of migration, the combating of illegal migration, the prevention of illegal transportation by sea, and readmission agreements. Not surprisingly, development and security were the primary concerns of the European Commission, linking poverty and the rise of extremist radical groups in Muslim countries. A document on the EU's development policy underlined an intrinsic link between poverty and development within an approach that mixed different aspects of security and migration claiming that "sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism, often linked to poverty"(European Commission, 2005: 8) .

In the report to the European Council presented by the Commission on the "Global Approach and the priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean", amendments were made to the first proposal presented at the Tampere summit with the addition of legal migration and integration. The document maintained the rhetorical commitment to the migration-development agenda as a key factor for the deterrence of illegal migration, stating that "the prime challenge is to tackle the main push factors for migration: poverty and the lack of job opportunities" (European Commission, 2006b: 5). Legal migration was justified in terms of European labour market needs for high-skilled and seasonal migrants without countervailing the Community preference principle (European Commission, 2006b: 7). Nevertheless, the document underlines awareness of the brain drain and the scarcity of health workers in developing countries produced by demand in Europe and hoped that dependence on certain migrants could be replaced by increasing the offer within Europe. Also worthy of note is the introduction of a proposal for new legislation on penalties against employers as the latter represent a pull factor for illegal immigration.

Despite a developmental rhetoric, which underlined cooperation with African and Mediterranean countries to boost development, the security approach and "Fortress Europe" considerations were increasingly shaping EU migration Policy. The enhancement of external border controls was seen in the launch of the European Agency for the Management of Operational

Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) in October 2005.[22] This new agency was created to coordinate EU's efforts to secure maritime (Mediterranean Sea and West African Coast) and land borders (Southern Eastern Europe) as part of the its efforts to control irregular migration. Cooperation with Third Countries in North Africa and Eastern Europe was required as part of the new ENP. As part of the strategy to control the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) sought cooperation with third countries to operate the surveillance system jointly with European Members.

In sum, the key elements driving the EU's immigration policy seem to be at odds with one another. While the "root causes" approach was maintained in terms of the rhetoric and some initiatives, the link between migration and development was not fully developed. At the same time, a security-driven and more restrictive policy emerged. This was apparent in the resources allocated through MEDA, particularly MEDA II, and in the subsequent initiatives on border control.

MEDA II included both a programme to support the channelling of legal migration to those regions in EU where there was a demand for labour and a programme which addressed the need to control illegal migration by providing technical and financial support to the Moroccan government to improve border security. Yet, there was an imbalance between the resources devoted to these objectives. In the period 2002-2004, the MEDA II budget provided €5m. for institutional support to channel legal migration and €40m for border controls (European Commission, 2006: 5).

MEDA I, as a mechanism inscribed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was expected to bring much needed resources to Morocco. However, the fact that only 29% of the total budget allocated for the period 1995-1996 was implemented served as a disincentive for Euro Med partners, including Morocco(see table 4.5) (European Commission 2005: 17). The inclusion of

[22] For further information see the Frontex website at: http: //www.frontex.europa.eu/

migration management was seen as positive for the Moroccan government as immigration and the settlement of Sub-Saharan migrants had become a burden. However, the security approach which emerged after 2001, and which was re-emphasised following the events in Casablanca in 2003 and the Atocha bombings of 2004, constituted a source of concern for the Moroccan government given the xenophobic reactions towards Moroccans in Europe (Daki, 2004). MEDA II concentrated its efforts on improving the management of illegal migration, development of the Northern Region of Morocco and providing support to private enterprise (Krouz et al., 2002). As discussed above, the resources assigned to Morocco were destined more for the management of migration and even the construction of detention centres in the North of the country, as proposed by the Germans and opposed by the Spanish and Moroccans (Kreienbrink, 2005). There are fewer activities reported under the budget line of "root causes" than the migration management line. In addition, resources are channelled to the North, which has proved to be the principal transit point, but not to the new sources of Moroccan migration such as the central and more urbanised areas.

When comparing MEDA I and MEDA II, migration and security become more closely linked in the latter. While the main purpose of MEDA I was to encourage increased trade (which would indirectly serve as a substitute for migration), MEDA II incorporated an explicit mechanism to manage migration. A major focus for the MEDA programmes has been aid to develop the infrastructure for trade around North Africa's Mediterranean basin, and specifically the North Morocco area. The underlying assumption establishes unemployment and the lack of economic prospects as push factors that can be eradicated based on the improvement of effective market access for developing countries to the EU and other industrialised countries as well as the integration of developing countries into the world trading system (European Commission, 2002b: 8).

4.8 Conclusions

The conventional wisdom regarding development is reflected in the trade and aid policies promoted in both regions. The combination of NAFTA and the PPP in North America and the pursuit of liberalisation and aid programmes within the EuroMed-MEDA framework in the Mediterranean were both driven by an assumption that greater market integration would foster development and financial aid should be provided to enhance the infrastructural capacity for exports. As such both regimes can be seen as fitting into a “root causes” approach to co-development, with export led growth providing the opportunities and employment to alleviate the pressure to migrate.

In both regions, however, the impact of these frameworks is open to question. The lack of competitiveness of most Moroccan exports and the protectionist restrictions upon those products which could compete, mean that the impact of trade liberalisation has been quite limited. While some parts of Mexico have benefited from the increased trade associated with NAFTA, those gains have not spread to more peripheral regions (such as the South of the country) nor to neighbouring states in Central America. The aid programmes, which were intended to enhance development, have been plagued by implementation problems and payment delays as well as, in the case of PPP, significant political opposition from civil society in the region.

As regards their treatment of migration, the regional regimes appear to have been rather different, a reflection of the way in which the issue was (or was not) incorporated into the framework. In the case of NAFTA, with the exception of arrangements for highly skilled workers, the issue of labour migration was not directly addressed institutionally. In the case of EuroMed, migration has been more explicitly addressed and policy has been reinforced by the evolving EU regime on immigration control.

In both cases, however, migration has become perceived as a regional issue but one which was increasingly addressed on the basis of border control and security considerations. By the time that the second MEDA programme entered into force a significant part of the budget for Morocco was devoted to border control activities. Moreover, those considerations were as much directed

towards the Southern borders of Mexico and Morocco as to their immediate frontiers. Both PPP and MEDA were used as mechanisms to reinforce border control while in the case of EU-Morocco, additional resources were allocated in an attempt to restrict migrants transiting across their territory.

Behind the logic of increasing trade and expanding commercial zones, therefore, the control of the borders emerged as a priority to provide smooth access to capital and goods while preventing the entry of illegal migrants and illicit commodities. The events of 9/11 increased the perceived need for “smart borders” in the US and EU and prompted further cooperation on security and terrorism questions. New arrangements such as the Security and Prosperity Partnership in North America emphasised border controls but did not directly address the question of immigration.

Overall, the role of regional agreements in managing the migration-development nexus has formally been quite limited but some mechanisms for consultation have been developed. However, arguably they have provided a framework for the closer development of bilateral contacts between sending and receiving countries, the focus for the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5 THE BILATERAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we examined the regional governance of the migration-development nexus. We analysed the role of co-development policies in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions both in terms of the broad trade and economic integration frameworks (NAFTA/EuroMed) and associated development programmes (PPP/MEDA). We argued that the co-development aspect of policy was relatively limited at the regional level; instead security considerations tended to be more influential in shaping the regional governance of migration.

Below this regional level, the central question of the "governance" of migration with respect to co-development initiatives involves a much wider range of actors working at various policymaking levels. Perhaps the most important level is the bilateral political dimension where domestic and foreign policy interests constitute the principal driving forces behind the governance of immigration and co-development. In co-development terms, this bilateral relationship can be seen in the respective priorities of the sending and host states, such as, the importance of remittances for home countries and the logic of addressing the root causes of migration for host countries. Nevertheless, the control of external borders for alleged security reasons and concerns about ongoing irregular immigration are increasingly shaping bilateral relations with consequences for the way in which co-development policies are pursued. This chapter therefore attempts to describe and analyse state-led policies involving Mexico and Morocco as sending countries on the one hand and the US and Spain as host countries on the other.

For Mexico and Morocco, the governance of migration has become a source of conflict in bilateral relationships with Northern partners despite ongoing trade and security cooperation. As discussed in the previous chapter,

the Euro-Mediterranean and North American regimes have arguably used trade-oriented cooperation for development as a policy to contain migration flows. Generally, development and migration are largely separate topics with distinct bilateral political agendas, although they converge in the rhetorical discourse surrounding border control programmes, policies and debates. In practice, the different treatment of migration and development issues is reflected in unbalanced relationships between Northern and Southern protagonists. Both Morocco and Mexico seem to be willing to cooperate with their Northern partners on matters of border security despite the negative political consequences for their relations with Southern neighbours, but there is little reciprocity from the North in the development of favourable migratory agreements.

Indeed, it could be argued that, in effect, the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regimes contradictorily seek to decrease obstacles for expanding markets whilst increasing controls on the cross–border movement of people.[1] Therefore, there is a tension between the dynamic of economic integration in each region and the preferences of political leaders and domestic political considerations which shape bilateral relationships. Thus, the question posed here is the extent to which economic-political and migratory outcomes are the result of an interaction between national interests and regional commitments.

The chapter is divided into two main sections, covering the impact of national interests in each region. In each section, we examine how far the bilateral relationships between sending and receiving countries have been shaped by their respective national economic and political priorities. In particular, we consider the extent to which national interests serve to define the regional treatment of migration issues. We then examine those policies which have been developed at the bilateral level and which are broadly oriented towards co-development. The core questions in this chapter concern the extent to which

[1] See the discussion in Chapter 1 on the theoretical debate and the discussion in Chapter 4 on the political discourses provided by political actors concerning the effects of trade liberalisation on migration trends.

cooperation on development is linked to the migration issue at the bilateral level and how this cooperation for development has been included in bilateral negotiations as a quid pro quo for cooperation on border control.

In the first section, we examine the case of the Mexico-US relationship, highlighting the factors which have defined governmental positions in bilateral discussions. We then focus on attempts to link migration and development in the US-Mexico context. Even if the concept of co-development is not explicitly referred to in migration-related policies between these two countries, we are able to describe processes and initiatives in North America which have an equivalent effect. The discussion analyses the development of migratory policy of the US and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The section also attempts to explain the state's interest driving the migration issue.

The second section assesses bilateral relations between Morocco on the one hand and Spain and the EU on the other. Based on the assumption that co-development is a policy related to migration that involves both sending and receiving countries, these bilateral relationships represent an important factor in migration governance. By looking at the Spanish relationship with Morocco we are able to examine the particular relationship between one of the Southern EU member states and Morocco, how their understandings of co-development differ from the EU as a whole and how has this been reflected in the management of co-development with Morocco. Given that co-development in the Spanish context is been related as a policy to manage migration and promote local development in the sending country, the section analyses the impact of this policy on the Moroccan immigrant population and the Morocco's migratory policy.

5.2 The US-Mexico Bilateral Agenda

The immigration issue has been on the US-Mexico bilateral agenda for a long time along with other political priorities such as drug trafficking, trade and hemispheric security. In order to distinguish the level of cooperation on these subjects, we need to analyse the outcomes from bilateral meetings involving a variety of governmental bodies. As noted in the previous chapter, there has

been a proliferation of regional and bilateral meetings at different levels over the last two decades, from trilateral North American Presidential Summits serving as the highest level of interaction to structural mechanisms of dialogue for migration such as the Binational Commission and informal communication meetings between stakeholders on both sides of the US–Mexico border.

While US-Mexican discussions have traditionally been difficult on issues such as migration, the political changes in both countries have led to a shift in relations: the underlying attitude to their approach to common problems changed from one of "distant neighbours"[2] to one of "shared responsibility".[3] The turning point for the US-Mexico relationship appears to have been the decision of Presidents George H. Bush and Carlos Salinas to create a North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA was finalised in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The presidencies of Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo were the focus for a bilateral agenda which addressed issues of drug trafficking, migration, trade and the economic condition of Mexico after the 1994 peso devaluation (an event that jeopardised plans to increase trade with Mexico). The presidential terms of George W. Bush and newly elected Vicente Fox in 2000 raised expectations of an even more positive and collaborative partnership between the two neighbours.

While overall relations have considerably improved since the end of the 1980s, the issue of migration has remained difficult. Although both Presidents Carlos Salinas and George H.W. Bush[4] indicated that migration was going to be on the NAFTA negotiation table, ultimately it was not in the interest of either government to address the issue as immigration could have jeopardised the overall negotiation (Papademetriou, 2003:45). However, institutional

[2] Alan Riding, in his book "Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans" coined this term to describe the US-Mexico bilateral relationship as complex despite the growing interdependence which was conditioned by different system of political, economic and cultural values (Riding 1985).

[3] After the 9/11, the US and Mexico Governments engaged in cooperation in the fight against terrorism and migration as common goals (Délano 2009).

[4] Both US and Mexican Presidents defended NAFTA as a mechanism to promote trade, foreign direct investment and employment, implying a decrease in the Mexican immigration to the US (Fernández de Castro 2004).

cooperation on migration did increase at US - Mexico bilateral level, particularly in the post-NAFTA period. At the diplomatic level, the post-NAFTA period was distinguished from previous periods by the multiplication of communication channels, both informal and formal, and the institutionalisation of regional trade and economic activities. Thus, the outcomes of the policy on migration are determined by the interaction on different level and degree of the bilateral mechanisms set in place before and after NAFTA.

The US–Mexico relationship has been further institutionalised post-NAFTA (Rosenblum, 2004). While prior to NAFTA the bilateral relationship was intense and relied on multiple informal channels of communication, it lacked institutions and consultative mechanisms and negotiations (del Castillo Vera, 1987). Table 5.1 describes the different institutions and mechanisms that currently regulate the bilateral relationship. In an attempt to illustrate the multiple levels of operation, the table is divided by level of governmental interaction. The most frequent annual meetings are the Border Governors Conference (BGC) that date back to 1980, but which have extended their scope in the years since NAFTA was signed. At the state and local levels, the extent of transborder cooperation has been continuously evolving over the post-NAFTA period, while the Executive level shows greater unevenness over the period. While meetings at the regional and executive levels are held sporadically, those related to binational mechanisms and transborder cooperation are continuous and include the participation of organised civil society.

Despite the reinvigorated US “Good Neighbour Policy”, which used a non-interventionist and cooperative approach in its foreign policy towards Mexico (Spokes, 2006, Valenzuela, 2007), US governmental bureaucracy considers immigration a matter of inalienable national interest (Briggs, 1992; Briggs, 2003). Hence, at the state level there is growing cooperation and a multiplication of communication channels in the economic arena which is unbalanced in comparison with the limited cooperation on the migration issue (Andreas 2002). Thus, the creation of migration regulations at the Congressional and Executive Levels has been characterised as unilateral with little or no attempt to consult with Mexican counterparts. The response to growing Mexican immigration in the

US traditionally has therefore been characterised as largely unilateral. Over time, however, Mexican officials have sought to engage with the US on migration issues. The Mexican Government has long been aware that Executive Summits are pivotal for bilateral dialogue and has sought to pursue other channels to address Mexican immigration as a binational matter. Thus, the Conference of Border Governors and the Mechanism of Border Liaison have become more effective local bodies for tackling cross-border issues.

Table 5-1 US-Mexico bilateral institutions and mechanisms

Bilateral/ Institutional	Partnership for Prosperity	
	Interior Mechanism of Liaison	
	Binational Memorandum for Safe Repatriation	
	Binational Commission	
	Inter-parliamentary Summits	
	Border Legislation Conference	
	US-Mexico Commission for Education and Cultural Exchange	
	Merida Initiative	
	Plenary Group for Justice Enforcement	
	US–Mexico Senior Law Enforcement Plenary (SLEP)	
	US-Mexico Border Environmental Programme – Border 2012	
Transborder/ Gov. Bodies	US-Mexico Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning (BBBXG)	
	International Boundary & Water Commission (USIBWC)	
	Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC)	
	Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM)	
	US–Mexico Border Health Commission (USMBHC)	
	State Gov.	Border Governors Conference
		Conference of Gulf of Mexico Governors
		Chihuahua-New Mexico Commission
		Arizona- Sonora Commission
	Local Gov	Meetings of Border City Mayors
		Local Understandings for Migrant Repatriation
		Binational Group for transborder facilitation.
	Civil Society	Environmental Groups
		Human Rights Protection for Migrants
		Societal Organisations and Clubs

Source: Elaborated by the author

Nevertheless, despite the proliferation of institutions and bilateral mechanisms there have been criticisms that their impact on resolving the migration issue has been limited. In order to assess the limits and achievements of such bilateral frameworks as the Binational Commission, the Inter-parliamentary Meeting Group, and the Mechanism of Liaison, the following section discusses the politics of the bilateral agenda.

5.2.1 Migration in the bilateral agenda: from distant neighbours to a shared responsibility policy.

5.2.1.1 The appraisal of the Pre–NAFTA period: The distant neighbours

In order to assess the scope of bilateral discussions and agreements regarding Mexican Immigration to the US, it is necessary to consider the multi-level channels of consultation and cooperation which developed before and after the signing of NAFTA.

One of the first attempts to develop the bilateral relationship dates back to 1977 when US President Jimmy Carter and the President of Mexico José López Portillo established a Consultative Mechanism to seek collaboration on border-related issues such as trade, crime, health and the environment as well as migration (Henrikson, 2000: 127). The Consultative Mechanism opened an institutional channel for consultation between the two countries' executives. At around the same time, other arrangements were being established to address the consequences of the growing integration between the two countries. The establishment in 1977 of a Regional US Border Commission and the Coordinating Commission of the National Programme for the Border and Free Trade Zones provided a framework for discussing border issues (Henrikson, 2000). The focus of these working groups was commercial activity across the US–Mexico border and its effects on the regional economy. However, the migration issue was excluded from the bilateral agenda despite the increase in regular and irregular border crossings of Mexicans to the US.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the two governments established the Binational Commission (BNC), a binational dialogue structure which held an annual summit involving different ministerial and governmental departments. It was to serve as a permanent working group which consulted and collaborated on specific topics of common interest (Ayón et al., 2009: 9). Even if trade and the free customs area were the main issues on the Commission's agenda, the intensive movement of workers and cargo across the border inevitably made these issues important features of the agenda until the last meeting held in

2006.[5] While it came to be regarded as ineffective, the Commission served as one of the main channels of communication between the two Administrations until it was replaced by other multiple and diverse formal and informal channels. The main accomplishment of the binational summits was to provide a forum for ongoing discussions of the management of immigration flows to the US, the protection of migrants' human rights and the root causes of migration. Those discussions were influential in the ensuring such matters were included in subsequent legislation (such as the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)).

Despite these bilateral initiatives, immigration was mainly addressed in the domestic political sphere, with legislation being agreed unilaterally. One early attempt to establish such controls was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), approved by Congress in 1986. IRCA sought to discourage illegal immigration by imposing penalties upon firms that employed undocumented migrants.[6] However, this legislation was also notable for being the first mechanism to address immigration from an economic and development perspective. The IRCA created the Asencio Commission, headed by Diego Asencio, former Assistant Secretary of the US State Department, as a review body consulting and researching on how to boost local development in Mexican communities with high emigration rates. Despite the lack of follow-up to the Commission's work, it is worth noting that its recommendations took into account economic development rather than solely control and regularisation programmes to deal with illegal Mexican immigration (Alarcón, 1995b). The report stressed the importance of accelerated development as the most feasible and desirable instrument for stemming migration from Mexico and outlines the migration-development nexus:

[5] In 2006, the Presidents of the USA and Mexico decided to cancel the Binational Commission Meeting given its lack of efficiency for tackling major issues.

[6] The agricultural sector has been historically a high-demanding labour sector of Mexican undocumented migrant, which was favoured by IRCA under the regularization of undocumented workers through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers program (SAW) (Hanson, G.H. & Spilimbergo, A. , 2001).

1. Targeting migrant-sending regions for economic growth. Since migratory flows originate in specific regions, the Commission suggested that development efforts be targeted not at resource-poor areas with meagre development prospects but at nearby regions with greater potential to offer improved economic alternatives to prospective migrants.

2. Developing small business. Since the informal sector often serves as a refuge for the urban poor and provides employment to an increasing number of women, the Commission suggested that national and international development agencies work with governments to reduce legal and bureaucratic impediments to the development of small business.

3. Channelling remittances into productive small businesses. The Commission found that most migrant remittances are used to pay for basic needs and that little goes to productive investment. The Commission recommended that individual migrant remittances be complemented by other financial resources from public and private institutions to support development of the small business sector. The Commission singled out the Agency for International Development to take the lead in fostering such cooperative financing arrangements (Asencio, 1990).

Another of its principal recommendations was to support the creation of a North American Free Trade Agreement as a mechanism to expand the American market and create employment in Mexico and in Central American and Caribbean countries (Asencio, 1990).

In the early 1990s, the increased immigration of undocumented Mexican workers to the US and the unsuccessful enforcement of IRCA's sanctions against employers led to a xenophobic perception of the Mexican population, especially in US Border states. As a result, it became even more important for US politicians to be seen to be acting on the immigration issue. The extension of free trade to Mexico was presented as an economic mechanism to diminish the "push" factors in Mexico. At its 1994 meeting, the Migration and Consular Affairs Group of the Mexican-United States Binational Commission agreed to conduct research on the subject to understand new trends and propose

adequate bilateral policies (US Commission on Immigration Reform and Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997: 4).

Notwithstanding this attempt to pursue a joint analysis and approach to the issue of Mexican migration, in practice the most important initiatives in the US were unilateral.

Perhaps the most important - and contentious – initiative was that taken at the subnational level by the Californian state authorities: Proposition 187. Public opinion blamed immigrants for being the cause of an economic recession in the state and there were demonstrations calling for further controls on irregular immigration (Calavita, 1996). Proposition 187 was a plebiscite, supported by the then Governor Pete Wilson and passed in 1994, which targeted undocumented immigrants, requiring that they should “not receive any public social services to which he or she may otherwise be entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified” (Martin, 1997: 897). The law was criticised by Presidents Clinton and Salinas de Gortari (though the Clinton administration was itself committed to stopping illegal migration) (Martin, 1997). Moreover, state politicians in other parts of the country such as George Bush, then Governor of Texas, and Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York, refused to follow Wilson’s example (Weintraub et al., 1997: 461). The controversy surrounding the proposition illustrates how responses to the issue of migration differed not only between different levels of government but also within them.

Another sign of tough unilateral controls on migration was to emerge a few years after Proposition 187 with the 1996 Congressional approval of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA] of 1996 (US Congress, 1996a). The Act sought to reinforce border controls with enhanced surveillance systems and to put more resources into detecting irregular migration. The Act increased the number of immigration officers along the US-Mexico border by no less than 1,000 per fiscal year in the period 1997-2001, and funded the construction of fences at hub check points such as San Diego-Tijuana. Another Act passed by Congress during the Clinton Administration was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which seemed to follow the earlier Californian initiative by seeking to restrain

"aliens who are not qualified or non-immigrants ineligible for state and local public benefits" (US Congress, 1996c).

The question of migration control was, moreover, often considered in relation to other aspects of US-Mexican relations. In the same year, the US Congress allocated funds to assist Mexico in its fight against drug trafficking and money laundering activities (US Congress, 1996b) and the two Presidents signed the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs (also known as the Declaration of Alliance) (Government of Mexico, 1997). While the Declaration of the Alliance does not explicitly address illegal migrants crossing the border, the discourse of Bill Clinton established the need to control the border and secure it against the two main threats coming from Mexico: drugs and illegal migrants.

There were also a number of US initiatives at the federal level to increase border controls. However, programmes such as Operation Gatekeeper carried out in 1994 in San Diego, California, proved to be inefficient to halt immigration and jeopardised the security of undocumented migrants before evolving into a complex collaboration between US and Mexico at the border gates. One of the findings of a study carried out by researchers from the University of Texas at Austin revealed that commuting workers were the most negatively affected by these operations (US Congress, 1996b). This argument was also supported by assessments conducted by US agencies.[7]

The "Gatekeeper" and the subsequent "Hold the Line" operations led to the "Prevention through Deterrence" border enforcement, failing to distinguish between the intensive daily flows of commuters across the US-Mexico Border and illegal migrants crossing the border. According to the former INS, the

[7] One of the main concerns is that the flow of undocumented migrants crossing the border can be accompanied by the illicit traffic of drugs and more recently by terrorists. At the root of the discussion is the problem of distinguishing between economic migrants who cross the border illegally and criminal offenders who do the same. This is in part due to the lack of a homogenous system for sharing technical information between the Border Patrol's IDENT system and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's IAFIS database since they use different databases; one stores information about "border crossers" and the other is related to criminal offenders in the US. (Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 2004).

deterrence operation relied on the deployment of strong border controls at the busiest crossing point, Tijuana-San Diego, to reroute illegal border traffic from traditional urban routes to less populated and geographically harsher areas and thereby increase detentions (Nuñez-Neto, 2008: 24). However, instead of curbing illegal immigration the result was an increase in immigrant deaths with at least 1,600 fatalities occurring between 1993 and 1997 (Eschbach et al., 1999; Cornelius, 2001). The research services of the Department of Homeland Security calculated that successful illegal entries grew from 3.5 million in 1990 to 11.5 million in 2001(Nuñez-Neto, 2008: 12).

In this period, questions of border control in Southern Mexico were also put on the US Mexican bilateral agenda. In response to US concerns, during the Regional Conference on Migration in Puebla in 1996,[8] the Mexican Government called for an integrated regional policy to protect the human rights of Central American migrants while deterring illegal migration. Modifications to the Mexican General Law of Population in 1996 addressed the question of illegal immigration and the mechanisms used to deter it. The Beta Group was created during this period as an unarmed "border police" to deal with illegal migrants at both the Northern and Southern Mexican borders. Cooperation between the US border patrol and Mexican authorities began to contemplate training and joint teams at both of the country's border

While much of the policy in this period was driven by US domestic priorities, reflected in the unilateral initiatives such as the 1996 Act, there was a degree of bilateral cooperation. In 1996, the two governments agreed upon a Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican and United States Nationals (Governments of US and Mexico, 1996). Thus, human rights protection and the safe return of deported migrants became part of bilateral cooperation. In the following year, Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo held meetings in Mexico City and in Washington DC that focused on drug trafficking and immigration issues. Concerns about rising violence against migrants crossing the border and the protection of their human rights later led to the signing of the

[8] This conference launched the Puebla Process discussed in Chapter 4.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation against Border Violence in February 1999 in Merida, Yucatan (Gobierno de México y de Estados Unidos de América, 1999). This mechanism also required prosecution of those who were involved in illegal acts and who acted violently against government officers along the border. The aim of this Memorandum was to address complaints from the Mexican Government regarding the "hunting" of migrants by civilians and to serve as a way to enforce cooperation with Mexico for the prosecution of illegal activities related to drug trafficking and smuggling.

One of the mechanisms created to manage returning migrants was the Border Liaison Mechanism involving Mexican consular officials and immigration authorities from Border states as well as the Consultation Mechanisms on Immigration and Naturalization Service Activities and Consular Protection, better known as "Interior Consultation Mechanisms" (Governments of US and Mexico, 1996). The main objective was to provide deported migrants with access to Consular protection and ensure the proper channelling of this population towards Mexican territory.

The Repatriation Agreements signed by the then Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Mexican National Institute of Migration and border state Consulates were derived from the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of United States and Mexican Nationals and the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding on the Consultation Mechanism of Immigration and Naturalization Service Functions and Consular Protection (Secretariat of Foreign Relations of the Mexican United States (SRE) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the United States of America, 1998). This legal framework, together with bilateral mechanisms, embodied most of the daily activities of the US and Mexican Immigration authorities in providing attention to deported migrants, including women, minors and vulnerable persons.

On balance, an assessment of US Mexico agreements on migration shows that there was only limited scope in the bilateral relationship for negotiating favourable conditions for Mexican migrants on such issues as greater immigration quotas and regularisation. However, the institutional dialogue in such frameworks as the Mechanisms of Border Liaisons, the Binational

Commission's Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs, and the Migrant Protection Groups achieved a better understanding of migration issues in US Mexico relations. Moreover, it is arguable that, over this period, the Mexican Government showed a greater interest in influencing US Legislation. This shift to an active policy towards Mexican migrants in the US was effective, for example, in securing a Presidential veto on amendments of the IIRIRA which sought to curtail social benefits to immigrants (Rosenblum, 2004: 111).

A further stage in the regularisation of immigrants followed in 2000 with the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act and LIFE Act Amendments of 2000 (Pub. L. 106-553 and -554), signed by President Clinton. The Act amends gaps in the previous IIRIRA issued by the US Congress in 1996. It granted residence to those who applied for a green card between January 14, 1998 and April 30, 2001 and could prove they had remained in the country during that period. The main objective was to regularise the status of family members of legal residents. Overall, the LIFE was a regularisation process used to ease the backlog of pending immigration petitions rather than an amnesty for immigrants. Still, it was the preamble to a positive and major discussion on immigration.

5.2.2 A Shared Responsibility Approach: Initiatives of the Bush- Fox Administrations

When the PRI lost the Mexican Presidential election in 2000 after 70 years in office, the recently elected US Republican President George Bush sought to strengthen the bilateral relationship. There were various factors that indicated that relations between the two countries would improve. Politically, President Fox was both business-oriented and pro-American and was keen on expanding the scope of NAFTA while George Bush had been Governor of Texas, the state with the most intense trade with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Moreover, there were positive indications that the new relationship would embrace the migration issue. In particular, there were expectations that the two countries would be able to negotiate a "Seasonal Workers Agreement" to facilitate the movement of Mexican workers into the US (Délano, 2009). The perception of migration had changed with previously hostile groups (such as the trade unions)

adopting a more sympathetic position (Secretariat of Foreign Relations of the Mexican United States (SRE) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the United States of America, 1997).

However, prospects for a closer agreement on migration issues were irreversibly damaged in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. At the bilateral level, the dialogue on migration at the national level was suspended, cancelling out any possibility of approving the Seasonal Workers Agreement. More generally, the US government's response to those attacks was to reform the policy and process of immigration enforcement fusing the functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service with other security tasks in a new organisation: The Department of Homeland Security.[9] The Department established the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2003, making it responsible for enforcing and investigating illegal immigration into the country (US Government, 2002a: 4). From this moment on, irregular immigrants were considered a matter of national security and the new agency's responsibilities were defined as "identifying criminal activities and eliminating vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our nation's borders, as well as enforcing economic, transportation and infrastructure security" (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2006: 1). The detention and removal of "aliens" was the major task and implied coordination with foreign governments to process those deported. While the fear of a porous US–Mexico border served as a justification for the new approach, its indiscriminate application had a serious impact on the immigrant community, and resulted in many deportations. The categorisation of crime included a wide range of civil misdemeanours ranging from minor transit infractions to major drug trafficking related crime. Moreover, the new US policy imposed a serious burden on the Mexican authorities who lacked the infrastructure to process the deportees, making it harder to maintain an effective bilateral relationship with the US.

[9]As border security became central to the immigration legislations, the Congress passed and the President signed into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) along with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296 (CIS report)).

The US government's increased concerns about security also made it more difficult to conduct the economic activities which had characterised the border region. While the level of economic integration and interdependence is tangible at border crossing points, the control of illicit drug trafficking and border crossings affects the daily life of commuters. The US therefore implemented "Smart Borders", a sophisticated infrastructure used to select eligible border residents who commuted on a daily basis as well as fast track cargo from the maquiladora sector. In terms of economic benefits, the programme was used to distinguish the border crossings of consumers from those of potential immigrants. The main programmes included the Secure Electronic Network for Travellers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) which was first implemented in 1995 to ease the flow of daily commuter traffic using strict security surveillance between Tijuana and San Diego.[10] As a result, attempts to maintain a balance between activities that boost the economy and statecraft used to strengthen security have only served to impede the movement of persons and goods with negative economic effects being the result. A study carried out on behalf of Border Conference Governors showed severe delays occurring when figures from 1994 to 2008 were compared. For instance, it is calculated that crossing the border by car at the Tijuana-San Diego Gate now takes one and half hours on average when it previously took 40 minutes. And in terms of economic losses caused by border crossing delays, in 2007FY these amounted to US $7.5 billion if we take into account all six Mexican border states (Border Conference of Governors, 2009).

While the increased concern with security in the US has made both economic interaction and policy discussion more difficult, Mexican politicians have sought to develop links with the US. In the opinion of Mexican Senator Oscar Luebbert, Member of the Mexican Commission for Border Issues, Mexico's influence on US migration legislation is more likely to be based on the regular and intensive exchange of communication between the two legislative bodies. In order to assess how influential this bilateral communication can be at

[10] See the following website for further information concerning requirements for safe passage. http: //www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/sentri.xml

the Congressional level, he referred to initiatives proposed by Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) which arose from an Inter- parliamentary bilateral meeting on security issues and the need to identify Mexican migrants to rule them out as suspicious persons. His initiative - the Border Security and Immigration Reform Act (S. 1387) presented in July, 2003 - proposed a guest worker programme to reinforce legal migration by "identifying those who are here to work and then return home would allow law enforcement to focus on those who attempt to enter the United States illegally, or worse, enter for purposes of committing terrorist acts" (Cornyn, 2004). There were pro-immigrant initiatives such as that proposed by Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas) to "allow Mexican illegal aliens already residing within the United States to apply for a temporary visa which would permit them to work for one year in the United States", which it is claimed were influenced by the shift in US–Mexico relations (Camarota, 2001).

Indeed, it was during the Fox administration that the Mexican Government approached both Executive and Congressional members (Storrs, 2005). In 2001, President Fox attended a session of the US Congress and held meetings with different congressmen. This approach resulted in installation of the Congressional Study Group on Mexico in 2002 and the US–Mexico Caucus of 2003 (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2001). It is noteworthy that by this point, the overriding importance of the border security issue effectively dashed Mexican hopes for further regularisation of migrants. Nonetheless, the shift of the Mexican Government towards a more positive engagement with the US, trying to influence country's policy making process constituted a major change in the Mexican approach to the bilateral relationship (Rosenblum, 2004).

5.2.3 Co-development Initiatives and the Mexico--US bilateral agenda.

Whatever the interests behind US and Mexican stances on migration and co-development, it is clear that their positions as host and home countries are potentially in conflict with each other. For the US, Mexican development was not a priority while for Mexico controlling emigration has been of secondary importance compared with other objectives (Meyers and O'Neil, 2004: 3). Indeed Mexico has for many years relied on migration and sought better

treatment for its migrants. Looking back over the country's migration policy history, the emigration of an increasingly large labour force was perceived as a safety valve. Moreover, nationals abroad emerged as a source of foreign currency to improve macroeconomic conditions. According to the Central Bank of Mexico, the country was receiving US $26,076 million dollars in remittances annually by 2007, equivalent to 2.5% of its GDP (Banco de México, 2009). Migrants have proved to be a source of funds contributing to the balance of payments and reducing local poverty. In sum, emigration flows continue to be of national interest for Mexico, with a young population facing a lack of employment opportunities. Whereas economic growth resulting from export-led policies and market liberalisation may be a long-term objective, emigration is still the ultimate resource in the short term to reduce pressure on the national labour market. From this perspective, the interest of Mexico has been to seek agreements with the US to facilitate this process.

However, the bilateral agenda has forced border control issues to be taken into account and Mexico has been increasingly prepared to accept this process and extend it to the Southern border by controlling Southern flows across its territory. The question is why Mexico's concerns became focused on the porosity of the Southern border, when in the past control was established within the country. According to scholars and non-governmental organisations,[11] the answer is clear: undocumented Southern transit towards the US spurred interest in greater cooperation with Mexico to control the Southern border (Lohrmann, 1997). According to Dr. Juan Sandoval, researcher from the Centre of Research for Chicano Studies in Mexico, the PPP was effectively set up as a border control policy based on a trade-oriented plan. In his view, the Fox administration convinced Central American partners to follow up this initiative as a part of a further regional plan: The Americas FTA.[12] NGOs opposed to such an agreement also share this perspective. Their argument was that the US was

[11] Interview with Dr. José Manuel Sandoval as a member of REMALC and Sin Fronteras.
[12] Interview with Dr. José Manuel Sandoval as Director of the Seminario Permanente sobre Estudios de Chicanos, México DF, 2004.

seeking to secure the region by extending trade agreements arranged with Latin American allies.

So, why did the Mexican government redefine its position on regional trade? As noted, this policy was a consequence of the shift to liberalisation pursued by the last three PRI regimes and particularly by the Fox administration which sought to promote the interests of Mexican business by expanding its regional market opportunities. Moreover, the shift needs to be seen as part of a broader shift in foreign policy pursued by Fox. The new administration aimed to create a closer and smoother relationship with the US while moving away from the neutral isolationism of the past to play a more active role in the region. From this perspective, Mexico planned to extend the logic of the PPP beyond the Southern-Central America region to the rest of the continent as part of the Las Americas Plan and in the process further underpin the Mexico-US relationship.

Mexican government enthusiasm for a closer bilateral relationship with the US has had consequences for the governance of migration within the region and for regional cohesion. Some groups in Mexico and Latin America (e.g. small and medium primary sector producers, development agencies, human rights groups and others) have found it hard to accommodate US demands for an expanded regional trade agreement, particularly as at the same time it has toughened immigration controls. Mexico's traditional foreign policy orientation – built upon historical and cultural links with the rest of Latin America – has become complicated by its recent shift to a closer bilateral relationship with the US. Thus, a Mexican initiative to reopen negotiations on the FTA received a hostile response from most Latin American governments who regarded it as an attempt to assert regional leadership and promote US interests in the area (Torres, 2005). This response can be explained by a shift in the region towards leftist governments whose discourse was more or less anti-American and which gave greater weight to social issues than to an agenda mainly concerned with trade liberalisation.

At the rhetorical level at least, left wing governments in Argentina and Brazil would have found it extremely problematic to embrace such neoliberal discourses and to accept the leadership of Mexico's right-wing government in

the region. Instead, bilateral negotiations were held between the US and Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia to increase economic and security cooperation, including migration control. Changes in Mexico's migratory policy towards the rest of Latin America were also not welcomed, especially in leading countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The reciprocal non-restricted visa to remain in Mexican territory was modified to a restricted visa. The initiative was seen to be part of a pro-American policy which was pursued regardless of its consequences for political relations within the Latin American region (Cámara de Diputados de México, 2009).

It is therefore clear that improving the bilateral relationship with the US – and ultimately securing a migration agreement - was the main priority for the Mexican government under Fox (Castañeda, 2002; Carreño, 2004). It hoped that its unemployment problem would be eased by obtaining a migration agreement with the US while development would be fostered by greater trade. As it turned out, these hopes were not fulfilled given the events of 2001. However, it is questionable, whether such a strategy would ever have been successful. The US considered Mexico primarily as a trade partner which would benefit from increased investment and credit; accordingly, trade would effectively serve as a substitute for migration. Moreover, one can question whether the Mexican government's objective of an extensive migratory agreement was realistic. According to former US Ambassador to Mexico, Jeffrey Davidow, any possible migration agreement was always dependent on the effective cooperation of the Mexican government in controlling its borders, both in the north and in the south, mainly due to the country's position as a transit country.[13] The government followed the US policy of imposing greater restrictions on Central American migration and pursuing open markets in the region, but this did not in the end result in a full agreement between Mexico and

[13] Former US Ambassador Davidow referred to "Mexican ideology and policy which impels the government to take measures to stop their nationals illegally crossing the US border. As a result of the Mexican position, its American counterparts always suspect that any agreement on migration issues would be null given the lack of political commitment from Mexico to stop illegal immigration". See "El Oso y el Puercoespin" by Jeffrey Davidow, a book he wrote after leaving office during Bush's second term as President (translation is based on the Spanish edition).

the US. Although Davidow characterised the good relationship between the two Executives as a good one, it was not enough to secure the desired Migration Agreement (Davidow, 2003)– though there was increased cooperation on border controls with the Mexican Immigration Office receiving US support for the training of border officers.

5.2.4 The domestic factors in the US Migratory Policy towards Mexico

Immigration policy in the US is considered an issue of national sovereignty which constrains the scope for bilateral negotiations on migratory issues (Sassen, 1996: 760). This unilateral approach has historically reaffirmed that labour markets are regulated by domestic politics.

Labour market conditions have been the main factor determining whether the US adopts a liberal or restrictive immigration policy towards (Pastor, 2001: 128). Historically US migration policy sought to accommodate the needs of the industrial and agricultural sectors which relied on a cheap and flexible labour force. The shortage of labour to support development in the post-war era was the key factor in the US seeking migration from Mexico. The Bracero Programme as a migratory agreement between the US and Mexico facilitated movement of people but did not provide the envisaged guarantees of working conditions and wages. Instead, market forces rather than regulated conditions for migrants were the means of balancing the US labour market. After suspending the Bracero Programme with Mexico in 1964, illegal immigration was tolerated by relaxation of immigration controls (Calavita, 1992). Since then, the quota system to provide agricultural workers along with restriction to access a legal status to undocumented migration and border control are mechanism to assure the source of a cheap, unprotected and flexible Mexican labour immigrant.

Beyond the specifics of migration conditions, some interviewees pointed to the lack of a smooth bilateral US-Mexico relationship, attributing this to the lack of trust in the Mexican Political System sustained by almost 70 years of single party rule and the authoritarian, nationalistic and antidemocratic values of the PRI. At the same time, Dr. Gustavo del Castillo – a researcher from the Colef -

has referred to the complexities of the US political system and its unilateralism with respect to national sovereignty concerns as political constraints upon securing bilateral agreements on issues such as migration.

US domestic perceptions have had an important influence on the country's immigration policy. According to Papademetriou and Meyers, a US-Mexico migratory agreement might have been possible given changing attitudes towards immigrants on the part of political actors such as trade unions, business, religious and advocacy groups which now consider they have a positive economic impact (Meyers and Papademetriou, 2002). Certainly, concerns over possible labour shortages in the Californian agricultural sector were reflected in a change of discourse on the migration issue by comparison with 1994 (Watts, 2003: 1377). In contrast to their discontent and opposition in previous decades, labour unions such as the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) began to advocate a comprehensive regularisation programme as immigrant workers became a major potential cohort of members (Briggs, 2001). As one of the labour unions exercising a major influence on immigration policymakers and public opinion, the AFLCIO played an important supporting role when the Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA) was issued in 1996 (Sweeney, 1996). Nevertheless, support was still limited to the regularisation of illegal immigrants rather than the creation of an open-door immigration policy. More recently, during the debate on migratory reform at the beginning of the Bush administration, the AFLCIO favoured an expansive recognition of immigrants' human and labour rights and opposed the implementation of employers' verification instruments (Sweeney, 2004; American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 2000).

However, notwithstanding the changing attitudes of important civil society groups, the shape of US immigration policy has been primarily determined by the positions of officials and politicians at the federal, state and local levels. It is evident how the immigration issue plays a crucial role in the voting tendencies of the electorate, particularly for the Hispanic community. In all political campaigns at all levels, the question of immigration reform is on the agenda.

Moreover, state and county elected authorities have some discretion as to how they implement immigration policies. An example of the contradiction between the central and state migratory approach was the case of the US Treasury's initiative to make driver's licenses an official identification for all residents regardless of their legal status. Some state Governors were opposed to this and ignored federal policy (Mittelstadt, 2004; Nash and Writer, 2004) .

While developments at the state and local levels are important, it remains clear that the Federal level plays a decisive role in setting the overall direction of immigration policy. In this regard, it is important to realise that the beginning of the Bush-Fox era was one of upheaval in both countries. Mexico's new democratic process was taking shape while the US initiated an intensive security policy after September 11, 2001. After that event, the need to respond to national political fears made it impossible for the US government to continue with the negotiation of a migration agreement. US Ambassador Davidow referred to the willingness of the White House to offer President Fox a quota of 100,000 work permits for temporary workers rather than an agreement (Davidow, 2003). However, Fox was under pressure to deliver on his campaign promise of addressing this historical demand (and had created high expectations domestically). Thus Fox, and especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Castañeda, did not consider that the offer satisfied their previous demands. At the same time, it appears that when Bush realised the limited domestic political benefits of increased Latino support, his interest in reaching a migratory agreement with Mexico diminished.

5.2.5 Cooperation for Development in the US-Mexico Relationship

Domestic political issues undermined an extensive agreement on migration between the two countries. In the same period, however, the Mexican authorities were willing to comply with tougher US requirements on border control. This reflected increased securitisation of the migration debate in North America. However, to what extent is it possible to discern elements of a "co-development" approach in relations between the two countries?

Looking at the case of Mexico, co-development is a concept that rarely appears in academic literature or the communications of governmental institutions. However, some academics and governments have identified policy elements in Mexico with a co-development character. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, in its publication “Le Codéveloppement” highlights the arrangements between various Mexican public authorities and home town clubs of Mexican migrants in the US as an example of successful co-development policy(République Française, 2005). Moreover, the Mexican state has in practice sought cooperation for development to inhibit emigration and increase the flows of remittances that sustain its balance of payments account. As noted, the impressive growth of remittances in recent years has attracted the attention of the principal global financial and development institutions as well as the Mexican government. This is not surprising since remittances were projected to grow by more than 300% between 2000 and 2006. According to the Director of Mexico’s Central Bank, the amount of remittances - US$92.7 billion were received during Fox’s presidential period - is greater than Mexico’s external debt or its stock of Foreign Direct Investment (Banco de México, 2009).

The channelling of these resources has emerged as a central issue in US-Mexican bilateral economic cooperation with the evolution of programmes launched by US government agencies to tackle Mexican development. The most remarkable agreements are those providing a cooperative framework to support this remittance-based development. As in the Mexican case, therefore, cooperation for development is part of US foreign policy towards Mexico, even if it is not explicitly articulated as “co-development” in official discourse.

Two decades after the recommendations from the Asencio report were issued, the very first attempt to include remittances as a development factor was the Partnership for Prosperity (P4P)(Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) Banco de México y The Federal Reserve Financial Services, 2006: 35). Indeed, in the opinion of Deborah Meyers from the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC, the bilateral discussion on development started by Asencio Commission proposals was comparable to the Global P4P. The Global P4P was signed by Bush and Fox in 2001 as a mechanism to promote Mexican

development and migration issues – in particular the use of remittances. While the P4P attempted to bring together the government and private sectors in strategic areas of development such as the construction of ports, airports, and housing, perhaps the most innovative element related to the channelling of remittances to productive projects in sending regions. The P4P attempted to extend the resources of the private sector to incorporate those economic sectors marginalised from the financial system (such as small and medium businesses and Mexican migrants abroad). Accordingly, the P4P marked a new era of economic cooperation in the bilateral relationship, with its main lines of action being the reinforcement of NAFTA trade and liberalisation trends in parallel to the integration of remittances as a bilateral exercise to enhance co-development as a policy. The agreement included the following activities:

• “Governments and financial institutions worked to bring more people into the financial system and lower the cost of sending money home. During a nine-month period in 2002, Mexicans living in California opened more than 170,000 first-time bank accounts.

• The US State Department led an effort to train 200 Mexican small business owners to use electronic commerce to expand and access new global markets.

• The US Export-Import Bank (ExIm) opened a $100 million fund to finance Mexican environmental projects. Projects include renewable energy, water supply, and waste management.

• The US Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a $50 million dollar, seven-year effort to enhance the capacity of higher education institutions. The first 18 university partnerships have been approved.

• The US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) awarded $1.5 million to study the feasibility of infrastructure projects in Mexico, including modernization of Puebla airport and expansion of the port of Veracruz.

• The Economy Ministry’s Marcha hacia el Sur programme promoted investment in the southern regions of Mexico. In 2002, 68 projects were identified generating almost 48,000 jobs.

• The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financed US franchise opportunities in Mexico. The first investment was $1.2 million for new food industry franchises in Yucatan and Tabasco". [14]

Meyers argues that this agreement embodied a new political willingness to support development in Mexico and provided a hopeful sign of an improving bilateral relationship. [15] Therefore, it could be argued that, even if co-development as a concept is not explicitly invoked in this bilateral approach, initiatives agreed by the US and Mexico to foster the transfer of remittances constituted a de facto process of co-development. Furthermore, this plan was based on transnational interaction involving a variety of actors: government, private enterprise, and migrants.

An important complement to the P4P was a series of initiatives by the Mexican government to strengthen its relationship with the Mexican diaspora and to facilitate financial links with home communities. The increase in funds sent by Mexicans in the US to Mexico, as well as other developing countries, attracted the attention of governments and banking institutions (Abernathy, 2003). As a consequence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda, launched a programme to provide Mexican citizens in the US with a form of national identification through Consulates, in particular those in states with the largest Mexican populations. With the declared objective of increasing remittances, both Governments sought to reduce the costs of these remittances and increase use of the banking system as a legal and formal channel. Consulates therefore came to an agreement with banks for acceptance of the Consular ID (Matrícula Consular) as a requisite for proving the migrant's identity as a Mexican citizen and for allowing them to open an account. There are currently 45 specific agreements with 17 Consulates which have permitted a rapid increase in the number of bank account holders (Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME), 2007). However, not all states accepted the Consular ID and under the REAL ID Act of February 2005, Congress issued standards for

[14] For further information on bilateral programmes within the P4P, se the official web page. http: //www.state.gov/documents/organization/16197.pdf

[15] Interview. September 2005. Washington,DC

accepting only driver's licenses as official US ID for opening bank accounts. The other agreement was reached between the US Treasury and the Mexican Government to reduce the cost of remittances from any US bank account to Mexican banks (Mittelstadt, 2004).

While taken together, these initiatives can be regarded as embodying a form of co-development, they were not as extensive as those debated in the Asencio report. Moreover, they contrast with the absence of a full agreement on migration between the two countries despite Mexican concessions on migration control, and a friendlier bilateral relationship overall and numerous US-Mexico Presidential Summits.

5.3 Spanish immigration policy and its effects on the Moroccan community

Due to pull factors in its labour market, Spain, together with other Southern EU members, has become the strategic entrance for migrants from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. In its relations with Morocco, Spain has been important both as a protagonist in shaping the overall stance of the EU and as a bilateral partner seeking to address immigration from the "South". The fight against irregular migration has been on the two countries' negotiating agenda since at least 1992 when the first readmission agreement was signed by Morocco and Spain (Gobierno de España y Reino de Marruecos, 1992; Betts, 2006). However, the Seville Summit of 2002 marked a low point in relations between the countries when the Spanish government sought to restrict EU development funds in order to discourage Morocco from adopting "uncooperative" positions regarding the management of irregular migration.

This analysis of Spanish immigration policy covers the economic and socio-demographic factors shaping labour market needs and the political pressures, both domestic and EU-related. From this perspective, the process of regularisation followed by the González, Aznar and Zapatero governments was influenced by the country's labour market needs. The need for a supply of workers to fill positions in the health, construction and services sectors is the main factor shaping informal and irregular immigration and a major influence on Spanish immigration policy. Thus, the challenge for Spain has been how to its

labour force requirements in these sectors with the EU's immigration policy. According to Jose Antonio Alonso from the Complutense University in Madrid[16], irrespective of whether the government was left or right there has been an underlying continuity in immigration policy, particularly insofar as it has had to take into account an increasingly restrictive EU policy.

In Spain, there have been at least six regularisation processes, in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005. The first three programmes involved the granting of legal status to those migrants who were already in the country and had failed in their regularising status for different reasons (Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). Although levels of migration to Spain were low in the 1980s, the prospect of membership of the European Community and the need to limit its potential as port of entry to the Community led the González government introducing the 1985 "Foreigner Law" (Ley de Extranjería). The law sought to accommodate to its condition as becoming a EU's member by updating its migration policy through the use of visas and to deter illegal immigration (Torres Kumbrián, 2008). The 2000 program, however, represented a shift in Spanish migratory policy since the objective was to "regularise" migrant workers from the informal sector, provide a more comprehensive integration policy and deter illegal immigration. Later, the 2005 regularisation aimed to regularise all those immigrants that had fallen into the category of illegal as a corrective measure to the previous regularisation which were based on immigration quotas. Table 5.2 summarises the total regularised population during the six processes.

Table 5-2 Results of Regularisations in Spain.

Regularisations in Spain	*Requested Resident permits*	*Issued Permits*	*Rejected*
1985	38,181	34,832	3,349
1991	130,406	109,135	21,271
1996	25,000	21,382	3,618
2000	246,392	229,874	16,518
2001	351,269	232,674	118,595
2005	691,655	578,375	113,280

Source: Annual Statistical Book of Immigration. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Government of Spain.

[16] Interview at the Universidad Complutense in May 2004.

At the beginning of the 1990s immigration became perceptible in Southern Europe with increasing flows of migrants from Morocco to Spain (90,000) and Italy (130,000) (Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005: 122). According to Antonio Izquierdo, Moroccan immigrants increased after the regularisation processes of 1985 and 1991(Izquierdo, 1996). The lack of proper legislation to provide legal channels for migrant workers along with a rise in demand for low-skilled migrants led to an increase in irregular migration which was largely absorbed by the informal economy in sectors such as agriculture, services and construction and services(Alonso, 2004). More important was the increased irregular migration prompted by the legalisation process of 1991 which was limited to the renewal, and issuing of work permits. Izquierdo calculated that, of the 128,000 applications for regularisation, there were 82,000 legal migrants seeking the renewal of temporary permits. Despite the established quotas agreed between the economic sectors and the Spanish labour authorities, the labour demand usually exceeded the quota limit, leading to a permissive system which the 2005 immigration law sought to correct. The law favoured the naturalisation and return of Spanish descendants, leading to an increasing share of Latin Americans in the immigration statistics.

Nevertheless, the legalised Moroccan population was higher than the legalised Argentinean population at the time (Berriane, 1996: 54). It is calculated that until the regularisation process of 2000, the Moroccan immigrants received resident permits in greater proportion than other nationalities (Van der Erf and Heering, 2002). Moroccan migration also benefited from family reunions: in 1998 out of a total of 13,887 resident permits granted, this national group obtained 7,548 and in 1999 it was 5,432 out of a total of 10,069, 54% of the permits for the total migrant population (Gobierno de España, 1998a). However, after the introduction of the immigration Laws from 2000-2001, Moroccans have been displaced by the Latin American immigrants in terms of their access to citizenship, working permits and reunification as channels for legal migration (Izquierdo, 2004b).

The Aznar government started to plan the regularisation of 2000 in a very difficult political context. The discussions on regularisation were affected by a

more xenophobic political atmosphere, as reflected in the El Ejido events when local residents attacked Moroccan communities in Andalucía. The government attempted to limit the risk that the regularisation would encourage further illegal immigration by limiting the period for applications from March to July, 2000. There were 146,781 successful applications from a total of 246,086 and it was primarily for those people who had been in the country before 1999 but had failed to regularise their status (Kostova Karaboytcheva, 2006) .

According to some Spanish scholars, Spanish migration policy under the PP permitted an increase in irregular migration to supply growing demand in some sectors while at the same time being selective in restricting the North African immigration and facilitating Latin American and East European immigration (Izquierdo, 2004b). Comparing those regular and registered by municipality on the basis of data presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter 2, Figure 5.1 shows that the Latin American levels of irregularity were higher than the Moroccans. This appears to confirm the view that the prevailing policy to fulfil the labour demand with irregular migration was based on an ethnic preference for Latin Americans.

Figure 5-1 Irregular migrants by country of origin in Spain, 2001-2004



Source: Ministry of Labour and Immigration and Institute of National Statistics of Spain.

Moreover, comparing Morocco as a country of origin to the rest, especially with Latin America, the data shows a higher Spanish citizenship rate granted to nationals from countries such as Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. Morocco and Peru head the list of origin immigrants who received Spanish citizenship, both of them with 25.7% and 11.0 respectively; however, the number of Latin American nationals represented almost half of the total with 51.7% (See Table 5.3). Overall, this can be explained by the Spanish integration policy which favoured the Latin American immigrants on the basis of cultural similarities (Van der Erf and Heering, 2002). [17] The growing naturalisation of Latin American versus the African, especially Moroccan cohort is due to the preference of the Spanish migratory policy which had granted citizenship to Latin American after fulfilling three years of residence while the Africans had to prove 10 years (Izquierdo, 2004a). These differing requirements can be seen as a response to concerns about the integration of immigrants in the Spanish society which arguably would be easier for the first immigrant cohort (Gil Araujo and Pedone, 2009).

Table 5-3 Citizenship Status Granted in 2002 and 2003

Country Origin	Total 2002	Total 2003	% Total granted Citizenship Status
Morocco	3,111	6,827	25.7
Peru	3,117	2,932	11.0
Dominican Republic	2,876	2,639	9.9
Cuba	2,088	1,601	6.0
Colombia	1,267	1,802	6.8
Ecuador	1,173	1,951	7.3
Total "Latin American"	14,304	13,738	51.7
Total	21,810	26,556	

Source: Annual Statistic Book for Immigration in Spain, 2003.

The 2005 regularisation introduced by Zapatero was seen as recognition by the Spanish Government of the important relationship between immigration flows and the labour market. In addition, it was also seen as an attempt to deal

[17] According to interviewees from the Spanish Government, the logic of facilitating the acquisition of Spanish citizenships over other nationalities, especially Moroccans, was the relative low cost in terms of cultural factors, such as language and religion.

with backlogs from previous regularisations and the inclusion of undocumented workers into the formal economic sector(Aguilera Izquierdo, 2005: 178). In this case (as Table 5.4 shows), the total number of applications was 691,655, of which 85% were successful (Pajares and Displàs, 2006: 7). Again, this shows the relatively limited share of Moroccans in the total numbers regularised (11.9%).

The 2005 regularisation marked a shift away from previous regularisation programmes. Earlier regularisations had been designed to help fill those jobs that were not taken by Spanish natives and did not require an employment offer to obtain the working permit (Aguilera Izquierdo, 2005: 183). In this sense, undocumented workers already in Spain were the subject of legalisation programmes. However, in the case of those earlier regularisations, the laws established workers' contracts in their country of origin and prohibited regularisation on the basis of residence or any other channel for regularisation. Therefore, new immigration flows to Spain at the beginning of the 2000s were channelled through legal immigration procedures in the country of origin and were linked to the labour demand presented by economic sectors (Aguilera Izquierdo, 2005: 184).

The regularisation process carried out by the Zapatero Administration in 2005 aimed to reduce the number of irregular immigrants in Spain, estimated to be as much as 1.4 million. This new policy sought to provide social rights to migrants in line with social democratic commitments, as well as to integrate the population into the taxation system. However, while Zapatero's policy marked a more cooperative approach between the two countries, the policy was also driven by concerns over border security and the fight against illegal immigration. Even so, the approach raised concerns inside and outside Spain. As it aimed to regularise those already settled in Spain, other EU members voiced fears that it might encourage further flows, a criticism supported by certain anti-migrant conservative PP members (Telò, 2001; Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005).

Table 5-4 Immigrant population regularised in 2005 by nationality.

Immigrant by Nationality	Total of applications	Total of Issued Permits	% of the Total regularised population
Bulgaria	25,598	22,239	3.8%
Romania	118,546	100,128	17.3%
Ukraine	22,247	19,466	3.4%
Morocco	86,806	68,727	11.9%
Mali	7,205	6,249	1.1%
Senegal	10,100	7,265	1.3%
Ecuador	140,020	127,925	22.1%
Colombia	56,760	50,417	8.7%
Dominican Rep.	3,994	3,212	0.6%
Peru	3,605	2,950	2.6%
Bolivia	47,325	39,773	6.9%
Pakistan	15,782	8,602	1.5%
China	13,416	8,159	1.4%
Other	140,251	113,263	19.6%
total	691,655	578,375	100.0%

Source: Annual Statistical Book. Spain, 2005.

5.3.1 Moroccan responses to Spanish and EU migration policies

The Spanish regularisation policies were just one aspect of national migration policies which impacted upon Moroccan policies. Indeed, the Moroccan authorities had to respond to a variety of Spanish and EU policies. It is debateable how far the Moroccans gained concessions in return for their compliance on what were often very sensitive policy issues.

Access to visas for legal migration has been a major priority for the Moroccan government given its economic dependence on remittances. Therefore, the regularisation laws of 2000 and 2001 were seen as contradictory by the Moroccans as being preferential to Latin American and Eastern European migrant workers (Khachani and Mghari, 2006). The fact that Latin Americans were growing in numbers and receiving work permits, while Moroccans who were already settled in Spain were not, contributed to bilateral tensions between Morocco and Spain.

Another example of the sensitivities surrounding bilateral migration relations was the 2001 cooperation agreement on migration. With Spain becoming both a receiving and transit country for Southern flows, it faced the

difficulty of reconciling the need to comply with EU policy on controlling illegal immigration on the one hand and its own need for migrants to supply its labour force in the face of changing domestic socio-demographic conditions. The 2001 cooperation agreement on immigration between Spain and Morocco sought to balance José María Aznar's compliance with the EU pressures and the Moroccan's expectations of more channels for legal migration.

In 2001 the Aznar administration announced it had reached an understanding with Morocco on a temporary migration agreement based on work permit quotas for Moroccans in exchange for collaboration in deterring Sub-Saharan Migration[18]. The legal admission of new arrivals was part of the general labour scheme which allowed the recruiting of workers in the country of origin (Telò, 2001; Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). Agreements such as this were relatively successful at channelling legal migration (Khachani and Mghari, 2006). However, such agreements were signed to cover specific shortages in the agricultural sector. In other respects, illegal immigration continued as a result of the high demand for workers not handled by the administrative recruitment process in the country of origin.

While the temporary migration agreement was relatively effective in some respects, its potential was constrained by continued tension between the Kingdom of Morocco and the government of Spain. The temporary migratory agreement signed in 2001 was suspended at the end of the same year due to allegations by the Government of Spain concerning Morocco's failure to stop Southern immigration flows. According to Belguendouz, Morocco was considered responsible when illegal migrants attempted to cross the Mediterranean sea, headed for the Atlantic shores of The Canary Islands or sought to enter Ceuta and Melilla (Belguendouz, 2002). Tensions over migration were, moreover, reflected in a more generally tense relationship between Morocco and Spain over such matters as fisheries and the Western Saharan conflict. Ultimately, Morocco had to accede to pressure from Spain

[18] The Agreement for Seasonal Workers was signed in July 25, 2001 in Madrid (Royaume du Maroc et le Royaume d'Espagne , 2001).

which enjoyed the support of the EU, given its dependency on external EU resources (Mansour, 2001).

The influence of EU policies on Spanish-Moroccan migration relations was apparent in other respects. As was discussed in Chapter 4, migration issues were linked to questions of broader economic cooperation. In the framework of the Association Agreement with Morocco, the EU Commission established as a priority the cooperation with third countries to address the questions ”how to address illegal migration and readmission” (European Commission, 2002a: 23). In response, the EU Commission underlines the budget line B7 767 as the mechanism to support the implementation of the readmission agreements with Third Countries by “improving national legislation and management of legal migration and asylum” and “making national legislation more effective to prevent and combat illegal emigration” (European Commission, 2002a: 27). Thus, the changes in their national legislation and the readmission agreements became conditions for further economic cooperation towards Euro-Med partners, including Morocco. The Moroccans’ cooperation on this issue was shaped by the prospect of better economic relationship with the EU: Association Agreements, Direct Foreign Investment[19] and Aid for Cooperation were linked as incentives to the negotiation of readmission agreements with “Third countries” (Trauner and Kruse, 2008).

The EU-Morocco negotiation of readmission agreements was to be a drawn out and ultimately unsuccessful process. Morocco had signed bilateral agreements with a number of member states: Spain (Gobierno de España y Reino de Marruecos, 1992), as well as Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Although a full agreement was not secured, Morocco cooperated with the EU on the issue, even if it caused political frictions with Southern partners. This was the case after the EU requested Morocco implement visa requirements for third country nationals during its mission to Rabat in 2000 (Van Selm, 2002). The HLWG Action Plan for Morocco established “Support (for) the

[19] Spain is the main partner in Foreign Direct Investment. Investment in Real Estate and Tourist infrastructure brought €40 million from Spanish multinational companies including the ONE in the electricity sector and Repsol in oil and natural gas.

adoption of visa requirements by Morocco for third country nationals, especially those of the West African region (such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Democratic Republic of Congo), and effective measures to be adopted by the Moroccan authorities, to prevent the illegal migration of aliens transiting through Morocco" (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999).

Moroccan compliance with EU requirements was also apparent in the country's 2003 legislation which represented a shift in migratory policy. Given that the country did not possess an up to date migration law, the regulation of entry and permanent residence in the country in terms of foreigners' rights could have been seen as a positive development. However, the focus on punishing illegal immigration and the lack of protection for asylum seekers reinforced the impression it had been created to accommodate EU demands. Despite controversy about its effects on the Moroccan population, the Kingdom ordered the imposition of substantial fines and even prison terms for those violating the new legislation. Moreover, the contested issue of Law 02-03 (Morocco's Immigration Law issued in 2003) appeared to demonstrate Morocco's cooperation with the EU despite the lack of resources to apprehend both national and Sub-Saharan immigrants(Alami M'Chichi, 2005a). Therefore, the need for EU assistance to achieve this goal had to be reinforced through the MEDA II.

Abdel Belguendouz asserts that the Law on Migration issued in 2003 by the Moroccan Government responded to political pressures from the EU and specifically Spain, notwithstanding the difficult political relationship with the latter[20]. The penalisation of human traffic, illegal Moroccan emigration and immigration from other African countries was Morocco's attempt to comply with the EU's fortress policy. Moreover, the enlargement of Europe in 2004 once again brought up the question of readmission agreements with Morocco. The Commission prepared the document "Wider Europe" to draw on the new policy towards Eastern Europe, partnership with Russia and continuing Southern immigration, in which Morocco played the role of a barrier to African immigrants

[20] Interview with Prof. Belguendouz in Rabat, July 2004

by means of cooperative actions with Spanish border control authorities. In Geddes' opinion, the external dimension of EU migration and Asylum policy is linked to a policy that places "emphasis on the wanted or useful migration in terms of its potential contribution to the economies of Member States" (Geddes, 2005).

This cooperation on migration control was manifest in a variety of Moroccan initiatives. The Moroccan Government created a Police Directorate for Migration and Border Guards as well as an Observatory for Migration in 2004 to work in conjunction with Spanish maritime patrols in the Mediterranean Sea and off the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the Canary Islands. According to a report from the Moroccan authorities, measures taken by the Moroccan government succeeded in deterring illegal migration and the country received positive recognition from the Spanish government, although the pressure to extend collaboration is constant in the Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relationship (Lahlou, 2005b). Certainly, increasing deportations of asylum seekers from Morocco have become the focus of criticism from human rights organisations. According to Moroccan authorities, 360 human trafficking networks were dismantled as part of the fight against smuggling (Geddes, 2005: 799). In order to demonstrate cooperation on the control of illegal migrants, the Moroccan Government in December 2004 announced the apprehension of 26,000 illegal migrants, 9,000 Moroccans and 17,000 Sub-Saharans (Lahlou, 2005b). Nevertheless, the October 2005 scenario has been repeated as migrants attempting to cross the border to Ceuta are injured in the process, along with the "pateras" who cross to the Canary Islands in order to avoid the Northern border secured by the Spanish government's Integral External Surveillance System (SIVE) (Salin, 2006). The SIVE was intended as part of the Spanish government's compliance with the EU's external border control policy. Its main objective was to detect and apprehend those illegal migrants traversing the Spanish maritime border through the Canary Islands and Andalusian coast principally. In 1999, the Spanish government approved a budget of €150 million for its development over the period to 2004 (Carling, 2007). Nevertheless, the anticipated prevention of illegal immigration had instead humanitarian

consequences as there was shift to more dangerous routes which were less accessible for surveillance (Alami M'Chichi, 2005a: 78; Alami M'Chichi, 2005b; L'Economiste, 2005).

Moroccan cooperation with the Spanish authorities focused on the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. According to Spain's Ministry of the Interior, the measures used to reinforce the physical border controls around these territories had successfully deterred attempts to cross the border. It reported a reduction of almost 42% in 2006 when compared to the previous year and in the case of Melilla, a reduction of 80% (Ministerio del Interior, 2006). Beyond the question of effectiveness in stemming illegal immigration, border cooperation with Morocco was welcomed by the Spanish Government and it sought further cooperation in the readmission of migrants (Abou, 2005). In 2006, the number of deported migrants was 12,270 and the majority were Moroccans (Ministerio del Interior, 2006).[21]

Further institutional cooperation was achieved through regular meetings between Ministry of the Interior officials from Spain and Morocco. Accounting for the successful cooperation between countries, the reports on illegal migration showed an increasing number of apprehensions. According to Spanish government statistics, in 1996 Morocco made 6,701 apprehensions and this number increased to 12,858 in 2000. During the same period the number of apprehensions of Sub-Saharans rose from 142 to 3,431(Lahlou, 2005b). However, more significant is the collaboration of the government of Morocco as well as those of Senegal and Mauritania in the apprehension of illegal African immigrants in their own territories. Spain announced the implementation of the SIVE along the Southern Coast of Spain, the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla in conjunction with the Royal Moroccan Guard (and claimed that it was efficient in terms of apprehensions and the repatriation of illegal migrants). Financial assistance, the exchange of information and joint operations to control

[21] The consequences of cooperation with Spain and the EU were exposed in 2005 when many Sub-Saharan migrants were killed by Moroccan officers while attempting to cross the border into the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa. On this occasion, Moroccan border forces shot at migrants climbing the fence Abou, G. (2005) Melilla : nouvelle tentative d'assaut. *AFP Maroc*, 6.10.2005..

EU external borders proved to be the principal mechanisms featured in the bilateral relationship, pushing aside the priorities of development announced in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Another major project involving Morocco in the control of borders, the "Sea Horse" project was launched by Portugal, Italy, Germany, France and Belgium. It was led by Spain which was to work jointly with Morocco, Mauritania, the Cape Verde Islands and Senegal. The main objective of the project was to reinforce the maritime border on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts with financial assistance from AENEAS. Different actions were projected to jointly deliver with each country which, according to the Spanish Civil Guard, had as its main object the persecution of "the criminal networks that operate in the illegal immigration area are jointly working regularly with drug traffics, smugglers and terrorists which are serious scum for the European Union" (Guardia Civil de España, 2006).[22]

The consequences of pressure on Morocco are accusations of human rights violations and the failure to provide legal channels for the country's own population to migrate. As analysed by different Moroccan scholars, the need to migrate is continual and the need to arrange migratory agreements is a priority for the Moroccan government. However, the benefits which Morocco obtained in exchange for its cooperation could be considered as quite limited, as seen in the overall effects of economic integration (discussed in Chapter 4) and in more specific arrangements on migration cooperation. In 2004, an attempt to channel legal migration was organised as part of the Aeneas programme.[23] However, according to Manuel Alonso and Spanish NGOs,[24] it has been a complete failure since the administrative procedures used to match demand to the supply

[22]Author's own translation.

[23] Here, the European Union and the Government, through the Agence de L'Emploi, are collaborating in addressing specific demands of labour from European employers. However, the infrastructure and the financial resources do not cover all the needs to process applications and recruitment. Moreover, the Moroccan government has been blamed when some fraudulent incidents arose from these programmes. There is basically a note on a case where certain company required specific trained labour force, and the government was asking certain amount of money to process the application, so when the company withdrew its offer, the government had to face the potential migrants.

[24] Interview in Rabat, Morocco, July 2004.

of workers via independent recruitment companies lacked verification mechanisms that would make their operations reliable.

5.3.2 The Politics of Spanish-Moroccan Relations.

The distinctive relationship between Morocco and Spain was conditioned by changes in political leadership, domestic politics and geopolitical interests in the two countries. As regards political leadership, the death of King Hassan II served as a turning point in the national and international politics of Morocco. At the same time, the political momentum created by Spanish President Aznar had a major influence on both Spain's relationship with Morocco and the shaping of the EU's position, particularly in the field of immigration and cooperation for development.

Morocco's diplomacy was influenced by the change in leadership and domestic political circumstances. As the successor to the throne of the Kingdom of Morocco, Mohammed VI was strongly influenced by his educational experience in France. He favoured an open Moroccan economy where foreign investment capital would foster economic growth. However, while he wanted to pursue a close economic and commercial relationship with the EU, he also wanted to maintain close ties with geographical and historic-cultural neighbours in the Maghreb and the rest of Africa as well as with the Arabic and Islamic Worlds (Hernando de Larramendi, 1997; Sehimi, 2003).

The willingness of the Moroccan government under Mohammed VI to cooperate with European partners was manifest in various respects. The Association Agreement signed between the EU and Morocco required the development of a coherent and comprehensive immigration policy, including bilateral cooperation against illegal immigration to the EU (Sehimi, 2003). As discussed, Morocco's willingness to cooperate on this matter was seen in its 2003 Immigration Law which established procedures to regulate national and international illegal migration across its borders. The Association Agreement also demonstrated the extent to which Morocco had shifted its economic approach towards neo-liberal policies such as privatisation, trade agreements, and openness to foreign capital in state-owned strategic sectors. Morocco's

economy, it was argued, needed to attract foreign capital to increase economic growth.

While generally cooperative in pursuing economic reforms, in other respects the regime was prepared to enhance its legitimacy by highlighting its defence of Moroccan concerns, thereby steering public opinion in a patriotic direction. This was most apparent in the government´s diplomacy with Spain where it sought to assert its national interests at a time when bilateral relations were deteriorating. Relations with Spain during the Aznar era were particularly poor (López Garcia and De Larramendi, 2003). Historical territorial claims became sources of tension in the relationship, as demonstrated by disagreements over Ceuta and Melilla and the "conflict" over the Perejil Island. Another instance of the tension was over the future of the Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco in the 1970s following Spanish withdrawal). This had become an issue of national sovereignty for the Moroccan people and the government was able to channel public support on this issue (According to interviews with Moroccan intellectuals, they all agreed that Spain should endorse Morocco's territorial claims[25] and support Morocco in the Sahara conflict). Issues of sovereignty had been at the heart of the monarchy's claims to legitimacy since its independence from France and Spain. The regime invoked this nationalism as a source of cohesion and common identity in its call for the return of lost territories (Gillespie, 2004).

Indeed, it could be argued that the nationalistic pride of Moroccan political elites was provoked by the political attitude of Aznar government towards the king, a factor that contributed to a deteriorating bilateral relationship.[26] While various officials and academics from both countries agree that the Spanish President's personality contributed to this negative bilateral relationship, the Spanish approach was also driven by other factors. According to Alonso, the toughening of Spanish migratory policy under Aznar was driven by an attempt to take the lead in harmonising migration policy within the EU. As Alonso notes,

[25] Interview with Prof. Larbi Benoth, Mohammed VI University, Rabat, Morocco.

[26] Interview with Jose Antonio Alonso, Director of the Foreign Affairs Studies Centre of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, May, 2004.

the policy was not only pursued by the government: the 2000 Immigration Law was approved by the Partido Socialista Obrero de España (PSOE) as well as by the Partido Popular (PP) even though the Socialists were committed to helping vulnerable groups as part of their programme.[27]

However, relations were not only conflictual: cooperation intensified as regards the security aspect of regional policy. Morocco demonstrated its commitment to border security by investing resources in border controls. According to Alonso, Spanish-Moroccan cooperation rather than conflict was to be expected after the terrorist attack at Madrid's Atocha Central Railway Station for two reasons: firstly, the effect of the attack on the Presidential elections was to bring about the defeat of the PP and return the PSOE to power. This change was seen as boding well for the relationship (not least because the new minister for Foreign Affairs, Manuel Montesinos, was known as a well-established specialist on North African matters)(Hernando de Larramendi, 2004). Secondly, Morocco was seeking alliances to support it in its territorial claims in the Western Sahara region. Spain's support was seen as central to addressing this territorial dispute, and Morocco might have been willing to swap better control of the border financed by EU and Spanish funds for political support on the Western Saharan matter.

5.3.3 Bilateral Development Initiatives and Migration: Co-development Policies towards Morocco

Given this background, how did co-development emerge in terms of different member state policies towards Morocco? The Seville Summit of 2002 saw the Spanish government propose that financial aid be used as a coercive mechanism to punish those Third countries failing to cooperate on migration control. While opposition to this measure - especially from France and Sweden - obliged the Spanish Presidency to withdraw the proposal, it was still perceived by Morocco as symptomatic of their difficult relationship with the Spanish government of the time (Sehimi, 2003). When the PSOE returned to power, there was an expectation of more favourable migration policies. Overall,

[27] Ibid

therefore, domestic politics emerged as a key factor defining forthcoming bilateral relations, although this axiom is true only if national interests do not pose a danger to the regional interest shaped by EU foreign policy in the Euro-Mediterranean region.[28]

In considering the role of development aid in the relationship between Morocco and the EU, it is worth taking into account the contrast between the EU's aid and investments in the eight Mediterranean countries and those in Central European countries, a difference that underlines the distinct diplomatic strategies pursued in each region and also underlines a distinct regional foreign policy towards those geo-political units. In 1994, Mohammed VI noted that EU aid represented "1 to 2 % of Morocco's development need"[29] and compared it with "the development aid given by the OPEC members (which) is seventeen times superior to those agreed by the ECC. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the principal providers" (Alaoui El Hassan, 1994). However much of the aid that Morocco receives is on a bilateral basis from individual EU member states. Moreover, Morocco receives substantially more from the EU and its members than other MENA countries.

Thus, a political cost–benefit analysis might help us to understand Morocco's reasons for accepting the terms for its negotiations with the EU and the outcomes of those negotiations. One of the consequences of Morocco negotiating more financial resources is that the EU could claim greater reciprocity in terms of cooperation on migration control. This fact could explain the Spanish authorities' view that Moroccan–Spanish cooperation had reduced the illegal entry of Sub-Saharan migrants. In the words of the Spanish Interior Minister, there was an "intensification of Moroccan-Spanish collaboration,

[28] Financial aid as a coercive instrument was already used by the EU when pursuing changes to the Moroccan political system. After January 1992, when the EU refused to ratify the 4th financial protocol signed by the EU and Morocco, the Kingdom of Morocco was clear that the EU multilateral approach was driven by a factor of conditionality given that its political system was not based on Western democratic values. This was exemplified by the Sahara issue, which led to categorization of the Moroccan Kingdom as one lacking democracy and a transparent system.

[29] See assessment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco when signing CEE-Maroc complimentary protocols in Rabat on May 26, 1988 and cited by Mohammed Ben El Hassan Alaoui in his book on the signing of the CEE-Maroc complimentary protocols in Rabat on May 26, 1988.

mainly through the exchange of information and the reinforcement of common patrols as well as control measures, including the SIVE".[30]

As noted, in 2002, the Spanish Government, then holding the EU Presidency, proposed using EU Development funds as a mechanism to enforce readmission return programmes. France was one of the countries reacting negatively to this proposal. There are a number of explanations for the French reaction, but the most likely ones would be its traditional policy of seeking to accommodate the political leadership in Francophone Africa and its attempts to take the lead in the development of EU migration policy. Although Spain, like France, has a colonial link with Morocco, their relationships with the former colony have developed in very different ways. This difference is apparent in their respective migration and co-development policies. As with France, Spain has its own co-development policy for its Mediterranean partner. Indeed, while the Spain-Morocco relationship can be seen as a component of the overall EU-Morocco regional framework, it also needs to be considered from the specific perspective of bilateral relations. Moreover, the nature of the relationship is made even more complex by the Spanish system of regional autonomy (see Chapter 6). Although the Spanish government aims to pursue a common policy, the nature of politics in different parts of the country emerges as a particular shaping element that differentiates itself from the central Spanish government regarding co-development.

The initial attempt to link development and migration in national policy was made in the GRECO Plan on migration management (Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración 2000-2004). The policy was led by the Interior Ministry which was responsible for immigration control in Spain. This plan outlined the country's co-development policy and the involvement of various institutions in its implementation (Dirección General para la extranjería y la Inmigración, 2001). Interviews with the scholar Graciela Malgesini and an NGO official highlighted the Plan's objectives as being centred on the return of migrants by offering technical and financial aid to migrants

[30] http: //www.moroccotimes.com/Paper/article.asp?idr=6&id=14225 Downloaded on 20.04.06

along with cooperation for development in their countries of origin. Bilateral cooperation on the readmission of illegal migrants was central to migratory policy.

As the Plan GRECO was seen as part of Spain's foreign policy to follow up EU migratory policy by supporting Southern border control, the central government's policy evolved into Cooperation for Development policy through the State Secretariat for International Cooperation under the direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On this basis, the current AECID (previously the AECI) provides financial aid for Morocco as a key neighbour within the Non-EU Mediterranean region. The main objective was to accomplish the Millennium goals: the reduction of poverty by accompanying financial aid receptors in carrying out development projects is the proposed goal to be followed up through the Technical Office for Cooperation established in recipient countries such as Morocco. According to interviews with AECI officials, migratory policy was never a component of Spanish Cooperation for Development programmes. Nonetheless, the Plan Rector de la Cooperation 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 as the guideline for the AECID (or AECI) outlines the concept of co-development as one of the pillars of Cooperation for Development policy, and also establishes the mechanisms to be followed by the main actors implementing decentralised cooperation for development.[31] Moreover, official documents such as the Annual Plan for International Cooperation highlight poverty as a cause of migration. Consequently, bringing development to origin countries with high migration rates could give the impression that immigration is being dealt with in a humanitarian way. Nonetheless, migration policy was primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior prior to 2004. As a policy, co-development in Spain has evolved from its origins as a return policy similar to that pioneered by Nair into a more broadly based local development policy. The Spanish government's definition of the policy appears to cover the main elements as developed by the French government: inter-state cooperation to halt illegal migration, visa quotas, and financial aid for return. It is

[31] Interview with Jesús Rodríguez Andia, Ambassador under Special Mission for Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, Madrid, Spain May 2004.

also clear that co-development is carried out by different state institutions in response to their particular objectives and circumstances.

In line with the co-development approach and the voluntary return policy, Spain launched its own voluntary return program. Along with integration policy actions carried out by the Spanish government, in 2000 organisations and governments promoted the return of asylum seekers. Dissemination of information and financial aid were the mechanisms used to attract potential returnees. Other programmes were elaborated jointly with the International Organization of Migration. As in the French approach, Spain promoted co-development as a return policy through the issuing of micro-credits by the Spanish Cooperation for Development Agency (AECID) (Gallego, 2003). Apparently, the lack of a well organised infrastructure and information led to the failure of the programme in Spain as was the case in the French initiative (2006).

Co-development appeared to enter a new phase with the institutional reorganisation which followed the election of Zapatero. Until 2004, the AECI was the main organisation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for implementing a programme of development principally in the Northern areas of Morocco where there is a colonial legacy. Following the election of the PSOE in 2004, the State Secretary for International and Ibero-American Cooperation was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This body articulated the link between development and migration more explicitly: the 2004 Annual Plan for International Cooperation emphasised co-development as a strategy for international cooperation (involving a wide range of actors from the Spanish Cooperation arena), as well as a mechanism designed to reduce economic pressures for migration from particular geographical areas (Cano, 2006).

Given the complexities of the way in which co-development was integrated into the government's program, it is necessary to clarify the structure and objectives of the Spanish authorities on this issue. The country's decentralised cooperation system involves a financial aid and co-development policy which crosses different state institutions and leads to multi-level intervention from a wide range of actors. The main players are Parliament, the General State of Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Ministry of

Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, NGOs, Universities and Trade Unions as well as the Interministerial Commission for International Cooperation, the Development Cooperation Council and the Interterritorial Development Cooperation Commission.

The bulk of funds for development cooperation are channelled through contributions to the EU's development budget and its own bilateral aid arrangements. In 2004, the total amount directed from Spain to EU multilateral cooperation was just over €495 million while Spanish bilateral cooperation represented €842 million (including nearly €224 million of loans, €334 million allocated to the Autonomous Community and local government budgets and €80 million to NGOs (Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica, 2004). Geopolitical interests were evident in the distribution of bilateral aid for development: North Africa received 7.6% of ODA, compared with 44.2% directed to Latin America (Intermon Oxfam, 2003: 4). Moreover, bilateral aid allocated to Morocco was part of a resource shared with other North African Countries though the Spanish government claims it favours Morocco in its cooperation for development policy, pointing out that it benefits the most within the region.

The Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation (2001-2004) explains that preferential, although not exclusive, cooperation with Spanish-speaking countries is "related to the degree of their historical and cultural links amongst other complex intrinsic interests" (Gobierno de España, 2000: 11).[32] This justification may have been strengthened by growing direct Spanish investment in this region: Spain shared 40% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the region in 2000, displacing the US as the major traditional investor in Latin America (Subdirección General de Estudios sobre el Sector Exterior, 2002). According to the same document, however, the Maghreb and specifically Morocco are also defined as an important geographical area for Spanish Foreign Policy. The criterion is also based on historical and geopolitical factors, as well as considerations of regional security and migration. Thus Morocco, and

[32] Translated by the author.

specifically its Northern region, received special attention in terms of support for cooperation for development. Consequently, those NGOs favoured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by means of the AECI are concentrated in the North of Morocco.

From an economic development perspective, there seems to be limited linkage between aid and migration issues. For the most part the funds invested in development are, it is claimed, concentrated in various social and cultural activities. Thus, for instance, in 2001 Spanish-Morocco bilateral non – reimbursable ODA was nearly €42 million, of which €19.8 million were used in the maintenance of a Spanish academic institutes (Gobierno de España, 2003b). [33] Indeed, cultural activities consume a considerable proportion of Spanish aid which is considered an instrument of foreign policy as Spanish language is a tool to expand Spain's trade and market opportunities (Fernández Blanco, 2005). It appears that other elements of the budget for cooperation are focused on the implementation of development projects. Therefore, Spanish funds for development in Morocco must be analysed in terms of the political benefits that a closer relationship could bring as a result of humanitarian and development aid policy.

The current Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation (2005-2008) delegated co-development policy mainly to the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The geographical priorities are Ecuador and Morocco, the two largest migrant groups in Spain. Bilateral cooperation with the origin-country implies coordination in terms of quotas and voluntary returns. Co-development policy is implemented in line with policies defined by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and, specifically, the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration in coordination with other administrations and cooperation agents. The policy embraces those elements associated with Nair´s definition of co-development. Financial and technical aid accompanies return migration policy along with micro credits and training.

[33] The total budget for the Institute Cervantes increased to €61.9 million in 2005 (Fernández Blanco, V. ,2005).

Remittances represent the capital to boost local development in the origin communities by means of their optimisation of productive projects. Migrants organised in associations are the agents of transnational action to improve living standards in their origin country.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how both the policies of host countries and the responses of sending countries are shaped by a variety of domestic factors and pressures and by their respective geopolitical interests. In both cases, the home countries have had to adapt to a migration debate in the host countries, which is increasingly informed by security concerns, and to cooperate with policies of stricter border controls. Their cooperation, however, has not always been reciprocated in terms of agreements for managing and improving the conditions of migrants in host countries.

Migratory policies in both contexts are often at odds with a constant labour market demand for low-skilled workers. In US migration policy, domestic political pressures have prevailed over labour market requirements. Although in the past, Mexican governments were able to secure agreements with the US federal government; this level of cooperation was not always reproduced at lower levels of the US political system which were characterised by unilateral actions and failures to implement federal agreements. Even after an improvement in bilateral ties marked by a shift from “distant neighbour” to “shared responsibility” attitudes and by apparently good relations between Presidents Bush and Fox, the Mexican government was able to obtain limited improvements on migration issues. Similarly, hopes that the Spain-Morocco bilateral relationship would improve once the PSOE replaced the PP in government were only partially fulfilled. Both Mexico and Morocco hoped for improvements in the arrangements for seasonal migration and for the regularisation of their nationals abroad. The Spanish government granted some increase in seasonal migration quotas but these were regarded as inadequate. Similarly, in the regularisation process, the Moroccan immigrants were less favoured than the Latin American countries, indicating an ethnic preference in

the migration policy-making process. Mexico's hopes for improvements on both immigration and regularisation were largely dashed by 9-11.

Indeed, 9-11 overshadowed both bilateral relationships, directly in the case of US-Mexico and indirectly in the case of Spain-Morocco. Cooperation on security implied further changes in the immigration rules from sending countries since they had been also identified as transit points for illegal immigration. Maintaining a smooth flow of goods across the US–Mexico border represents a challenge at the same time as upgrading the level of deterrence for drug trafficking, illegal migration and terrorist threat. In the Spanish-Morocco case, the challenge was to expand the collaboration between governments after the terrorist threat of extreme Islamic groups in Spain and in Morocco itself.

In the dimension of cooperation for development, the approach from the US and Spain towards Mexico and Morocco respectively are quite distinct. To the extent that there are signs of emerging policies of co-development, these too seem to be shaped by the particular circumstances, priorities and interests of the countries involved, particularly the host countries. In the case of Spain, co-development policies seem to have emerged out of particular political circumstances and have had different results from other host countries such as France. In the case of the US, a different dynamic is at work, involving agreements between the US and Mexico to increase remittance inflows that could be translated into local development programmes. In both cases, the measures have been related to immigration control policies. In the case of Spain, co-development has been linked to policies of readmission and return aid. In the case of the US, the changes in national financial rules and bilateral agreements to facilitate the transfer of remittances are accompanying mechanism to implement the readmission and return of migrants.

When comparing Morocco and Mexico as sending countries, it could be said that neither of them has explicitly adopted the concept of co-development as a way of referring to those programmes which link transnational action and local development. However, it is clear that Mexico has deployed a more sophisticated approach to reach its diaspora and translated this into the transnational action of local investment than is the case in Morocco. However,

as we will see in Chapter 6 both countries are witnessing a dynamic and energetic involvement of the diaspora in the development of their home communities.

CHAPTER 6 CO-DEVELOPMENT AS A BOTTOM–UP POLICY

6.1 Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 have examined the treatment of the migration-development nexus from the perspectives of public authorities in the regional, bilateral and domestic contexts, focusing on co-development as a top-down policy. In this chapter, we shift the emphasis towards a more bottom up perspective. Here our view of co-development is based on the core assumption that the migrant plays a central role in a bottom-up policy involving interaction with various official and unofficial organisations. It also aims to take into account the migrant's ability to participate in transnational action which could be fully accomplished if it is based on an entitlement to two-way transit between the host country and the sending country. However, in the cases examined in this chapter, such bottom-up activities have not been pursued in isolation, detached from public authorities. Instead, we have seen a convergence between the top-down and bottom up aspects of co-development. Co-development as a policy entailing a top-down approach assumes coordination between different institutions and state-to-state interaction which may affect the actions of migrants. Capital, training, education, employment, investment, health, and urban infrastructure are just some of the mechanisms involved in the achievement of such co-development policies. The extent to which this policy is effective in involving migrants and producing transnational action to boost local development in migrant communities is the central concern of this chapter.

For analytical reasons, in this chapter, co-development is considered to be a process resulting from transnational interaction between migrants and their communities (migrant-led initiatives) whereas co-development as a top-down policy implies state intervention (state-led initiatives) as a response to political and economic interests beyond the migrant's immediate well-being. The analysis focuses on the extent to which migrant and home communities develop a transnational dynamic as well as the interaction between top-down and bottom-up approaches in the sending-regions of both Morocco and Mexico.

The main objective of this chapter is therefore to provide analysis of the local actors participating in co-development. We analyse the extent to which links have been established between state-led programmes and migrants and the ways such relationships are organised, focusing on how transnational communities influence development in sending regions. My assumption is that co-development is shaped by geographical, historical, economic, and political contexts. While there are some similarities between the two countries, the differing contexts have contributed to different outcomes in each case. For example, while both Mexico and Morocco initiated processes for institutionalising the state-diaspora relationship, it is Mexico that has managed to devise local policies for the migrant population abroad and sending communities. There are also important differences in the roles played by the host countries in these co-development programmes. When we examine the approaches to co-development apparent in host countries, there is a clear distinction between the active role played by Spain and the passive role of the US.

The chapter is divided into two main sections dealing with the cases of Mexico and Morocco. Both cases demonstrate different forms of engagement with co-development, reflecting their respective migratory histories and the political and cultural contexts. The sending regions within these two countries are classified as new or traditional. Recent migration flows from Southern Mexico, such as Chiapas and Veracruz, are contrasted with traditional flows from such states as Zacatecas. Meanwhile, in the case of Morocco, recent changes in the migration profile show a shift to central urban regions such as Casablanca and Rabat from traditional regions such as the Souss. There is a clear contrast between the lack of hometown associations in the first category and well-structured socio-political networks in the second. Nevertheless, co-development policies serve as an umbrella for interaction between local sending communities, migrant-based organisations in host countries and governmental institutions in both host and sending countries.

In addition, there are differences in the way receiving countries have engaged with migrants in the development of such policies. In this chapter, we

focus on the case of Spain whose experience as a receiving country is different from other European countries with established Moroccan migrant communities. In the Spanish case, reflecting their relatively recent arrival, the migrant community seems to be less established than the well-positioned Moroccan communities in other European countries. We explore the way in which these conditions have affected attempts by Spanish government and nongovernment organisations to encourage bottom-up co-development policies.

In the other case under consideration, we find that as a receiving country the United States lacks formally defined co-development policies to engage Mexican immigrants with development programmes that serve to boost development in migrant communities. Nevertheless, we do find mechanisms that serve to facilitate increased remittances as well attempts to direct them to productive projects through financial institutions.

6.2 Mexico: Migration and Development

6.2.1 An introduction to State-Diaspora initiatives in Mexico

When comparing the migrant-oriented development policies of Zacatecas and Chiapas, we find they have received different treatment with regard to national development and state-led social initiatives. Faced with a national migratory policy seeking to promote the state-diaspora link, local actors have reacted in different ways to government initiatives. Local actors in Zacatecas have been referred to as pioneers of co-development in Mexico since the late 1980s while stakeholders in Chiapas have only become aware of the impact of migration on their communities and have yet to respond institutionally (Vila Freyer, 2007).

In order to understand the different stages of state-diaspora engagement at the local level, it is necessary to consider the history of the institutionalisation of migrant-oriented policies. One of the best known examples is the so called *3x1 Programme* which has been highlighted as a successful instance of co-development (République Française, 2005). Preceding this programme, Zacatecan social clubs in the US demanded attention from the Governor of Zacatecas in order to execute building projects in sending communities. In response, the Zacatecas Government created the 1x1 Programme which

established cooperation between the government and the diaspora,[1] triggering an increase in the political and economic demands addressed to the state government. At this stage, Mexico's central government entered the frame, adding US$1 to the US$2 provided by migrant clubs and the Zacatecas state government. This additional effort effectively institutionalised the link between the state and the diaspora. From 1992 to 1995, the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) initiated an unofficial programme incorporating demands from migrant communities abroad and their hometowns in Mexico to provide social and infrastructure projects in sending regions. Subsequently, President Fox converted this local programme into a national project involving all state and municipal authorities as part of the Citizen Initiative (Iniciativa Ciudadana) Programme which in 2002 became the 3x1 Programme conducted by the Ministry of Social Development (Soto Priante and Velázquez Holguín, 2006).

From a conventional perspective on development, Zacatecas could be analysed as a positive example of a bottom–up policy of using remittances for productive projects likely to stem migration from sending regions. However, certain scholars have been critical of the way the Government agency focused on developing political links with migrant hometown associations and of the limited development benefits of remittances. The severest critics have underlined the ultimate interest of the state in replacing the government budget with funds sent by migrants (García Zamora, 2006; Alarcón and Rabadán, 2009). Such criticisms cannot be fully assessed given the absence of long-term evaluations, however. Moreover, there is evidence that the schemes have had positive effects on transparency in the use of resources, local organisation, improvements to public services and the promotion of employment. Certain

[1]See the Zacatecan home towns association web page for further information about their foundation and activities:
http:
//www.federacionzacatecana.org/index.php?sectionName=projects&subSection=overview&story_id=131

scholars have, therefore, proposed a broader analysis which takes into account such factors as the stage of migration under consideration to differentiate the immediate benefits for well-being from those of later stages when migration decreases as result of sustained development (de Haas, 2003a). On the basis of the broadly positive assessment, international financial institutions have also become involved in spreading this model of government-migrant cooperation as an example to be followed elsewhere (López Cordova, 2004).

Taking into account the evolution of the state-diaspora relationship in Mexico, certain questions must be highlighted concerning how migrants were able to engage with this process of institutionalisation and the extent to which it benefited local development. Co-development as a mechanism to inhibit migration in the long term is based on the premise of increasing living standards in sending regions to reduce the pressure to migrate. However, the ultimate goals of both state and non-state actors may include interests beyond simply boosting development. Despite the negative assessment of critics of these programmes, there is a positive assessment that claims there are immediate benefits for high-rate sending regions. The next section therefore explores those cases involving current sending regions and their experiences as beneficiaries of institutional aid programmes. It appears that, for those communities in states participating in international migration, remittances can have a considerable impact on economic growth at the local level. German Zárate (2004) highlights the importance of the amount of remittances with respect to federal spending on state budgets: in some municipalities, remittances are greater than revenues received as part of the federal budget. It is in the traditional sending regions that remittances are highest and where migrant organisations based in the US are most highly developed. Towns in these regions clearly benefit from the efforts of community organisations with direct remittances being channelled into local infrastructure and housing improvements.

6.2.2 Transnational Politics in Mexico: The 3x1 Programme

The most political and well organised migrant organisations in the US come from those states with high rates of migration and a long-term participation in the international migration phenomenon (Rivera Salgado et al., 2005). Given that the Mexican co-development model is primarily focused on a limited geographical area, some have questioned its feasibility as a national strategy. Local development based on transnational action is clearly a consequence of the political consensus and organisation previously achieved by migrant organisations. However, there remains a question as to whether some form of political commitment on the part of the government could improve this situation, specifically in relation to local development already undertaken by migrants in communities where remittances have always been a source of investment in sectors such as agriculture. In such cases, a similar threefold (central, state and migrant) investment arrangement could be directed towards creating the infrastructure that in the developed countries is normally carried out by the government. Remittances are indeed a source of capital used to ameliorate the state's limited capacity to invest in local development and are also used as a strategy to fight poverty (Mariscal, 2006).

Bottom-up initiatives for investment in common projects and the use of remittances as capital are inherent to the history of migration. In this sense, Goldring distinguishes "transmigrant-led" from "state-led" transnational processes to differentiate traditional philanthropic initiatives from those boosted by the government (Goldring, 2002a: 60). The use of informal channels to send family remittances from the US was a regular practice among Mexican migrants during the period of circular migration due to the lack of financial mechanisms provided by the banking system. Since communal decisions regarding investment in projects in sending towns were related to social and religious activities, the role of the government as an actor in the policies of local development based on remittances was a novelty in local politics. As soon as municipal and state government authorities understood the political asset represented by Mexicans abroad, however, transnational politics also acquired a political dimension at the national level. It is not surprising that, on coming to

power, former president Vicente Fox, who previously served as governor of the high migration state of Guanajuato, created the position of Special Coordinator for Relations with the diaspora and institutionalised the state-diaspora relationship through the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) as part of his foreign policy. This organisation had as a precedent the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad which was dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6.2.3 Mexican migrants as transnational political actors.

The beginnings of a change in the role of Mexican migrants abroad – and of the attitude of the Mexican government – date back to the 1970s. In the opinion of Ayón, the Mexican government shifted its policy of "no-policy" to an active policy to reach Mexicans in the US when Luis Echeverría became president in 1976. His government became the very first to approach "Chicano" (Mexican American) organisations for economic and political reasons. Emigration was used as an escape valve for economic problems in Mexico and a source of political influence for lobbying Mexican interests in the US (Ayón, 2006). Nevertheless, the Mexican response was limited to cultural and academic exchange with the "Chicano" community, that is, those who claim Mexican ancestry but are ultimately more involved in identity politics in the US than the pursuit of a link to Mexico as their country of origin.

The interest of Mexican migrants abroad in collaborating with government initiatives dates back to the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Los Angeles in 1986 when it sought to direct remittances for developing projects jointly with the Zacatecas state government. This example of a diaspora-government model used to support projects via bottom-up initiatives in Zacatecas was later used in other states. In 1989, hometown associations (HTAs) from Guerrero and other states were organised into federations in the main cities of California, Illinois, Texas and New York.

At the end of the 1980s there were efforts to move beyond the strategy of seeking the approval and support of Hispanic or Latino organisations in order to establish a relationship with networks of Mexican citizens in the US. Scholars who have studied the political relationship between the Mexican government

and the diaspora in the US maintain that the shift away from the policy "of no policy" is explained by the demand from the same migrants to participate in local public affairs (Ayón, 2006; Délano, 2006). Two factors have influenced this transformation in the relationship between the Mexican government and the diaspora: one is the democratisation process in Mexico that opened channels of communication, while the other is a foreign policy that began to address the Mexican-origin community in the US by means of specific programmes.

At the start of the Salinas administration (1988-1994), the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (PMCA) was launched with the main objective of reaching the "pro-NAFTA and generally pro-Mexico lobby among newly legalised Mexican immigrants as well as professionals and entrepreneurs of Mexican origin" (Goldring, 2002a: 65) in order to contribute to the pursuit of Mexican interests in the US. In 2002, during the Fox administration, the PMCA evolved into the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IMA) and was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thereby institutionalising the state-diaspora relationship. One of the most important objectives of this institute was to establish a link with the population of Mexican origin in a broad range of sectors[2]. In 2002 the IMA established the National Council for Mexican Communities in the US as the institutional channel of communication between Mexican organisations in the US and the government of Mexico (Sada Solana, 2006: 24). Even if institutionalisation of the relationship with the diaspora was a determining factor for carrying out projects funded by the 3x1 Programme, it was the infrastructure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that provided the IMA with an extended network linking Mexican migrants to the Federal government and the Consular structure in both the US and Canada.

Indeed, the capabilities of the 47 consular offices in the US served as a pivotal mechanism for expanding channels of communication with Mexicans abroad (González Gutiérrez, 2006). The structure of the IMA is based on representational mechanisms such as the Consulting Council that serves as a

[2] The former Executive Director of the IMA has worked with the PMCA. His experience as a member of the Consular staff in Los Angeles allowed him to establish a strong link with Mexican Clubs and develop the IMA funding strategy. Interview with Carlos Gonzalez held in June 2005, Mexico City.

channel of communication between representatives of the Mexican community in the US and government institutions at the state and local levels (González Gutiérrez, 2006). This structure therefore offers a political voice to people who live in the US illegally and cannot cross the border, linking them to Mexican institutions. In effect, a form of transnationalism takes place independently of the lack of mobility of those who cannot physically share the same territory. In the case of Zacatecas, for instance, Governor Amalia García indicated there were 850 thousand Zacatecans living abroad while 1.35 million were living in the state itself (Cano, 2004). The social and political capacity to influence decisions both in Mexico and the US is therefore based on both the quantitative and political organisational capabilities of the diaspora in the US. Sub-national governments have therefore also deployed their own institutional infrastructure to reach out to migrants abroad and create their own foreign policy.

The policy of state-diaspora institutionalisation in Mexico seems to be the consequence of political demands initiated by the Mexican community abroad which in turn were boosted by the democratisation process in Mexico. An indication of the changes taking place was the decree issued by President Zedillo in 1997 which reformed Articles 30, 32 and 37 of the Constitution regarding the rights of those who were born to Mexican parents abroad (by blood or acquisition) to acquire Mexican nationality. However, the right to citizenship did not extend to the right to pursue a representative position in Mexican politics as this remained restricted to those Mexican nationals born in the country (Congreso de México, 2004). The distinction between nationality and citizenship was at the centre of the democratisation process as the right to vote and to run for representative office was not extended to Mexicans living abroad. It was only in 2004, during the Fox Administration, that the House of Representatives approved a bill for “double nationality”, thus enabling all Mexicans abroad who had acquired the citizenship of another nation to maintain their Mexican nationality rights. This was an important shift in the state-diaspora relationship in the Mexican case since it opened legal channels for Mexican migrants to pursue representative positions and enabled them to vote for the

very first time in the presidential election of 2006, an initial step in recognising the political rights of Mexicans abroad.

Mexicans in the US were also important players in the process of democratisation. For them, the government of Mexico had failed to show transparency in the allocation of resources, eradication of corruption, promotion of economic development and the granting of legal and transparent elections. Therefore, when comparing the political image of Vicente Fox to the other two presidential candidates in 2000, Fox managed to create empathy with these goals among Mexicans abroad. After his election, Mexican HTAs, which had already begun to approach local governments in Mexico, proposed that the Fox Administration expand the 3x1 Programme and establish it as an institutionalised federal policy.[3]

The 3x1 Programme gave a political dimension to the transnational activities of HTAs. The governance of migration-development programmes involves different levels of government: as well as the HTAs there are local Supervision Committees and the local civil society of communities. In a complex working structure, the politics of HTAs evolved as a distinct reality from those in the community of origin. From a transnational perspective, HTAs in the US are political units acting in their own interests while the leadership of HTAs becomes a political struggle for status in home-towns in Mexico (Goldring, 1998). The political struggle leading to the election of a President of the Confederation provides a microcosm of Mexican domestic politics (Goldring, 2002a). Federations and confederations represent the highest level of organisation of the Mexican migrant community abroad. The first level includes sporadic actions carried out by spontaneous organisations of migrants from the same hometown; the second level is that of HTAs as more formal migrant organisations from the same locality. The third level corresponds to the Federation of HTAs as the umbrella organisation for all HTAs in the same US

[3] The Home Town Association for Zacatecans in Southern California (Federación de Zacatecanos) recognises Martha Ofelia Jiménez as the co-founder of the nation-wide 3x1 Program. She negotiated the rules enabling the participation of most HTAs in the US with the Fox administration. See http: //federacionzacatecana.orgi

state (Zárate Hoyos, 2009: 133) and there are Federations from the major emigration states such as Zacatecas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Oaxaca. Since many of their leaders support, and even belong to, political parties in Mexico political activism is translated into local political dynamics in Mexico. One interesting case was the immigrant leader known as “The Tomato King” who, even though he resided in the US, was able to participate in local elections thanks to a recent State law in Zacatecas that removed residency in Mexico as a prerequisite for political candidacy. He ran for the post of mayor of his hometown, Jerez, and was proposed by the three major political parties at different times (Smith and Bakker, 2005).

The empowerment of municipalities in Mexico together with the ability of HTAs to influence municipal programmes created a micro-space of governance that reflected the process of democratisation in Mexico. In parallel to the political organisation of HTAs, Mexico’s governmental administration converted municipalities into active participants due to changes to the Mexican Constitution which gave them budgetary autonomy (Guerrero Amparán and Guillén López, 2000). Thus, municipal authorities were empowered to participate in the decision making process of community projects that were jointly defined with the HTAs, although a struggle is involved when municipal authorities try to impose government planning priorities (García Zamora, 2006). Therefore, the decision making process implies negotiation at the basic level within local authorities which also gives way to a balance of power between state and national authorities. In addition, the implications of civil society monitoring the spending of HTA resources may create conflicts of interest if they belong to different political parties.

Based on previous empirical research, it is clear that international migrants participated in the organisation of communal projects and the investment of savings in their own productive projects (Alarcón, 1984). However, these initiatives were usually sporadic and did not necessarily imply the formal organisation of migrants. However, the launch of “Iniciativa Ciudadana” as the first step to formalisation of the 3x1 Programme was supported by the active promotion of clubs of immigrants in the main Mexican-origin populated cities of

the US, including Chicago and Los Angeles (Sada Solana, 2006). HTA leaders themselves recognise that formalisation of their association and expansion of their branches at the national level was boosted to a significant degree by active promotion of the 3x1 Programme by the Fox administration (Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME), 2005). Nevertheless, the internal politics of HTAs embedded in the Federations could affect any external effort to reach consensus or complete projects forming part of a government initiative[4].

The other political aspect is related to the political dynamics of a multi-level governmental project. A common interest for all three governmental levels is the use of migrant remittances to subsidise public programmes. However, any attempt to define community projects considered suitable for the receipt of federal subsidies leads to clashes within state and municipal governments as well as between migrants themselves. One example was the restriction of the 3x1 Programme to investment in “infrastructure” or “productive” projects, which led to its ruling against the interests of Michoacán migrants wanting to build a rodeo. HTAs claimed their right to invest in this type of project regardless of the rules imposed by the 3x1 Programme, and the case was resolved in their favour after negotiations with municipal authorities (Rivera Salgado et al., 2005). HTA influence extended further to include social and community projects as part of the 3x1 Programme (Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico (SEDESOL), 2007). Since then HTAs have become active in good governance at the local level.

At the state level, in 2004 recently elected Zacatecas State Governor Amalia García also supported the Federation of Zacatecans and its interest in launching social projects within the 3x1 programme. In this case, the Governor from the left-wing PRD political party, initially responded to political demands from Zacatecans abroad who wanted their interests to be included in the state government programmes. The response was also politically motivated as it prompted a clash with the right-wing President Fox who challenged the legitimacy of these proposals on the grounds that such traditional and

[4] During an informal conversation with a former Governor of one of the most traditional sending states, he expressed his concern at the lack of organization among clubs within the confederations and the lack of consensus for intrinsic political dynamics on matters of community projects submitted for 3x1 funding.

communal HTA projects were not part of the Programme (Cano and Valadez, 2004). The state government and HTAs therefore represented a joint political force for demanding that the construction of churches, the organisation of celebrations and the building of rodeos should qualify as suitable projects for 3x1 Programme funding.

Taking into account the different studies evaluating the 3x1 Programme, their conclusions show the strengths and weaknesses of the project. The inclusion of migrants in local development projects is certainly a positive step since they become involved as political and economic actors (Burgess, 2006). The participation of migrants has contributed to good governance according to the development paradigm[5]. Transparency, the rule of law and participation are pillars of good local governance boosted by the 3x1 Programme. However, the lack of mechanisms to guarantee balance and equality of participation by all three levels of government and HTAs weakens the extent to which it has boosted development as a bottom–up practice. As a programme of the Fox administration, the 3x1 reveals the logic of the state's interest in approaching the Mexican community abroad to make them sources of external private funds and political assets. However, the concerns of migrant communities for both the development of their hometowns and their destination communities in the US demonstrates their political interest in participating in both societies. The immigrant community have also been able to use the HTA as mechanisms for seeking the support of the Mexican government in pursuing the protection of their human, labour and political rights in the US, issues that they feel have not been resolved.

In terms of transparency, HTAs have served as a mechanism of scrutiny over public finances at the local government level (Fernández de Castro et al., 2006). One of the main demands of HTAs was the eradication of corrupt practices that would negatively affect the quality and efficient use of resources.

[5] A broad definition given by UNESCAP refers to Good Governance as " the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)", which is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law" United Nations. UNESCAP (2010) *What is Good Governance?* [online] http: //www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp.

Committees of Validation and Attention to Migrants were therefore created by the SEDESOL as mechanisms of scrutiny to observe the progress of approved projects funded jointly with 3x1 Programme resources. However, the lack of organisation and the internal political dynamics of these Committees in some cases led to problems of inefficiency and delays in the conclusion of projects. Since trust in local government as an administrator of their remittances is often weak, separate Supervision Committees, with their roots in local civil society along with NGOs and Universities, were established and became a trusted mechanism for continuing this program. Some researchers have accordingly highlighted the strength of these local Committees on the basis of their technical training and dissemination of 3x1 programmes (García de Alba Tinajero et al., 2006).

The economic benefits at the local level are evident, with remittances equalling or superseding the budget allocated to the 3x1 Programme by the SEDESOL in some municipalities. However, the rules of operation have undermined the equity with which resources have been distributed across the country. In response, the federal government modified the rules of operation for the 3x1 Programme with respect to the participation of HTAs to allow more efficient distribution of government funds to the migrants' hometowns. Previously, any civil association could participate as long as it was supported by an HTA. However, under the new rules only those clubs belonging to a Federation of HTAs enjoyed access to the program. Data collected by Katrina Burgess shows a more equitable distribution of the 3x1 Projects with more being carried out in the rural areas which usually correspond to the location of the migrants' hometowns. Based on information from SEDESOL, Burgess states that the period 2002-2005 saw the highest participation of rural areas at the national level, although it differed from state to state. For instance, in Guerrero and Guanajuato the share of rural projects was 82% whereas in Jalisco it was 48% (Burgess, 2006: 113). According to researcher Basilia Valenzuela, in the case of Jalisco the weaker participation of rural areas can be explained by the fact that local authorities from the Head City of the

Municipality[6] received federal funds with only written support from HTAs since these were not actively involved in the project (Valenzuela V., 2007).

The risk of the 3x1 Programme falling prey to clientelism has been a constant source of concern. The key issue is project selection, which might respond to the interests of the Federation of HTAs or one of the three levels of government. Despite the fact that the Rules of Operation of the 3x1 Programme created the Committee of Validation and Attention to Migrants as a consulting and technical body to approve projects with technical and budget justification, there is room in the negotiation process to politically influence the approval or veto of a project. As Garcia Zamora points out, there is a danger of creating a form of transnational corporatism based on political party alliances between local governments and HTAs (Burgess, 2006). Since the rules of operation require that only organised HTAs form part of the program, excluding individual migrants, there is a risk that political pressures will be more influential than migrants' preferences.

The resources within the 3x1 Programme are quite modest, limiting its effectiveness as a mechanism to stem immigration in the long term. In an attempt to illustrate the minimal resources invested in the Program, Rodolfo Garcia Zamora (2006) from the Zacatecas research group "Migración y Desarrollo", compares the average annual government budget of 15 million dollars during the period 2003-2006, used to fund 6250 projects, to daily remittances sent by migrants of 63 million dollars in 2006. Moreover, there is considerable criticism regarding the lack of productive projects which could have economic multiplier effects. While the inclusion of cultural or social projects eligible for the 3x1 Programme is a positive factor to ensure the involvement of HTAs and contributes to the "well-being" of origin communities, the overall economic effect is questionable. Moreover, the government initiative lacks mechanisms to attract the transnational business sector to accompany migrant initiatives. It seems that, although there have been attempts to launch

[6] According to the administrative organization of decentralised government in Mexico, a municipality can include more than one city and rural towns. The Head City of the Municipality governs all towns forming the municipality.

productive projects within the 3x1 framework; they have been unsuccessful given the lack of interest from potential business partners.

The programme has also been criticised because, although it is intended as a mechanism to tackle poverty alleviation, much of the resource have been used to fund investment in municipal infrastructure. This association between poverty alleviation and the 3X1 Programme is due to the fact that it is considered to be a part of national social policy: the 3X1 Programme is part of SEDESOL's development policy "Overcoming Poverty, Working Together" which is in turn part of the National Programme for Development. Indeed, SEDESOL has considered remittances as a tool to reduce poverty in high-migration and marginalised areas (Government of Mexico, 2008). The increase in the level of remittances from US$814 to US$1,000 per migrant from 2002 to 2002 is regarded as the outcome of a national policy which helped to reduce the sending costs, the access to the bank in rural areas and the issue of the Consular ID (Gobierno de México, 2002: 9). Thus, the positive impact on poverty alleviation through the channelling of remittances is considered to be a success resulting from the support of governmental agencies.

While there is a commitment to poverty alleviation in principle, an examination of the 3x1 programme budget indicates a different set of priorities. As Table 6.1 shows, most of the budgetary resources are invested in urbanisation, electrification, running water and community centres when compared to the total invested in productive projects, educational scholarships and even the health sector. In effect, the projects for urban infrastructure that should be separately financed by the government receive substantial resources from 3X1 while educational scholarships and productive projects receive less support.

Table 6-1 Total of 3x1 investment per category, 2002-2007 in Millions Pesos $MX

Type of Project	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	TOTAL
Running Water, Drainage, Electrification	$226	$274	$547	$440	$236	$376	$2,099
Roads and Highways	$67	$57	$83	$100	$58	$77	$442
Health, Education and Sports	$190	$113	$114	$151	122	$186	$876
Urbanisation and Paving	$276	$282	$477	$591	$452	$623	$2,071
Educational Scholarships	$0	$0	$0	$15	$25	$66	$106
Community Centres	$127	$143	$160	$298	$317	$220	$1,265
Productive Projects	$40	$22	$53	$77	$45	$50	$287
Other	$16	$8	$2	$19	$19	$15	$79
Total	$942	$899	$1,436	$1691	$1,274	$1,613	$7,855 ($785 US million)

Source. Ministry of Social Development, Government of Mexico.

Various studies have shown that a range of states and localities in Mexico have increased their participation as sending regions and receivers of remittances and assert their right to use the latter to cover household expenses instead of contributing to 3x1 projects (Alarcón, 2004; Cohen, 2005; Cortina et al., 2005; Zárate Hoyos, 2007). Table 6.2 shows that there is uneven investment from both the Federal Government and state and local municipalities in conjunction with migrant associations. Of particular note is the fact there is a steady increase in participation in terms of the absolute number of HTAs as well as the increased number of states of origin in the US. Another important detail is the increased participation of municipalities and the total number of projects. In this sense, the benefits seem to be distributed more widely in territorial terms although the total amount invested is less in relation to the number of projects.

Table 6-2 Budget, Projects and Participants on the 3x1 program. 2002-2007

Budget per participating organisation in Mexican Pesos	***2002***	***2003***	***2004***	***2005***	***2006***	***2007***
Federal Government	$113.7	$99.9	$175.9	$232.1	$192.0	**$257.7**
State, Municipal and HTA financial contribution	$266.5	$277.7	$461.8	$619.7	$556.9	**$690.8**
Participating actors and projects						
States in the US as funding origin	8	17	31	35	34	**37**
Migrant Associations	20	200	527	815	723	**857**
Projects in Canada	0	1	2	0	0	**0**
Participating states in Mexico	20	18	23	26	26	**27**
Investment Projects	942	899	1,436	1,691	1274	**1613**
Municipalities receiving funds.	247	257	383	425	417	**443**

Source: Secretary of Social Development, Government of Mexico.

Most studies measure the general benefits of remittances in relation to macro level finances, household incomes and living standards, and their participation in sustaining local governments, rather than 3x1 specifically. The Map 6.1 shows the percentage distribution of those households receiving remittances. As can be seen, Southern states have shown the lowest productivity rates according to World Bank reports described in Chapter 2, and are also the least benefited by income from remittances. According to Jeronimo Cortina et al., just 10 states received 70% of the total amount of remittances, with a differentiated HDI (Human Development Index) rate. When comparing the ten states, four of them have the highest HDI rate and concentrate 32% of total remittances while states like Chiapas and Zacatecas, Tabasco and Tlaxcala have a low HDI, and only receive 7% of total remittances. However, further comparison of terms or remittances per capita shows there is no correlation between remittances per capita and HDI in the case of Mexico City and Chiapas which received US$110 and US$117 respectively (Cortina *et al.*, 2005). However, such studies have not focused on the socioeconomic impact of the 3X1 programmes on the cycle of migration.

Map 6-1 Households receiving remittances from the Mexican population in the US, 2008 by percent.



Source: Unit of Geo-statistical Information, El Colef.Tijuana, Mexico.

6.2.4 Co-development: a Contrasting Experience between Traditional and Non-traditional Regions.

Taking into account new patterns of migration in Mexico, it can be assumed this is a widespread phenomenon that leads to the spatial definition for “traditional” and “non-traditional” sending regions (Durand et al., 2001). Following this categorisation, my research interests concerning such states as Chiapas and Veracruz are based on the assumption that both have developed different patterns of state-diaspora interaction, leading to different experiences when compared to traditional sending regions such as Zacatecas, Michoacán or Jalisco. Remittance-based programmes such as the 3x1 depend on the ability of migrants to direct funds that match the government project. Furthermore, their ability to form hometown associations is a prerequisite for participation in the programme. Therefore, states where migration is more recent have fewer possibilities for involvement when migrants abroad are less organised socially. Nevertheless, the contribution from these new migrant flows is considerable in terms of their impact on sending communities even if they do not take full advantage of Government aid and development programmes. Furthermore, state intervention is the result of demands from migrants rather than a top-down policy designed to pursue their well-being and local development. The state of Chiapas, like the rest of Mexico, became involved due to the institutionalisation of migrant activities with organised hometown communities abroad participating in the 3x1 Social Programme (*Iniciativa Ciudadana*) launched by President Fox. This programme represented an attempt to channel migrant remittances into hometown infrastructure projects. The Social Development Ministry contributed up to one third of an allocated budget of nearly $US 1 million which was invested in 899 projects in 2003 (see table 6.2) (Soto Priante, 2006: 233). However, the participation of Chiapas was limited to 11 projects with a total investment of US$120,000 (Córdova, 2007).[7] State and local governments

[7] It was calculated on the basis of the 2003 exchange rate and the total amount in pesos was 1,284,881 pesos.

allocated another third of the cost of planned projects while migrant organisations contributed the remaining third.[8]

The development stage of subnational migratory policies achieved by municipal and state authorities corresponds to the stage of migration in each Mexican region. In the case of Chiapas, its role as one of the new sending regions has been downplayed in comparison to its geographically important role as a transit and receiving area. Despite the attention paid to migration issues by policy makers, the government has not paid significant attention to its role as a sending region. Hence, the link between migration and development is not clearly established in the policies of the regional authorities. Despite increased local economic growth due to remittances, neither federal programmes nor local public policies have taken into account the migrant population, including those in transit and transnational workers from Central America. Poverty alleviation and border control are the driving factors of public policies at the national level, whereas initiatives like the 3x1 Programme do not involve all sending communities or the majority of marginalised areas (Zenteno, 2008) .

New migration trends in Chiapas have been affected by more general trends within the regional economy. The principal economic sector in Chiapas is still agriculture, predominantly the production of corn and coffee. Each has faced a critical situation due to the current state of international prices and unfair trading conditions. The primary sector, especially fishing, also has potential to increase production levels, but current levels of productivity are poor. According to scholars from El Colegio de la Frontera Sur, these conditions constitute the starting point for an ongoing cycle of poverty and migration, both rural-urban and international. Scarcity of land is also a factor for migration and is the result of limited agrarian reform in Chiapas that, due to population increases, provides just one hectare per family. This has in turn led to the search for opportunities beyond rural areas. In addition, the low prices paid for agricultural products have also led those who own the land to sell up and migrate. The worst cases are those of people who decided to rent an “ejido” and

[8] See http: //www.sedesol.gob.mx/transparencia/transparencia_iniciativa_3x1.htm Downloaded on June 20, 2006.

live on a low income with no access to state credit. This is due to the fact that they have no land title which is required as a credit guarantee. Therefore, it is understandable that, when interviewed, the Chiapas Secretary of Economic Development stated that “The agricultural sector is no longer attractive for the young economically active population who prefer to migrate”.[9]

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that Chiapas is an increasingly important new source of migration. In tandem with this, remittances are becoming a more significant source of funds for communities in the region (Villafuerte Solís and García Aguilar, 2006). In the past, remittances in Chiapas were not particularly significant in national terms: between 1996 and 2001 they represented only 3% of the total received at the national level. However, for the local economy their significance has increased rapidly: between 2001 and 2002 the share of remittances in the GDP of Chiapas increased from 0.29% to 2.58% (Gobierno del Edo. de Chiapas, 2006). They are a particularly important source of resources for the 29% of households that receive remittances and are also a source for financing international migration. They are also an important source of income for the Central American refugee population in the region which uses remittances to finance travel costs, as well as for survival in conditions of extreme poverty. According to a Guatemalan woman who had been a refugee in Chiapas for the past decade, her husband was able to migrate by using the financial resources sent by relatives abroad.[10] Following a common pattern for household economic strategies, the goal of the husband was to continue sending money to sustain the rest of the family which included grandparents unable to migrate.

While recent trends show that it has great potential, Chiapas is not currently a major focus for co-development activities due to the lack of strong migrant-based associations abroad, relatively low levels of received remittances and the limited engagement of government offices and NGOs at all levels. Studies have identified Chiapas – along with Veracruz - as new sending regions.

[9] Interview with Secretary of Economic Development, State Government of Chiapas in Tuxtla Gutierrez, September 2005.

[10] Interview to a Guatemalan woman on a bus with deported Central American migrants from Veracruz, Veracruz to Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas. September 2005

This is reflected in higher levels of remittances (Chiapas received 655.3 million dollars in 2005) (Mariscal, 2006). This economic increase is consistent with the higher participation of urban and educated young people migrating to the US However, while migration and remittances are increasing, it does not appear that migrants from Chiapas have been able to develop social networks and diaspora organisations to the same extent as traditional sending states and consequently their participation in the 3x1 Programmes which foster the channelling of collective remittances is low.

A census of participants in this 3x1 Programme highlights those from Michoacán, Jalisco and Zacatecas as the main beneficiaries of the programme (See table 6.3).[11]

Table 6-3 Share of Participation by States in the 3x1 Program (%), 2003.

STATE	% 3X1 Projects
Zacatecas	35.8
Jalisco	20.5
Michoacán	7.1
San Luis Potosi	7.1
Guanajuato	4.2
Tlaxcala	4.1
Aguascalientes	3.3
Chiapas	1.2
Others	17.9
TOTAL	100.0

Source: Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL), 2003.

Those states with a more recent history of international migration, such as Chiapas and Veracruz, play a very small part in this governmental programme although they do receive remittances.[12] Given the lack of long-term and organised hometown associations able to follow the same approach as those from Zacatecas, Puebla and Michoacán, the Government of Veracruz launched its own local development programme in sending regions. However, so far its scope has been limited. According to interviewee Bertha Alicia Escobar, a former official for the Coordination Office for Migrants in the State of Veracruz, a

[11] See the list of beneficiaries reported by the Ministry of Social Development for the 3x1 Programme at: http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/subsecretarias/prospectiva/padrones/iniciativa_ciudadana/iniciativa_ciudadana.pdf Downloaded on June 20, 2006.

[12] For further analysis of the local impact of remittances in Mexico, see Gustavo Verduzco and Alejandro Canales.

policy of cooperation for development in the municipalities of Veracruz should include a local migratory policy. In her opinion, this programme was limited to boosting local development while it should have also supported the receipt and transit of migrants as well as those who had been expelled and deported. Along with the management of migration, the local development policy should also have been used to facilitate a popular consensus with businesses on investing remittances and promoting development (based on links with the Mexican-American population and individual or organised action). Migration trends bring together local and central government efforts to deal with the migration issue by means of the National Coordination Office for Migrants. Specifically in the case of Veracruz, Escobar describes the negative perception of emigration by local authorities and the general population. According to Escobar, this perception has led to reluctance on the part of the state Governor to pursue a local migratory policy. Nevertheless, it was understood as a process in which migration could not be stopped given the economic crisis affecting the region and the higher wages available in the United States. The development of an approach to migration was made more difficult by the fact that Veracruz itself also attracts Central American migrants who mainly serve as a labour force in the agricultural sector.

Nevertheless, Escobar believes there is potential to promote local development and roll back the negative microeconomic factors spurring migration[13]. For example, the Centre for Migrants, as an office within the Sub-Secretariat of Political Development in the Veracruz Government, was able to detect areas with high migration rates. It then worked with women and young people who were potential migrants in order to establish micro-businesses supported by both the local government and the Mexican–American Association. However, the programme run by this Secretariat disappeared after a change of executive officer. To a certain extent, this fact is explained by administrative

[13] In the course of fieldwork, the author visited a number of municipalities in Veracruz, including Teocelo, Coatepec, near Xalapa, and Tierra Colorada and Paso de Ovejas, 20 km from Veracruz in Veracruz State. These are small towns close to urban areas that have recently experienced international emigration to the US and which have followed the same pattern regarding the investment of remittances in construction and consumer goods and the use of these funds to finance migration.

changes since the Economic Development Secretariat assumed control of micro-business promotion, whilst the Political Development Secretariat focused on attention to migrants. As Chief Secretary Alicia González Ceresero explained, the objective of the Main Office "is to offer direct contact for the Migrant with the Government. What for? To offer assistance, such as legal assistance, administrative orientation, requests for documents, the issuing of copies of birth certificates and driving licences, or just to communicate with their families... We as a government form the link between the family and the migrant."[14]

González Ceresero thinks migration is a natural phenomenon that has always existed; people migrate because they want a better standard of living, thus from her perspective migration cannot be stopped since "social mobility is natural".[15] In any case, it is clear that the pressures to migrate remain strong. Locals in the municipalities visited believed migration offered the only chance for survival despite efforts to spur local development by engaging them in the production of arts and crafts with the help of local community organisations.[16] International migration accelerated after the coffee crisis in the coffee producer corridor of Veracruz State, specifically Xalapa and surrounding areas (Pérez, 2007). In addition, the depressed state of cane sugar production and the production of other primary sector products which traditionally sustained the state's economy,[17] stimulated rural-international migration to the US as a means of finding employment or better employment. Comparison between traditional (Zacatecas and Michoacán) and non-traditional (Chiapas and Veracruz) sending regions, reaffirms the importance played by diaspora organisations in

[14] Interview with Alicia Gonzalez Ceresero, Sub-Secretary of Political Development for the Veracruz State Government, Xalapa, Veracruz, January 2004.

[15] According to Gonzales Ceresero, migration should be analysed as a process of social mobility rather than "expulsion" created by economic factors.

[16] During the fieldwork in September 2005, I visited rural areas that were reported by researchers in Veracruz and Chiapas as sources of new migration.

[17] Interviews with sugar cane producers in Veracruz indicated there was a lack of employees for harvesting sugar cane and unfair competition from fructose imported from the US. One of the main coffee producers in Coatepec Xalapa was diversifying their products for export given the currently low production of coffee and also complained about low prices. Rural internal migrants known as "Jornaleros agrícolas" are now occupying the space left by those who have already emigrated.

spurring co-development. The locally deployed initiative serving as a link with migrants is remarkable in all respects. The Zacatecas project started as an initiative of Governor Genaro Borrego Estrada, who is now a senator for Zacatecas state and long-term member of the PRI party. In 1986 the United Zacatecan Clubs Foundation of Los Angeles (Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos Unidos de Los Angeles) developed the 1x1 Programme with the support of the Zacatecas Governor. Henceforth, the idea of uniting remittances and the federal budget to build projects proposed by hometown associations gave rise to this "co-development" programme. It is worth noting that Zacatecas' long tradition of migration has resulted in a pattern of circulatory movements of people. Of note here is the fact that Zacatecas has a long tradition of migration, especially circulatory movements; the transnational character of these enhances their influence as governments recognise them as important economic and political assets. Meanwhile, Veracruz and Chiapas as new sending and even transiting regions have recently become more organised in addressing specific needs. In fact, local authorities started to pay attention to the migrants' communities, as a way to respond to migrant's families demanding help with repatriation, transport of dead migrants and localisation of families.[18]

Other sending states also have initiatives that are currently supported within the National Confederation of Governors (CONAGO) framework. As Senator Rios and Senator Luebbert explain, states such as Michoacán and Tamaulipas have a voice in policy making decisions vis-à-vis the US Congress, as well as with Mexican foreign office representations and local migrant associations.[19] Even if inter-parliamentary meetings are the most relevant means to raise the migration issue at the bilateral level, the relationship with nationals abroad also provides input for initiatives approved by the Mexican Congress and those launched by local and state government administrations, as shown by the presence of the Coordination Office for Migrants in most states.

[18] Interview with the Coordinator of the Office for Attention to Veracruz's migrants abroad. Xalapa, Veracruz, September, 2005.

[19] Interview to Senator Serafin Rios (PRD) and Senator Oscar Luebbert (PRI), Mexico, DF, October 2003.

6.3 Co-development in the Morocco-Spain Framework

6.3.1 Co-development as a policy at the Autonomous Community and Municipal Government levels in Spain.

While the previous chapter tackled the policy of co-development as a component of Spanish foreign policy, in this section I examine the way in which co-development operates at other levels in the Spanish system. The country's quasi-federal characteristics make it possible for the sub-national units of government, principally the Autonomous Communities (AC) but also Municipal authorities, to pursue their own policy on development aid, subject to the overall priorities of national policy and the need for coordination by the centre. The extent to which these levels of authority engage in co-development activities varies considerably with some ACs - such as Catalonia, Andalusia, the Basque Country, and the Madrid Community - apparently very active in promoting co-development on this basis. While these programmes have as a guideline the "Master Plan", the 4-Year Plan for International Cooperation and Cooperation Law, each AC is able to draw up its own Plan of Cooperation and Cooperation Law as the basis for conducting autonomous co-development policies. Not surprisingly, the shape of the policy is the result of local political dynamics as well as the Central state - AC relationship. Decentralised cooperation in Spain has been referred to as a unique opportunity for bottom up co-development (González, 2007). However, the limited participation of immigrant associations, especially Moroccan associations, has been seen as a handicap to the pursuit of an effective co-development partnership.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of co-development has entered the Spanish academic and policy debates. The potential for applying those ideas, however, is subject to the interpretation and discretion of governments at various levels of the system. While there are national policy principles, different subnational authorities are able to carry out co-development in a variety of ways and in response to their own immigration-related interests. Consequently, co-development as a state-led policy conducted by local authorities is subject to varying interpretations of how to integrate the immigration issue into local public

policies. In some cases, for example, the funds are used for the purposes of integrating migrant communities within the region itself.

Institutionalisation of the international cooperation process involves a unique, albeit complex, interaction of state and non-state actors. Spain is divided into 17 ACs, 50 provinces and 8,092 municipalities; theoretically, every political unit is legally entitled to participate in the Official Aid for Development Programme. Each of the ACs in Spain is able to launch cooperation for development based on its international priorities.[20] Given the extended power to conduct co-development programmes from all AC authorities, the Inter-territorial Commission for Co-operation on Development is a mechanism used to coordinate their co-development policy actions. This Commission was created by the central government to regulate these "co-development" actions, focusing on state-AC interaction. Institutionally, it is linked to the Secretary of State for Cooperation for Development in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and acts as a consultative mechanism between central state institutions and autonomous governments, including Ceuta and Melilla. However, its consultative character means it does not act beyond the issuing of requests for the exchange of information that could help bridge the gap between co-development-related policies pursued by central institutions and ACs.

As a consequence of the rules governing each regional and local development programme, there has been a proliferation of local and regional Development-based NGOs (DNGO) and other civil society organisations. Once every AC allocates the ODA's Fiscal Year Budget, participation criteria for cooperation for development actions forming part of the support scheme for DNGOs are established. Geographical preferences, sectoral priorities and NGO registration requirements are amongst the criteria applied.

The ACs with the largest ODA budgets in 2002 were Andalusia (€22.43m.), Catalonia (€23.64m.), and the Basque Country (€30.05m.) (Acona et al., 2002) (See table 6.4). There are, moreover, important differences in the regions,

[20] According to the Constitution of Spain, Autonomous regions can conduct their own foreign policy initiatives as long as they do not conflict with those of the State in areas such as the signing of agreements and official foreign representation.

sectors and mechanisms which are supported by different ACs' development programmes. While the Madrid AC primarily favoured Latin American countries through the DNGOs, the Andalusia AC promoted cooperation through a DNGO support scheme, direct institutional cooperation with Morocco [21] and a Transborder Development Programme which represented a joint project between the Northern Provinces of Morocco and the government of Andalusia (Gobierno de España, 2003a).

The Law of Cooperation and the Strategic Aid Plan for Cooperation for Development are the mechanisms which provide a framework for subnational and local entities, overseeing the cooperation for development programmes carried out by diverse government and non-government actors (Malgesini, 1998). As a legal instrument, the Law of cooperation issued in 1998 sets the rules for the conduct such policies, setting the principles of "budgetary autonomy and self-responsibility" to define their aid for international cooperation (Gobierno de España, 1998b).

As Tomás Vera Romeo, Director of the Office for Cooperation for Development in the Ayuntamiento of Madrid, explains: "In Spain, international cooperation is decentralised, this implies that each one of the administrative units, and always a priori, formulates its cooperation in terms of what they believe appropriate and feasibly efficient, although this does not mean we are independent whenever we try to achieve international cooperation". He also explained how constraints on this independence come from feedback with political actors as well as from the guidelines coming from the AECI's Strategy Plan. He illustrated how this works in the following way: "We exchange ideas with the PP representatives in the "Cortes" (Congress)…but they do not have programmes, so our coordination is with the AECI, where we coordinate and complement programmes". In this sense, the policy of co-development for the Ayuntamiento de Madrid was influenced by the Partido Popular's members since they held power during this period, but the AECI provided the main guidelines to be followed.

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[21] http://www.andaluciasolidaria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=208

Table 6-4 Co-development in Spanish Autonomous Communities: Budget & Total of Non-EU immigrants.

Subnational governments	*Cooperation Law(4)*	*OAD (€ million) 2002(1)*	*% Budget 2002 allocated to co-development*	*Total Non-EU foreign Population 2003 (3)*	*As % of total*
Andalucia	Yes (Sept. 2003)	***22.43***	0.12	108,501	11.1%
Aragon	Yes	***4.51***	0.18	31,482	3.2%
Asturias	No	***4.53***	0.23	6,242	0.6%
Islas Baleares	Yes (Draft concluded in 2002) Approved in 2005	***8.18***	0.76	32,650	3.3%
Islas Canarias	No	***5.47***	0.13	45,292	4.6%
Cantabria	No	***1.58***	0.16	7,893	0.8%
Castilla-La Mancha	Yes (2003)	***12.78***	0.32	30,462	3.1%
Castilla y León	No	***4.69***	0.1	30,609	3.1%
Catalonia	Yes	***23.64***	0.16	289,326	29.6%
Extremadura	Yes (March 2003)	***5.47***	0.22	12,641	1.3%
Galicia	Yes (May 2003)	***4***	0.06	14,758	1.5%
La Rioja	Yes (2002)	***1.58***	0.3	11,171	1.1%
Madrid (2)	Yes (Yearly Cooperation Plan and Annual Plans)	***7.87***	0.1	276,715	28.3%
Murcia	No	***2.52***	0.15	48,159	4.9%
Navarra	No	***11.5***	***0.48%***	18,469	1.9%
País Vasco	Yes (Draft concluded in 2003) Approved in 2007	***30.05***	***0.45%***	14,370	1.5%

Sources: (1) Intermon Oxfam, La Realidad de la Ayuda 2003-2004. (2) Community of Madrid, Report on Cooperation for Development prepared by the Madrid's Public Administration (3) Ministry of the Interior, Spain: Statistical Yearbook, 2003. (4) Cooperation for Development: Legal Framework, document prepared by the University of Jaen, Spain. http: //www.ujaen.es/serv/vicint/home/docs/coop/documento_sobre_el_marco_legal.doc

Policy formulation seems to follow the same independent pattern, although it is interesting to note the differences between these local needs and those dictated by the Central Government administration. Here again, our interviewee Tomas Vera explains how the divergent co-development interests of the European Community, Spain and other ACs affect co-development policy in the local municipality (Ayuntamiento) of Madrid:

> "One step is coordination with other administrations, thus we coordinate with the Community of Madrid and we complement our programmes. Sometimes we cover spaces and sometimes we concentrate efforts in the same space and attempt to do the same with the central government's programme. One example is the programme

> "Azar" which is carried out by the AECI and concentrates aid in Morocco and which we are supporting. That is to say, our way of participating is to include Morocco in our strategic plan. Now we consider Morocco a priority, although our main guidelines are in line with the master plans, and perhaps the central government is in charge of the relation with the EU, so once they are coordinated we are also indirectly coordinating with them". [22]

Perhaps the most outstanding point in terms of this coordination is the fact that the ACs have an independent budget to address their own co-development and this has a potential impact on transnational action. While they do not contradict the guidelines of the Master Plan, they have developed a unique space to influence and perhaps balance state foreign policy. Thus, examination of the Law of Cooperation and the Master Plan linked to regional and local co-development programmes should allow us to reach some conclusions with respect to the influence of either bottom-up or top-down co-development policy guidelines.

The fight against poverty, respect for democratic principles, the protection of human rights, gender equality, the environment, the promotion of cultural dialogue, free-trade agreements, and the fair distribution of economic resources are basic principles for Spanish cooperation according to the Master Plan 2001-2004 approved in 2000 (Malgesini, 1998). However, policy is driven by specific national and regional geopolitical interests as well as by attempts to pursue co-development through a mix of integration policies at home and the integration of action abroad through NGOs of Spanish origin. Thus, the Master Plan establishes that "preferential orientation, although not exclusive for Iberoamerica and other Spanish-speaking countries, is based on criteria of coordination and complementariness pursued by EU Programmes: Spain must direct its resources to where it can have a more effective and beneficial impact" (Gobierno de España, 2000).

[22] Interview in Madrid, May 2004.

Indeed, when shaping their own Law of Cooperation and Cooperation Plans, ACs and local municipalities take into account the strategic geographical regions established by the national Master Plan (MP) and Law of Cooperation. Catalonia, for instance, establishes its priorities as the Maghreb, Algiers and Morocco which are described by the Master Plan as "the zone(s) of greatest interest for Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean and Arab World region, since Northern Africa is the closest region to Spain and with which it shares a wide-ranging and intense political, economic and socio-cultural interest"(Gobierno de España, 2000: 8).[23] It also considers supporting an area in conflict previously reported to the Council of Development Cooperation.[24]

Andalusia and Madrid have established Latin America as a geographical priority. For example, in 2001 Andalusia conducted 2,632 activities in Central America, 1,642 in Cuba, 1,682 in the Andean countries and 490 in South America, a total of 6,446, while in the Maghreb there were 1,113 with 1,111 in the rest of Africa. Madrid has also established Latin America as a priority, as Rosa María González from the Community of Madrid explained. The local authority (Ayuntamiento de Madrid) also participates in supporting this region.

While many officials stressed that Morocco is the most important region in the Maghreb, the resources allocated were limited. Andalusia, for instance, directs 3% of its total to Morocco, one of its geographical priorities, yet this is equivalent to the amount provided for Colombia (Aspectos Básicos de la estructura de la cooperación municipal: el caso de Andalusia: 63). In terms of decentralised cooperation carried out by local NGOs, for instance, Andalusia has provided €8.50 million in the period 1995-2004 for 52 projects in the Northern Provinces of Morocco. The main sectors are female empowerment (17 projects), health (9), rural development (6), training and education(4), productive sectors (5), child protection (4), culture(4) and social enhancement(1) (Junta de Andalucía, 2003).

[23] In terms of importance, other Latin American countries funded are el El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. In the African Sub-Saharan region, action is concentrated in Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal

[24] The full text can be found at http: //www.gencat.net/diari_c/3872/03071098.htm Downloaded on July 2, 2006

How far have immigration considerations shaped the priorities of AC and municipalities' development budgets? The growing significance of migration to Spain raised the political profile of the issue, with public opinion increasing the pressure for more funds to be channelled towards cooperation for development and integration projects. In principle, ACs' Cooperation Laws have set the geographical and budgetary priorities relative to the profile of non-EU member immigrants in their territories. Table 6.4 shows the total number of non-EU immigrants per Autonomous province and the proportion of the budget allocated to co-development policy.

Decentralised cooperation, along with DNGOs, played a significant role in ODA programmes. In 2002, the total budget was €360.5m. which represented a higher amount allocated by the Aid Development Fund (Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo, FAD). The budget for Co-development projects in Spain can be measured by the total amount allocated per AC or the percentage per immigrant in each AC. Figure 6.2 compares the proportion of immigrants within an AC on the one hand with each AC's share of the co-development budget on the other. In relative terms, a comparison of immigration rates and budgets for co-development shows, for instance, that ACs such as the Balearic Islands, Navarra and the Basque Country (which have significantly lower levels of non EU immigrants in their populations) receive an overwhelming percentage of the total budget for ACs, compared to ACs such as Catalonia or Madrid which have the highest concentrations of non-European immigrants in Spain.

Figure 6-2 Total of Non- EU immigrants in Spain and Co-development budget by Autonomous Region



Source: Spain: Statistical Yearbook, 2002 and Oxfam, 2003.

There is a marked difference in institutional and legal mechanisms between the different ACs. As noted in Table 6.4, most AC Governments have approved their own Law for Cooperation. This legal instrument follows the guidelines laid down by the Spanish State Law for Cooperation but moves beyond the Plan GRECO in terms of integration policy. Indeed, integration policies have become an important part of AC co-development budgets over time.

For example, as Madrid became one of the main destinations for non-European immigrants (mostly Latin American), it began to increase its budget for integration as part of co-development policy actions. Its Autonomous Cooperation Policy is summarised by Jose Antonio Alonso in the following way: two decades ago its budget was much less than that assigned by the Basque Region, it does not have the social and institutional support of that of Navarra, it has no associative tissue as in Catalonia and no ongoing institutional support as in the case of Andalusia to address aid development tasks (Ararteko, 2002).

The map of local co-development policy is now changing in terms of the new immigration profile. As we can see in Table 6.6, Madrid increased its budget from €7.1 to €17.39 million in the period 2000-2004 and there was a 74.6% increase in the bilateral Official Development Aid budget in the fiscal years 2003-2004 alone. In this latter one-year period, Murcia witnessed an increase of 44.6% followed by Valencia with 40.73%. The table also shows the Madrid and Murcia ACs as the regions with the highest proportions of immigrants in the local population. Yet Andalusia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country head the list of the most participative regions in terms of total budget, although the share of the immigrants in the population does not seem to be as significant as that of Madrid, Valencia or Murcia.

Table 6-5 Evolution of Official Aid for the Development of Autonomous Communities in Millions of Euros (2000-2004)

CCAA	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2004/03%*	2004/00 %*
Andalucía	16.67	16.17	22.43	25.82	32.62	26.33	19,28
Aragón	3.56	4.41	4.95	4.51	5.32	17.89	11.29%
Asturias	2.93	4.54	4.53	5.40	6.80	25.91	24.97%
Islas Baleares	2.82	6.09	7.57	9.70	8.13	16.21	38.11%
Cantabria	0.66	0.90	1.58	2.52	3.41	35.00	51.64%
Canary Islands	4.49	2.19	5.81	6.81	4.48	34.26	24,33%
Cataluña	13.04	17.76	23.27	26.73	31.36	17.32	24.85%
Castilla-La Mancha	3.83	6.70	17.16	27.47	27.21	–0.7	72.58%
Castilla y León	3.78	4.00	4.69	3.83	4.78	24.93	7.37
Extremadura	4.19	4.71	5.47	6.49	4.86	25.17	5,55%
Galicia	2.80	2.84	4.60	4.91	5.63	14.68	21.24%
La Rioja	1.34	1,45	1.45	1.90	1.99	4.74	11.02%
Madrid	7.10	7.37	7.91	9.96	17.39	74,66	27,92%
Murcia	0.89	1.21	2.49	1.82	2.63	44.66	40,11%
Navarra	11.52	11.44	11.51	13.34	16.73	25.37	10.29%
País Vasco	25.22	20.54	27.27	28.46	26.45	7.05	2.88%
C. Valencia	12.70	7.71	19.60	15.27	21.49	40.73	33.37%
Other ACs	0.10	0.14	0.07	2.06	– – –		
Total ACs (€Mill.)	117.64	120.17	172.35	197.00	221.27	12.3%	18.05%

* Annual average increase

Source: Government of Spain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seguimiento PACI, 2004.

To explain the regional balance of ACs' co-development policies, we need to take into account such factors as commercial interests, the preference of NGOs to work within national territory rather than abroad or their cultural preference to work with Spanish-speaking populations. In the view of José

Angel Sotillo, a professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, while the Laws of Cooperation are officially broadly based in terms of geographical objectives, in practice they are much narrower. He explains that while NGOs could be an effective bottom-up tool for invigorating co-development policy, the fact there are more NGOs working with Latin American countries than with Morocco has limited their impact. This bias is explained by a lack of interest concerning the Moroccan diaspora on the part of Spanish society and NGOs which in part can be explained by the negative perception of Spanish society towards Morocco after the events of September 11, 2001. As he explains, there is no pressure group demanding further action on the Maghreb and specifically Morocco.[25] The preferences of sectoral or geographical DNGOs are conditioned by the participation rules established by the Laws of Cooperation and the Cooperation for Development Plans at the state and AC levels. Thus, the quality and quantitative changes oriented towards DNGOs' performance in the decentralised cooperation framework are tied to mainstream ODA guidelines. As mentioned previously, Latin America is the main ODA recipient and Morocco is the main recipient in the North Africa Region. However, it is worth noting that, according to the CONGDE report on DNGOs, India received €25.19 million and Morocco just €7.19 million in 2005 (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2006).

Within this bilateral framework, decentralised cooperation is the main pillar. To avoid the dispersion of NGOs, local authorities make an effort to concentrate information in one single unit: the Confederation of Funds in Spain. A group of organisations and local authorities constitute each Fund. Among the members, we find organisations performing actions in various countries which play a significant and active role in the ACs. These include: Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament , Euskal Fondoa-Asociación de Entidadaes Locales Vascas Cooperantes, Fons Valencià per la Solidaritat, Fons Mallorquí de Solidaritat i Cooperació, Fons Menorquí de Cooperació, Fondo Galego de Cooperación e Solidariedade, Fons Pitiús de Cooperació, Fondo Andaluz de

[25] Interview with Jose Angel Sotillo, Director of the Institute for Cooperation, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, May, 2004.

Municipios para la Solidaridad Internacional, and Fondo Extremeño Local de Cooperación al Desarrollo. Participant members are organised by ACs and local authorities on the basis of geographical location. While links to political parties are diverse and participation is open, geographical location prevails as the main condition for constituting a Fund. The main purpose of the confederation is to analyse autonomous and local programmes agreed by each political entity within the regional groups. Following the Millennium Development Goals commitment on poverty reduction, Spain and its public administrations have linked ODA policy to decentralised cooperation by promoting the destination of at least 0.7% of their budget to cooperation with Third World Countries.[26] Therefore, co-development as a political debate is shaped by overall ODA policy where the relationships of sending countries with their diasporas are limited to integration and public services policy pursued by DNGOs and regional administrations. There are also national NGOs working regionally which belong to the Confederación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), a group of at least 100 DNGOs with regional offices in most of the ACs (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2006). The Spanish Law of Cooperation also considers universities, trade unions, and business groups as actors in cooperation for development policy. Since the multiple entities involved in ODA programmes and the lack of a clear co-development definition create a complex system to be coordinated by central government, ACs and Municipal administrations become a unit of analysis in terms of decentralised cooperation and its impact on co-development projects.

It is clear that, notwithstanding its potential value as a means of providing more decentralised and migrant-focused development, the Spanish system is characterised by problems of coordination not only between the different bodies engaged in co-development policy but also between them and the NGOs engaged in implementing such policies. Bodies such as the Interregional

[26] See web site for more information concerning actions carried out by the Confederation of Funds for Cooperation and Solidarity 2004 (Confederación de Fondos de Cooperación y Solidaridad) http: //www.confederacionfondos.org/castellano/3-2-2.htm

Commission for Cooperation[27] do not offer a solution to the lack of central administrative coordination and centralisation mechanisms for the identification of action by the organisation working from all autonomies. Even if local Laws of Cooperation or Plans for Cooperation require NGOs to be registered, there is a possibility that they could receive funds from a number of authorities. This results in the duplication of funds as well as efforts forming part of the programme.

The case of Andalusia offers a representative case of co-development as well as highlighting certain problems in terms of linking government action to the spontaneous participation of organised civil society. According to the rules of the Master Plan and the Law of Cooperation, local governments and other Autonomous governments invite the decentralised sector to participate in the co-development initiative as regulated by the Law of Cooperation. However, participating NGOs must demonstrate a certain level of experience and establish that they have spent a certain number years of working in the sector. Thus, out of 62 registered organisations in Andalusia, 41 participate in the government initiative. These organisations are broadly dispersed by sector and by region. Therefore, the result is that there are probably one or two working in one country, although this is alongside those from other Autonomous regions in the same country and the same sector.

Despite an increase in the number of NGOs involved in co-operation for development and an increase in the number of municipalities spurring co-development, there is also a lack of harmonisation for methodology used to assess the impact on goals. As Jesús Rodríguez Andia, Ambassador under Special Mission for Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, from the AECI points out, “Although there is a cooperation framework to coordinate actions with all

[27] This Commission was created under International Cooperation for Development Law in 2000 and attempts to coordinate International Cooperation Law objectives with representatives from the majority of Ministries, Autonomous and local government bodies throughout Spain, including Ceuta and Melilla. See further information from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at: http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Cooperacion%20Internacional/rganos%20Consultivos%20y%20de%20Coordinacin%20de%20la%20Cooperacin%20espaola/Comisin%20Interterritorial%20de%20Cooperacin%20para%20el%20Desarrollo/Paginas/ComisionInterterritorial_Coop.aspx

AC and local governments, the Central Government, in this case the AECI cannot force them to perform any action". Thus, in the next section I analyse the role played by those institutional and non-governmental organisations working together on co-development policy in Morocco as part of central and local governmental policy.

6.3.2 Bottom-up policy in Morocco

In assessing the role of co-development in the Moroccan case, it is important to bear in mind the high profile of the international aid community within the country. The head offices of the principal aid agencies and funding organisations are concentrated in Rabat, the administrative capital, with the UNDP, the EU, the French Agency of Development, and the Technical Office for Spanish Cooperation amongst the most prominent. There are also increasing numbers of foreign national NGOs working in Morocco tackling development issues, for example European-origin organisations carrying out projects along with Moroccan associations. In addition, there are non-state organisations working in rural areas, including hometown associations or migration-related organisations.

Interaction between all levels of government institutions and non-government actors is complex and develops in a variety of ways. Morocco is experiencing a process of democratisation in which those domestic NGOs that once operated illegally are now at the heart of an urban movement. Arguably, the development of this movement has been facilitated by AENEAS[28]. As Luis Dey, EU Delegate for Migration in Rabat, explains, such support "started functioning in 2001; the EU Justice Directorate provides a budget to include a programme to support those NGOs promoting the human rights of migrants."[29]

Under the same EU co-development scheme, other projects supported Moroccan organisations which provided micro-credit loans for those who are not considered candidates by the banking system, for example, the Foundation

[28] See http: //ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/pdf/themes-migration-reglement_en.pdf Downloaded on October 20, 2006.

[29] Interview with Luis Dey, EU Delegate for Migration at the EU Delegation in Rabat. Morocco, June 2004 .

Sakoura which manages funds directed to micro-business.[30] There are also other international organisations contributing to micro-credit programmes in Morocco. These include the United Nations Capital for Development Fund through the MicroStart Programme for the Development of Micro-financing Sectors. In addition, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), along with Moroccan-based organisations, is sponsoring a micro-credit programme as part of its "co-development" programme (Naudet and Delarue, 2008). USAID is also contributing through the organisation Al-Amana which competes with the Foundation Sakoura, providing 15.5 million dollars over a period of eight years (1995-2003) (USAID, 1999).[31]

Such alliances between the EU, the UNDP and the French Agency for Development, on the one hand, and Moroccan non-governmental associations on the other, provide micro-credit programmes that could be potential elements of a migrant-focused co-development process. However, these programmes still operate within a top-down cooperation for development framework. Although there is the involvement of organisations from the sending country, there is no transnational dimension involving the migrant communities.

Spain also launched its own voluntary return programme which followed a co-development approach. Along with integration policy actions carried out by the Spanish government, in 2000 organisations and governments promoted the return of asylum seekers. Dissemination of information and financial aid were the mechanisms used to attract potential returnees. Other programmes were elaborated jointly with the International Organization of Migration. Drawing upon the model developed by the French government, Spain promoted co-development as a return policy through the issuing of micro-credits by the Spanish Cooperation for Development Agency (AECID) (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2006). Apparently, the lack of a well organised infrastructure and information led to failure of the programme in Spain (European Union, 2006). Overall, it appears that the role of the migrant

[30] Information received from the Delegation of the European Commission in Rabat, Morocco.

[31] Interview with Jesus Rodriguez Andia, Ambassador under Special Mission for Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, Madrid, May 2004

in such schemes has been quite limited. By contrast, an effective co-development policy would have the migrant as a central player. It is the migrant and their forms of association that serve to construct fair development as transnational agents, bridging the gap between host countries and ethnic sending regions.[32] We now turn to examine the extent to which such policies have emerged in Morocco.

6.3.3 The Moroccan Associations as agent of development

The origins of local associations in North Africa are to be found initially in the anti-colonisation protests of the pre-independence era. Such groups were declared illegal and were not recognised by the colonial authorities. Later, following the struggle for independence, these associations sought legalisation. State controls on these associations differ according to each South-Mediterranean political system and its degree of democratisation. In the case of Morocco, these organisations have only been able to operate freely in the last decade and it is only recently that they have expanded their scope of action to include more diverse issues(Porter and Mourjui, 1997). Ammor highlights the way in which NGO development and active participation is a consequence of democratisation. He notes a distinction between urban and rural organisations, where the latter respond to projects supported by the Moroccan–origin population abroad. His assessment is that social capital and the need for internal democracy are characteristics of these new associations. They are also characterised by their relatively short histories and their fragility in the face of administrative and political obstacles, for example over registration, and of restrictions on the urban and intellectual elite and local peasants (Ammor, 2003: 80). Nonetheless, it appears that they have been able to develop a degree of associative capacity, though this is not always recognised by Spanish NGOs in Northern Morocco.

[32] Here I make a distinction between national identity and ethnic identity. In cases such as Mexico and Morocco, ethnic identity comes before national identity when referring to rural-international migration. Therefore, transnational action performed between host and sending ethnic communities will be separate from a foreign policy which does not distinguish between the different cultural values and needs of ethnic groups and which may in fact clash with those of the State.

Focusing on those rural organisations supported by Moroccan organisations abroad, Lacroix classifies co-development NGOs by distinguishing hometown organisations and migrant–related organisations based in Europe (Lacroix, 2005). Notwithstanding the apparent state promotion of co-development, the lack of a larger number of diaspora organisations in their programme prompts a question concerning state-migrant collaboration. According to a Moroccan government list of participating diaspora organisations in France, there is only one successful migrant hometown association involved in co-development in Morocco, Migration and Development (M&D). According to this well known association, co-development funds and actions are concentrated in the South of Morocco as a traditional sending region which represents 91.3% of the joint French and M&D funding.[33]Thus, the research conducted looked at Moroccan migrant associations in Spain to understand their relationships with the Moroccan State and the sending regions.

Through interviews conducted in both Spain and Morocco, it was possible to identify Moroccan migrant-based organisations working in both host and sending countries. One of these is the ATIME (Association of International Moroccan Workers) which has its main office in Madrid and offers a wide range of social services to the Moroccan diaspora. This organisation is the oldest and most recognised organisation among Moroccan migrants in Spain. One of their main activities is to offer legal advice to migrants regarding their labour rights. However, its main concern has been with the political rights of the Moroccans (whether in Spain or Morocco) rather than local development. It maintains a link with another Moroccan based organisation in Spain, Red Euromediterránea de Cooperación al Desarrollo (REMCODE), [34] an organisation which primarily works in the Northern region of Morocco, more specifically in the Riff area. They conduct rural development programmes and work jointly with Moroccan hometown associations. Cooperación y Desarrollo en el Norte de Africa (CODENAF) is another association, based in Andalusia, with projects seeking to promote development in both host and sending countries. Yet, according to

[33] Interview, Rabat, June 2004.
[34] Interview, Madrid May 2004

interviews with ATIME and CODENAF, these organisations in Spain were more concerned with the well-being of Moroccans in the host country rather than actively organising local development in Morocco. Moreover, their relationships with the state (host and sending) were difficult and even antagonistic.

Lacroix argues that there is a transnational space defining a co-development approach which is distinct from the official state-led policy. From his point of view, while there are different categories of developmental organisations successfully intervening in Moroccan sending regions, it is only the migrant-led organisations which can be the channel for a broader transnational approach to co-development (Lacroix, 2005: 18). Yet, notwithstanding some successful examples of so-called productive projects carried out by the migrant themselves at the local level on the basis of remittances, co-development seems hard to accomplish without an accompanying state-led policy pursuing economic growth. Thus, state interventions to reduce the cost of channelling funds and to encourage their use in productive projects are seen as priorities for both supranational and national institutions. It is questionable, however, whether Morocco is able to develop a model equivalent to the Mexican 3X1 Programme given the relatively recent emergence of NGOs in the country and relatively limited capacity of the state to engage at the local level.

It may be that the late emergence of both well organised associations and of urban and international migrants engagement has constrained the scope for bottom up co-development in the country. This may be changing, however. Moroccan scholars assert that the liberalisation of communications empowered the relationship between those who stayed and those who migrated. At the same time, the Moroccan government's slow but steady opening-up of the political system created a need to find a channel of communication to express their needs. Fatima Mernissi suggests that the "democratisation" of access to telecommunications helped to facilitate greater youth involvement in civic initiatives. According to the Government's register the membership of NGOs increased from 7000 in 1995 to 30000 in 1999 (Ammor, 2003: 80). Moreover, the Moroccan government's inability to address most of the immediate demands

for social development may lead to a greater organisation in both the rural and urban sectors.

From the perspective of Fatima Mernissi, M&D was successful not just in bringing together the diaspora and their communities of origin, but also reproducing a model which was followed for other towns such as the case of Ait Itkel (Mernissi, 1997). In 1995, Ali Amahane created the organisation Ait Iktel Association for Development. This organisation is an example of how the local J'maa along with the communities and with the financial support from their migrants, have been able to organise in order to bring development to their towns. The projects facilitated the provision of water, electricity and education to the villagers, with considerable impact on economic activity. Irrigation channels have enhanced agriculture, electrification has changed social life and education for women has become possible.[35] According to its founder, the rural organisation has been strengthened by the adoption of a legal framework which has modernised the way the traditional communities are administered. Remittances are the tool for investment, but the accomplishment of successful projects must rely on democratic organisation at the local level (Lacomba, 2004).

According to research conducted by de Hass, the migrant communities in the Souss have shown a level of organisation to invest in the agricultural sector based on the traditional organisation of the J'maa. However, international migration has changed the hierarchical traditional organisation, which used to be based on the ownership on the land, to have influence in the community's decisions (de Hass, 2003). Property has become the most attractive sector for migrants seeking to invest their remittances. On the basis of my fieldwork, it was clear that towns in the traditional emigration area from the Souss were characterised by improvements in the urban infrastructure, household, and social-religious buildings. Thus, the enhancement of the town appears to be linked to the investments in property achieved by the migrants from the community. At the same time, international migration has empowered to a new

[35]See the note on the Aga Khan Prize awarded to this association.

migrant elite that, supported by their "wealth", are able to conduct and invest in local projects.

From the Moroccan government's perspective, the links between migrant organisations and the government should be institutionalised, and should constitute a political extension of Morocco's foreign policy. However, the Moroccan migrant organisations are still struggling to become incorporated into the institutional framework despite the existence of Moroccan governmental bodies created for that purpose. The Foundation Hassan II and the Minister for Moroccans Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the main institutions which are attempting to strengthen the links with the Moroccan diaspora. However, the process is highly personalised in terms of the relationship between the King and his subordinates. One of the main activities during the year for the Foundation is to organise the return of migrants for the summer holidays.[36] The King himself welcomes migrants coming from Europe at the border gate in Tangier, a symbolic gesture designed to consolidate the link between the Kingdom and the diaspora. The Foundation's goals are described as follows:

> "The Foundation Hassan II considers the richness, the diversity and the importance of the associative tissue created by Moroccans abroad in the host countries and is conscious of the important role they could play in defence of Morocco and our community abroad, it intends to develop a relationship with them based on permanent consensus, cooperation and consideration." [37]

The Foundation Hassan II claims to have 1,464 registered associations that are recognised as pursuing development action in Morocco. Accordingly, in 2005 there were 124 projects evaluated, although only 50% were already accepted. Interestingly, these projects are only for the benefit of Moroccans abroad, mostly those based in European countries such as Belgium, Spain,

[36] Interview with official from Foundation Hassan II, June 2004
[37] http: //www.alwatan.ma/html/Associations/index.asp Downloaded on June 25, 2006.

France, Italy, the Netherlands, Senegal, Switzerland, and even Canada.[38] These projects are incorporated into the Strategic Plan of the Hassan II Foundation as part of a broader outreach programme to enhance institutional links with the Moroccan community abroad. The spheres of action are not only concerned with development, but also the promotion of studies on Moroccans abroad, social and cultural activities, and initiatives to promote Moroccan heritage among the young in the diaspora. The investment of each project is variable and its acceptance depends on the extent to which it is helping to foster the link between the diaspora and the Moroccan institutions (Rouyame du Maroc, 2003).

While the roles of the Foundation and of the Ministry are supposed to be distinctive in terms of infrastructure and goals, in practice there is often an overlap that leads to a waste of resources. Moreover, it is worth noting that in none of the interviews carried out with Moroccan Officials was there any reference to co-development as a state policy. They spoke of Morocco's efforts in cooperating on migration control and in increasing political links with the European Union members. From those interviews, one must conclude that the "official" Co-development approach remains a rather unilateral policy from European governments which is implemented through "their" NGOs rather than with the cooperation of home governments or associations.

Remittances have become a pivotal instrument for economic growth as well as a source for local development provided by the diaspora for "home towns". Indeed, while Morocco's development policies are mainly funded by financial aid, foreign investment and trade oriented programmes, remittances are becoming increasingly important for the national economy. As regards development aid, Moroccan officials believe that the EU authorities did not pursue an effective strategy. In their view, enlargement of the EU had taken priority, leading to a focus on development in the prospective member states rather than in Morocco or other parts of North Africa and the Middle East.

[38] Information on some of these projects are online:
http: //www.alwatan.ma/html/Associations/index.asp

Instead, the Moroccan government relies on remittances sent by its population abroad rather than on French or Spanish cooperation for development. As Table 6-7 shows, there an obvious increase in these remittances. In some cases, these remittances have been directed towards local schemes. The J'maa, which traditionally regulate the distribution of waters and settlement of disputes regarding the conflicts on water and communal labour, have become the basis for a broader organisational scheme to invest in communal projects (Lacomba, 2004). Some studies emphasise the importance of agriculture as the target for migrants' investment capital (de Haas, 2003a; Lacomba, 2004) while others highlight the channelling of remittances towards property (Sefrioui, 2005).

Table 6-6 Evolution of Remittances from Moroccan Residents Abroad, 1999-2003 (Thousands of Moroccan Dirhams)

	Years	Evolution 2003/2002					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	MDH	%
Bank Giros	11 509.9	13 108.9	17 689.8	18 912.2	21 263.7	+2 351.5	+12.4
Postal Giros	3 286.5	3 051.1	2 967.1	3 847.9	3 651.3	-196.6	-5.1
Foreign Currency	4 205.1	6 801.6	16 201.2	8 947.8	9 666.8	+719.0	+8.0
TOTAL	19 001.5	22 961.6	36 858.1	31 707.9	34 581.8	+2 873.9	+9.1

Source: Office des Changes Royaume de Maroc http: //www.oc.gov.ma/

The relation between the largest areas of recipients of migrants funds in Morocco correspond to their communities of origin. Interestingly, the distribution of bank deposits of Moroccan migrants is concentrated in the region of Oriental, followed by Tangier-Tetouan and the Souss (see Table 6.7). Moreover, there are specific localities within the regions that are outstanding as recipients of remittances and correspond to the traditional and new regions of migration. For instance, Benin Mellal receives 82.2 % out of the 100% in the region of Tadla. Similar patterns of concentration can be seen in the cases of Casablanca (94.4%) and Rabat (67.6%).Meanwhile, traditional towns in the Souss such as Tiznit (29.9%) and Agadir (23.9%) are outstanding as recipients as well as Nador (37.7%) and Oudja (19.9%)in the Oriental Region (Sefrioui, 2005).

Table 6-7 Distributional percentage of bank deposits owned by Moroccan migrants by region in 2003

Region	*% of Bank Deposits from Non-Resident Moroccan*
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia Al Hamra	0.2
Marrakech_tensift – Al Haouz	2.8
Meknès-Tafilalet	5.4
Oriental	24.7
Oued-Ed-Dahab-Lagouira	0
Rabat-Salé- Zemmour-Zaer	6.2
Souss-Massa-Daraa	9.3
Tadla-Azilal	1.5
Tanger-Tétouan	9.7
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate	7.2
Other localities	5.3
Total	100%

Source: Foundation Hassan II, Kingdom of Morocco.

6.3.4 Co-development in Northern Morocco: Bottom-up Local Development Supported by the Spanish Government

To what extent can we see the emergence of bottom up co-development within Northern Morocco? Northern Morocco is the site for mega development projects designed to increase regional trade (as discussed in Chapter 4). Moreover, while the Tangiers Peninsula is not a region with high or intense emigration rates, it is an important crossing point for southern migration. In terms of being a source of emigration, the centre of the country has been more significant. As one of the researchers from Movimiento para la Paz y la Democracia y la Libertad (MPDL), Manuel Alonso, explains, while the EU identifies Northern Morocco as an emigration zone, it is the area of Benin Mellal in the centre-west of Morocco that has the highest levels of emigration. Along with Jurigba, Benin Mellal has been the principal new source of emigration to Spain, witnessing a seven-fold increase over the period of a decade (Ammor, 2003). In contrast, Moroccan researcher Mohammed Berriane concludes that, having compared Tangiers with the Riff and Atlantic regions, the latter two are more important in terms of the total number of emigrants. However, Tangiers increases its importance with regard to the emigration rate as a percentage of total population (Berriane and Refass, 2004). In any case, these researchers agree with the idea that Tangiers is the “door” to Europe. Legal and illegal migration,

smuggling, drug trafficking, the return of migrants, international tourism to Morocco, and legal and illegal trade are all focused on Tangiers and its maritime links. Pablo de Mass has named this highly dynamic frontier the "Moroccan Rio Bravo" in reference to the US-Mexico border.

For the most part, however, it has been in Northern Morocco that Spanish co-development activities have been focused. The rationale for this support is contested. A member of the Spanish organisation taking part in these co-development programmes launched by the AECI is convinced that Spain developed a humanitarian policy towards Northern Morocco to compensate for the harm done during the colonial era; or, in the words of this Spanish official, it assumed a "special responsibility for the development of ex-colonial territories". [39] However, the geographical preference for Latin American is evident when comparing the total budget addressed to Morocco (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2005). Table 6.8 refers to the total budget for decentralised cooperation achieved by the CONGDE.

Table 6-8 Total budget and projects carried out by country. CONGDE 2003

Country	*Budget*	*Total Projects*	*Average Project Budget*	*Total NGOs*
Peru	€38,954,255	386	£100,918	53
Honduras	€30,536,368	336	£90,882	37
Bolivia	€29,469,135	321	£91,804	49
Guatemala	€ 29,134,043	272	£107,110	43
Nicaragua	€29,018,286	298	£97,377	43
El Salvador	€23,917,311	232	£103,092	34
Ecuador	€21,148,872	267	£79,209	42
Mozambique	€19,263,252	143	£134,708	26
Dominican Republic	€14,996,423	153	£98,016	27
Colombia	€14,992,562	188	£79,748	36
Palestine	€14,636,674	83	£176,345	18
India	€14,100,785	389	£36,249	16
Angola	€12,533,413	90	£139,260	17
Morocco	€9,875,247	139	£71,045	23

Source: CONGDE-Spain. 2005

The Chair of NGOs for the MPDL in Morocco, Manuel Alonso, assesses Spain's policy of co-development in Morocco as a social and local development programme and argues that it is not intended to address the migration issue. In his view, the AECI's instruments – such as the Mixed Commission for Scientific Cooperation and the Annual Plan of Cooperation - do not consider migration a

[39] Interview conducted with Manuel Alonso, MDLP, in Rabat, 2004.

priority. Indeed, raising migration issues is disruptive of wider development negotiations. In this sense, he concludes that migration control by enforcing border vigilance programmes is the option for the EU to deal with immigration. However, the official view of the development effort does give more emphasis to migration issues. This is the intention set forth in the PAIDAR, a development programme for Northern Morocco delivered in 2000 by the Spanish government as part of bilateral Cooperation. It offered guidelines for development in Northern Morocco which served as the basis for the Northern Development Agency and EU development actions. According to Jesús Rodríguez Andia, Director for Cooperation with Africa and the Middle East at the AECI, PAIDAR and GRECO are the two main strategies employed to deal with cooperation for development. The first aims to "develop the region and stabilise a constantly growing population" which accounts for 38% of emigration from Morocco to the EU (Berriane, 1996). The second identifies "co-development as a tool for returning migration" as well as readmission agreements with origin and transit countries and aims to carry out education and technical programmes to invest in the reinsertion of migrants in the labour market of the country of origin (Malgesini, 2003). Thus, there are several multilateral and bilateral mechanisms with shared similarities involved in the co-development paradigm affecting Northern Morocco.

6.3.5 Decentralised Spanish Cooperation in Morocco

While PAIDAR is a very specific development programme between the two governments, decentralised cooperation is attracting a large number of non-government and government actors to the co-development scenario. The extent to which they can contribute to alternative local development is the question to be tackled in the next section.

According to the scholar John Casey from the Universidad Autonomic de Barcelona, decentralised cooperation by Spain has been characterised as vertically linked to political parties and associations with corporate relations bound by governmental control and the lack of a knowledge base for management and organisational issues (Casey, 1997). In contrast to this

assessment, I found very enthusiastic Spanish or international organisations operating in Morocco with long-term experience in international aid. However, there were in many cases political, financial, and even cultural constraints which diminished their impact on development goals in Northern Morocco. In the interviews conducted during my fieldwork, these organisations themselves offered their opinions about these constraints and the Office for Cooperation in Morocco.

In an interview with Juan Peña from the Technical Office for Cooperation at the Spanish Embassy in Morocco, he provided a list of the main organisations working in Morocco - Intermon, Cideal, CODESPA, Medicos Mundis, Medicos Sin Fronteras, Movimiento para La Paz la Democracia y la Libertad (MPDL) – that are formally or informally linked to the AECI. The Table 6.9 summarises the DNGOs approached in both Spain and Morocco, with most of these based in Northern Morocco. Despite the limited number of NGOs working in Northern Morocco, as compared to those working in Central or Latin America, they do represent a potential model of co-development. He also explained that even though the assessment and evaluation process was difficult to perform, the organisations were reporting on their results and their use of the funds. However, it appeared that the activities of organisations were rather limited in their scope as far as encouraging bottom-up co-development was concerned. While the development sector is mostly focused on alleviating poverty, as mentioned previously, there are gaps where the migration issue could be addressed on the basis of transborder cooperation but where little progress has been made. Overall, co-development is not used as a tool or mechanism to either eradicate poverty or prevent migration from Northern Morocco.

Interviews with DNGOs based in Morocco revealed a general view that co-development is a demonstration of solidarity with the Moroccan population by Spanish DNGOs. However, the budget, infrastructure, cultural barriers, and extensive competing demands to alleviate poverty limit the impact of these non-state actors. As Manuel Alonso from MPDL explains “the cooperation is to improve the living standards of the Moroccan population, it is not enough to

inhibit emigration". He identifies structural reasons for the high levels of migration in such factors as the culture of migration, the inability of the labour market to integrate young professionals, the lack of opportunities to improve their economic condition as well as wage differences. Thus, a policy of cooperation should focus on these reasons to migrate. Sana Desalasi from Oxfam Morocco provided a similar assessment. This organisation also offers services in the sector working for the education of women and their insertion into society and the labour market. However, the goal is also to ameliorate the precarious conditions of vulnerable groups rather than attempt to inhibit migration. In her view, the reasons to migrate are promoted by the culture of migration perpetuated by Moroccan migrants settled in Europe: cars, household appliances, and remittances are not only status symbols; they also provide an incentive to migrate.

Given their limited budgets, these DNGOs tend to cooperate with the Spanish development authorities in order to increase their impact. One example is that of CODESPA, a programme designed to provide training for those interested in starting a small business. However, before this step is taken it is necessary to secure funds in order to launch the project. NGOs serve as a link to financial organisations such as the Popular Bank and Al Amana which offer micro-credits. Nevertheless, a necessary prerequisite for making the loan application is that the person is already a micro-entrepreneur. Thus, NGOs play an important role by bridging the gap between the general population and financial actors. The weak associative tissue in Morocco also limits the co-development potential, a factor identified by CODESPA as an obstacle to the expansion of projects.

Table 6-9 Summary of NGOs interviewed in Morocco

NGO	DESCRIPTION	Projects
Intermon Oxfam	The organisation is based in Catalonia, and the counterpart is in Morocco. The main office is in Rabat. The Office is linked to the central office in Barcelona. Oxfam Catalonia promotes the programmes. Here, they receive funds from local as well as central Government.	Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 1994 The objectives of this organisation are in the sectors of health, education, and women's participation in the labour market. Projects address to women empowerment: Micro-business, women's rights under the family code, intra-family violence and education.
MDLP.	The main office is in Madrid, however they have a central office in Alhucemas.	Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 1995 Projects in rural development, women empowerment, environment, civil society and infrastructure Professional Training, educational, medical and legal attention for women in the Centre ANNAJDA for women victims of violence in Casablanca and Rabat Continuing education and medical and legal attention for women in the Centre ANNAJDA. Centre created for the legal, psychological, scholar and awareness for women victims of violence in Kenitra. Centre for documentation, training and co-development Centre for the defence and promotion of women in Agadir, Southern Morocco.
CODESPA	The organisation has its central office in Tangiers. The interview identifies the lack of coordination with other NGOs when developing projects as one of the main problems. In fact, he identifies socially organised participation as one of the goals of this organisation.	Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 1995. Activities are focused on the promotion of self-employment, education, and democratic participation.
Caritas	Caritas is a Catholic organisation with offices all over the world. In the interviews held in Morocco and Spain, it seems that their participation depends upon the political environment. One officer in Barcelona denies the link between the government and the organisation given the political character of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia.	Support to Subsaharians immigrants and vulnerable groups.
Medicos Sin Fronteras	This is an international organisation which has representation in most of the world's conflict zones. As the Director explained, there is no official link between the Spanish Government and the organisation; nevertheless, given the Spanish nationality of the Director, there has been informal coordination. In this sense the joint meeting held with other organisations and the Technical Office in Rabat serves as a way to coordinate support, although they do not receive funds as is the case with other NGOs	Working in Morocco since 1997 Health support to migrants and Moroccans. Emergency and humanitarian aid in case of natural disasters.

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Given their limited budgets, these DNGOs tend to cooperate with the Spanish development authorities in order to increase their impact. One example is that of CODESPA, a programme designed to provide training for those interested in starting a small business. However, before this step is taken it is necessary to secure funds in order to launch the project. NGOs serve as a link to financial organisations such as the Popular Bank and Al Amana which offer micro-credits. Nevertheless, a necessary prerequisite for making the loan

application is that the person is already a micro-entrepreneur. Thus, NGOs play an important role by bridging the gap between the general population and financial actors. The weak associative tissue in Morocco also limits the co-development potential, a factor identified by CODESPA as an obstacle to the expansion of projects.

Cultural differences might also influence the lack of understanding between Spanish NGOs and their counterparts. One of the interviewees referred to a lack of initiative to become micro-entrepreneurs based on the religious belief that everything is in God's hands. Furthermore, there is the case of low levels of involvement by women in productive activities after marriage. Accordingly, within this culture, the preference to migrate has tended to prevail over interest in developing entrepreneurial activities. Government interaction also seems to be weak given the lack of state resources. Still, Oxfam did highlight the efforts of Moroccans to support one of their programmes, although NGOs do not usually receive funds from the Moroccan government.

In terms of the NGOs' independence from Spanish interests focusing aid on the North, one organisation - Oxfam Morocco - explains that multi-source funding allows them to act more independently. Thus, while Northern Morocco could be a priority for the AECI, Oxfam works throughout Morocco. According to interviews with AECI's officials, 95% of Spanish co-development funds and actions are concentrated in the Northern Morocco region in the region of Tangier and Tetouan.

One of the criticisms levelled at cooperation is related to objectives as well as assessment and evaluation. The Office of Cooperation points to the lack of NGO infrastructure to evaluate the impact of action. Thus, once funds are assigned it is the responsibility of the NGO to channel them to Moroccan counterparts, following the guidelines of Spanish cooperation. This particular point leads to the conclusion that the lack of a proper evaluation process is one of the weak links in assessing the real impact of co-development as a policy. However, it could also be argued that one of its strengths is the proliferation of actors involved in this co-development initiative, both government institutions and non-governmental organisations, as well as the non-official participation of

religious organisations, universities, and civil society. For instance, the Complutense University now offers a Masters programme which provides training in cooperation for development programmes. The programme helps people understand the administrative process involved in applying for projects as well as the structure of government institutions in charge of this policy. One of its concerns is the development of a methodology to evaluate the impact of co-development projects.

According to de Haas (2006a), Catalonia is one of the most active regions in strengthening transnational development. Local/national NGOs and/or the Government, along with migrant-based associations, are engaged in development programmes in both Spain and Morocco. On the basis of my fieldwork, however, the interaction between Moroccan migrant-based organisations in Spain was sporadic and they were not heavily involved in the majority of AC co-development actions in Morocco. On the basis of interviews and observation, I found Moroccan organisations working in Spain to be focused mainly on activities related to employment, integration and legal advice for assisting Moroccan immigrants.

This is a particular concern because those Moroccan migrant organisations such as ATIME are working along with REMCODE without any support from the Spanish authorities. The lack of a link between Spanish NGOs and migrant associations in Morocco and Spain has also been criticised, particularly given the formal commitment in the 2004 Plan for Cooperation which stressed co-development as an objective. From the standpoint of Moroccan migrant associations, this lack of involvement could be explained by factors related to the government–migrant relationship and economic and political systemic constraints in Morocco.

Juan Carlos Andreo from the Junta de Andalucía attributes the problematic relationship between Spanish and Moroccan organisations (and their concentration of activities in the North of the country) on the late emergence of Moroccan DNGOs and the lack of trained Spanish DNGOs. These factors constrained the potential for a collaborative development agenda in Morocco in the 90's. Over the period, however, the democratisation process

led to the emergence of an organised civil society which the Spanish DNGOs could work with on development projects (Andreo, 2001). At the same time, AECI funds were increased after 1995 for the training of professionals to work in Morocco. Subsequently, there has emerged a small but well organised cluster of Spanish DNGOs in Morocco.

6.4 Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the extent to which there has emerged a "bottom up" co-development strategy. Comparing the specific cases of Mexico and Morocco allows us to understand the dynamics between the state and the diaspora in this policy as well as the potential of co-development as a mechanism to influence local development in sending communities. Interactions between migrant organisations and both the hosting and receiving countries, together with the possibilities for migrant led transnational actions, were at the heart of the chapter.

The distinction between the process and the policy of co-development becomes evident when distinguishing the actors and their objectives. The categorisation of participating NGOs requires us to distinguish between various groups: groups based in the host country seeking to participate in co-development in the sending country and groups representing the migrants in the host country. The first category embraces those NGOs involved in a co-development policy implemented by the host country (principally the Spanish authorities). The second category refers to the migrant associations in the host country carrying out local projects in their communities of origin as part of a state-led program, as in the case of Mexico or acting independently of the state as in the case of Morocco.

These groups interact with public authorities in quite distinct ways. The emergence of home country NGOs has often been in tension with governments in the home countries. By contrast, the state-led programmes for co-development in Mexico, as in the case of the 3x1, have promoted the increase of hometown associations involved in local development projects. Meanwhile, the Spanish government has fostered the inclusion and expansion of Spanish

DNGOs to work on development projects in Morocco but with limited impact. The Moroccan associations in Spain, however, are not involved in the Spanish co-development policy and have limited contact with the Moroccan authorities.

The case of Spain is a singular one in terms of how co-development organisations deploy policy within a decentralised and complex system. The effects of such decentralisation have been mixed. While potentially providing a powerful mechanism for co-development, an assessment *in situ* of actual projects showed an overlap of DNGOS funded by the AECID and the sub-national governments. More generally, Spanish policy has been limited in terms of geographical concentration in the Northern Province. At the same time, the DNGOs have faced constraints to reach an extensive action in Morocco in comparison to their activities in Latin America. Cultural, bureaucratic, organisational and political constraints appeared to be limiting their participation. The lack of inclusion of migrant association in Spain into the co-development programmes can only be explain in terms of a national policy which embraces solely local NGOs.

Regarding the North American case, the co-development policy implied in the bilateral agreements issued from the P4P (discussed in Chapter Five) was principally focused upon channelling the flow of remittances in a more efficient way. Compared with the Spanish case, the US as a host country lacks a policy which would match DNGOs with local development programmes (with the possible exception of the P4P). Instead, it has been Mexico, as a sending country, which has carried out a state-led programme to promote migrant associations and their involvement in projects in their home communities. The increase of associations stands out as an achievement, although the limited entrepreneurial and productive projects have raised the question of its efficiency in channelling remittances into profitable projects. Nevertheless, the benefits of the 3x1 are reflected in enhancing the transparency, distributional equity and transnational politics as results of a greater interaction between the HTAs and the local governments.

Regarding the institutionalisation of the state-diaspora relationship, both Morocco and Mexico have initiated a more active approach to their nationals

abroad. The development of a foreign policy to improve relations with migrants abroad has also been accompanied by reforms in the migratory policy which grants citizen rights to reinforce the links with the diaspora. However, there are important differences between the policies pursued by the Mexican and Moroccan governments. While the 3x1 policy represents a tangible involvement of migrant associations in the policy, the Moroccan government remains largely inactive in this field. The lack of trust in the governmental bureaucracy seems to be the factor that explains an autonomous co-development strategy pursued by the migrants. Also, the limited organisational capability in the case of the Moroccan associations in new destination countries could also explain the limited approach from the Moroccan government. Thus, Mexico has been more successful in reaching the diasporas by relying on a wide Consular infrastructure in the US and greater political and institutional resources to involve the migrants in the social programmes.

Potentially, the Mexican and Moroccan hometown associations could be central actors in pursuing co-development, playing a trans-national role in promoting the development of their communities. However, the extent to which they do so in practice is quite uneven. Indeed, the main constraint to foster co-development is the capability to allow the transnational interaction, which could lead to an increase of remittances. Theoretically, the transfer of development is through remittances articulated by a multi-level organisational scenario, however most of the time migrants lack transnational ability. A more restrictive migratory policy also undermines the transnational movement. As discussed in Chapter 2, migration patterns have changed dramatically over the last two decades, with family reunification, migration control and integration replacing circular migration and affecting transnational action. Communal belonging and social capital are elements that facilitate the channelling of hometown associations in both the Mexican and Moroccan cases. New sending regions, where circular migration is less feasible than in traditional regions, have experienced a more disperse use of remittances making communal organisation less tangible and resulting in a lack of well-formed associations abroad. The extent to which the government can boost co-development in

sending countries also depends on the interests of the state and local authorities.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

The objective of this thesis has been to analyse the policy of co-development and its links to migration in the cases of Mexico and Morocco, both as polities in their respective regional settings. In order to identify their similarities and differences as countries of migration, the review of historical and new patterns of migration served to establish the criteria for comparison. Subsequent analysis compared the policy of development at the macro-level and identified current thinking on the migration–development nexus and its overlap with the governance of migration. The thesis adopted an approach which drew upon the concept of multi-level governance to analyse the way that migration and development were addressed by different tiers of government ranging from sub-national units to international regional frameworks as well as national authorities. In addition to examining the interaction between different levels of government, our analysis also examined the role of civil society in these policy areas. Our multi-level governance approach was accordingly informed by insights from the literature on transnationalism which provided the tools for analysis of the micro-level, including bottom–up initiatives, and its comparison with “top-down” policies at the macro level.

In this context, the concept of co-development has emerged as an alternative way of promoting development and integrating the migrant as an agent of cooperation. However, underneath the political rhetoric, we can identify how the process and mechanisms converge and move towards a single goal: stemming migration from the “South”. At the regional level, I found the MEDA and the PPP to be trade-oriented economic policies which were partly informed by a desire to halt migration in the long term. Meanwhile, the state-led policies of sending countries became more oriented towards engagement with the diaspora in an effort to increase remittances as a factor in development. To a great extent, however, these activities built upon the initiatives of migrant associations and sending communities to promote local development.

In this conclusion to the thesis, I summarise the findings of my research on a comparative basis, looking at the changing patterns of migration, the evolving debate on migration and development – with particular reference to the role of remittances – and the governance of migration. The chapter summarises the multi-level analysis of co-development as a "top down" phenomenon in the regional and bilateral settings and as a "bottom up" initiative amongst the migrant and sending communities. On this basis, I discuss the usefulness of the multi-level approach adopted in the thesis and consider some of the lessons which could be learnt from the North American and Euro-Mediterranean experiences.

7.2 Comparing the cases of the EU-Spain-Morocco and the US-Mexico

7.2.1 Patterns of migration

While there are important differences between the countries, particularly as regards the aggregate and average levels of income, they also share a number of characteristics such as high levels of poverty (approximately 20% of the total population[1]) and of unemployment amongst their predominantly young populations(Banque Mondial, 2002; Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), 2003). There are also important similarities between the countries in terms of their migration profiles. Both countries have similar rates of emigration, close to 9% of the population, and there are similarities in their relationships with their Northern neighbours in terms of the development of interdependent labour markets within their respective regions (though arguably this aspect is more apparent in the North American case). As economic migrants, Mexicans and Moroccans have clearly contributed to the economic expansion of their "Northern" neighbours during the post-WWII period and have been subject to hostile immigration policies when economic recessions have hit (Bustamante, 1976a; Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002: 19). Analyses of migration trends have identified similar dynamics in each case in relation to processes of globalisation, the interdependence of labour markets, the development of social

[1] Though this figure is contested in the case of Mexico where some analysts claim the percentage of people living in poverty is closer to 50%.

networks and cultural factors. The Straits of Gibraltar and the Rio Bravo constitute geographical reference points serving as borders separating the "North" from the "South" and sending from receiving countries, and present significant risks and even human disaster for migrants crossing these borders.

Moreover, the migrant profile in both countries is characterised by changing trends in relation to the socio-economic and demographic profiles of migrants. In both countries cities have become an increasing source of new migrant flows to the "North". In addition, there are important directional shifts in migration as both countries – traditionally classified as senders – are now receivers, becoming transit points for "Southern" migrants in search of new labour markets. For almost a century, various authors have always referred to Mexico as the main exporter of labour force to the US. However, less well studied is its status as a transit country for Central American migrants moving to the US as a final destination, or its own status as a recipient of migrants, primarily in the Southern states. A similar pattern of long-term relationships and changes that are more recent can be seen in the Moroccan case. Morocco has strong historical migration links to specific countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. While these countries were the primary destinations for the Moroccan migrant population over the last 40 years, in the last two decades, Spain and Italy have become important destinations. As in the case of Mexico, there have also been important changes in the demographic characteristics of Moroccan emigrants.

7.2.2 Migration and development

A key theme of the thesis has been the way in which the relationship between migration and development has been understood- in both the academic and the policy realms - and how those ideas have informed the pursuit of co-development. Trade and migration have been generally regarded as substitutes – increased trade would foster development and curtail the need for migration. The conventional wisdom on development has accordingly emphasised trade liberalisation, drawing on the ideas of the "Washington Consensus" which stress macroeconomic stabilisation and microeconomic liberalisation. This emphasis is

particularly apparent in the work of the World Bank (whose diagnosis of economic conditions in Mexico and Morocco was examined in Chapter 3). The policies supported by the Bank in its Strategy Papers for the two countries share an emphasis on market openness, democratisation and regional integration as determining factors for economic development. It is in this context that initiatives such as the Plan Puebla Panamá and the MEDA have to be considered.

Such policy recommendations have, of course, been subject to the criticism that they did little to eradicate poverty and contributed to greater inequalities within those societies, calling into question how far they could address the root causes which were considered to lead to migration. The World Bank's measurement of poverty – which defines the poverty line as USD $1 a day - is inaccurate in the cases of Mexico and Morocco. Moreover, the overall measures of income per capita obscure the levels of income inequality in such countries. Without an understanding of such income gaps, the World Bank's assessment of factors contributing to rural-urban and international emigration is deficient.

In any case, for the most part, the World Bank and other supporters of the Washington Consensus initially paid little attention to questions of migration (with some exceptions such as the Zedillo Report), mainly considering it as an indirect consequence of a lack of development which would be solved by the adoption of the appropriate economic reforms. More recently, however, the World Bank and other parts of the development establishment have given greater weight to migration and its potential contribution to development. Remittances have been at the heart of this debate.

7.2.3 Financial Remittances as a tool for development.

Over the course of the last decade, bodies such as the International Labour Office (ILO), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have given greater emphasis to the importance of remittances. Remittances have been studied at the macroeconomic level by these international institutions. The WB, the ILO and the IOM have issued

recommendations to facilitate the flow of remittances through formal channels and to facilitate their use in productive projects (Puri and Ritzema, 2005; Ratha and Riedberg, 2005; International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2009).

However, prevailing ideas differentiate between trade and remittance macroeconomic policies on the one hand from the movement of labour as a factor of production on the other, emphasising the former at the expense of the latter. Moreover, there are some questionable assumptions about the impact of remittances on poverty. While the World Bank's Strategy Papers have given greater emphasis to remittances, there has been criticism about the way in which they are regarded as a tool for alleviating poverty. The main criticisms offered by Mexican scholars concern reliance on remittances as a part of social policy, arguing that the recipients of remittances in Mexico are not from the poorest social groups and that not all Mexican migrants send remittances (Cortina et al., 2005). Furthermore, the links between poverty and migration override the fact that migration is constrained by the availability of resources and it is therefore not the poorest sector of the population that migrates as has regularly been assumed in migration studies (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002) .

However, such shortcomings in the World Bank's analysis of the links between remittances and poverty alleviation should not detract from the positive role which remittances (and, indirectly, migration) can play in fostering debate. Hence, the academic debate is shifting its attention to the link between migration and development, analysing the positive consequences on development due to the intervention of the financial remittances as well as the political and cultural remittances which boost development in the sending country, at the macro and micro level. The macroeconomic importance of remittances is significant for both countries: in the case of Mexico, they account for 2.5% of national GDP and 9% in the case of Morocco in 2007. Monetary remittances of $16 billion dollars in Mexico outstrip Foreign Direct Investment, while remittances of $3.4 billion dollars in Morocco by 2002 were equivalent to 81.3% of the trade deficit. Both the Mexican and Moroccan governments have benefited from an increase in the total remittances received annually which contribute to the balance of payments. At the micro levels, migrants are

increasingly perceived as a crucial factor of development as remittances have been translated into the enhancement of their communities, providing a strategy to improve living standards in the migrant's home families.

7.3 The Governance of Migration and Development: "Root causes"/Co-development/Migration Control-security.

When used as a tool to stem migration, co-development serves as a mechanism engaging different levels of interaction between state and non-state actors. There is multi-level and cross-cutting confluence of actions addressing the alleviation of poverty and return or integration. This process was examined from three main perspectives and in each case policy objectives, as well as intervening actors, were examined to establish the parameters of the co-development paradigm.

The findings highlight how the policy rhetoric has stressed a positive relationship between increased support for development and decreased rates of migration. However, the position of migrants in this rhetoric is less clear: not all development-migration linked policies include migrants as active participants and many of them consider migrants as mere subjects. The role of the migrant in both academic and policy discourses indicated the need to highlight different understandings of co-development and to differentiate between state-led actions and the spontaneous initiatives of non-state actors. This thesis has therefore sought to differentiate "co-development policy" from "co-development" in its analysis of the migration-development nexus at the three main levels or dimensions: international and regional agreements, host and sending country bilateral relationships and organised civil society and migrants as non-state actors.

In the course of the research, it became clear that nature of the migration-development nexus was increasingly informed by considerations of control and security. This tendency was particularly strong after September 11 2001 when issues of migration became increasingly associated with security concerns regarding the threat of terrorism. Questions of border control were particularly important, compounding the sensitivity of an issue which was already domestically controversial informed by xenophobic reactions and anti-immigrant

responses in host countries. In this context, co-development as an EU policy has essentially been designed to ensure cooperation from sending countries, firstly as a proposal to address the root causes of migration and secondly to secure borders. Meanwhile, with respect to NAFTA, cooperation to secure southern borders was linked to the prospect of preferential treatment in the use of legal channels for dealing with the labour surplus from Mexico.

7.3.1 International and Regional Agreements

As noted, a central part of the development strategies followed by Mexico and Morocco (and encouraged by the main international financial institutions) has been economic liberalisation. In both cases, those reforms have included an engagement with processes of regional economic integration – NAFTA and EuroMed. Both regional frameworks are principally based on the promotion and enhancement of free trade and economic liberalisation in their respective areas. These agreements contemplate cooperation for development based primarily on a free trade perspective and, to varying extents, development aid. Each region takes a different approach to the migration issue, however. NAFTA scarcely addresses migration issues, though they are covered by other mechanisms for North American cooperation. In the Euro-Mediterranean regional framework, the treatment of migration issues is more explicit and is largely shaped by the EU's policy on immigration and border security.

Underlying these frameworks is the neoclassical assumption that it is possible to stem migration if trade is increased. The goal of trade policy is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which establishes that "trade liberalisation increases remuneration to the factor whose supply is relatively abundant domestically when compared with the rest of the world" (Gordon and Spilimbergo, 1998: 18). In this sense, relatively speaking, Mexico and Morocco have a surplus unskilled labour force compared to the skilled labour force in the US and the EU. According to this logic, trade liberalisation is expected to reduce the income gap by raising wages for unskilled labour in Mexico as well as in Morocco.

This is the development policy that serves as the basis of NAFTA: development will raise living standards of the population in Mexico and the long-term result would be reduced migration. For both the Mexican and US governments, NAFTA was to be one part of a broader hemispheric agreement on free trade. While the latter has not been attained, the prospect of integration was one of the drivers for the Plan Puebla Panamá. The Plan was intended as a programme to develop and integrate the economies of Central America and the Southern states of Mexico into the broader North American economy. The Plan was characterised by a number of challenges - including political opposition and implementation problems – and its impact was primarily confined to improving the region's energy and transport infrastructure, changes which had a limited impact on the region's economic development. However, while the consequences of the PPP for migration were, in this respect, also limited, in other respects it marked an important change. The PPP not only established a system of monitoring migration flows but also became one element of policy shift towards stricter border controls containing migration from the South. Indeed, over the decade the regional treatment of migration issues was more focused on security and border control issues than on development. This was confirmed when, in 2005, a new trilateral agreement between Canada, Mexico and the US - the Security and Prosperity Partnership – set out a policy agenda which stressed border security but excluded immigration.

The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement established a mechanism for political and economic cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. It marked a new phase in relations between North and South insofar as there was a shift from seeing the Mediterranean as a key player in the balance of power in the bipolar system to seeing it as a less-developed region which presented challenges for political stability and migration-control. At the heart of the Agreement was a commitment to economic liberalisation, including the ultimate goal of a Single Market covering all the member countries as well as bilateral free-trade agreements between the EU on the one hand and the participating MENA countries on the other. However, while this goal would have created a much greater degree of integration than in NAFTA, the failure to achieve this

objective – along with other limits on the degree of trade liberalisation in the region – have meant that the Euro-Mediterranean integration has been more modest than that achieved within the North American model.

In contrast to the NAFTA framework, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement also incorporated a programme of development aid – the MEDA – which sought to encourage trade-led growth in the MENA countries by funding infrastructure improvements. In the case of Morocco, the first phase of MEDA supported projects such as the building of roads to join rural areas in the North of Morocco. However, over time, MEDA – and indeed the EU's relations with its Mediterranean partners such as Morocco - have increasingly been informed by considerations of security. Whereas development cooperation was initially informed by a root causes analysis which sought to use aid to foster growth and reduce migration pressures, more recently migration has been seen as much as a security issue as it has been regarded as a development issue. This in turn has been reflected in significant elements of MEDA funds (and other EU budgets) being directed towards border security in Morocco.

7.3.2 The Bilateral Dimension

The regional context noted above has been an important influence and, to some extent, a constraint upon the way that sending and destination states have managed the migration issue. However, in many respects, this bilateral level has been central to the management of the migration-development nexus with diplomatic and domestic factors proving decisive.

At the bilateral level, both Morocco and Mexico have shown similarities in terms of negotiating migration with their counterparts. However, my research indicates that the US–Mexico relationship has been more cooperative than that between Spain and Morocco. Overall, increased channels of communication resulting from the NAFTA integration process have facilitated agreements at levels from the Executive level down to deal with the migration issue. One of the explanations identified in the review of bilateral meetings at different levels is that these agreements appear to have increased after the signing of NAFTA due to closer economic ties between the countries. Moreover, the benefits of

the RIA are related to a stronger political relationship and a climate of trust for major investment between the two countries (Schiff and Winters, 1998). In the case of Morocco's relations with Spain and the EU, there are fewer bilateral agreements, whether formal or informal, although these are on the increase.

However, while each region is becoming more interdependent economically, political constraints exist and, in some cases, disrupt the relationship. Bilateral relations between host and sending countries fluctuate between cooperation and conflict with consequences for migration. Difficulties in the general relationship between Morocco and Spain (for example territorial claims) and between the US and Mexico have made cooperation on migration issues problematic while attempts to address the problems of drug trafficking and terrorism have directly impacted on the treatment of the migration issue in both cases. The extension of border controls to neighbouring countries in the south is also a pivotal element in the governance of migration since, while both Morocco and Mexico have made commitments to cooperate further in controlling these borders, the advantages they have obtained in terms of the treatment of legal migration have been limited.

Moreover, in both cases there is a tension between the needs of the labour market and the conduct of migration policy. Based on the analysis of the Spanish and US labour markets conducted in Chapter 5, while the demand for unskilled (and in certain cases highly skilled) migrant labour should be considered in the design of migratory policy, restrictive and selective factors have instead prevailed in relation to ethnic origin. This is clearest in the case of Spain where Moroccan migrants have been in competition with Eastern Europeans or Latin Americans for residence permits. Mexican migration has been less constrained – with migrant networks and geographical proximity the facilitating factors – though the policies of Federal and State governments have often been in conflict (Massey and Espinosa, 1997).

As a result, in both cases, irregular immigration is the consequence of inadequate migration policies that, rather than matching the labour market, respond to political and even economic variables. As described in Chapter 2, irregular immigration has been on the increase regardless of restrictive policy

and this issue has been addressed by both American and Spanish scholars in these two cases (Cornelius et al., 1994; Izquierdo, 1996; Bustamante, 2000; Cornelius, 2001; Izquierdo, 2005). In the US, since the Bracero Programme (1942-1964), illegal migrants seem to have been used as a form of manageable stock to keep production costs low and maintain US competitiveness (Calavita, 1992). Quotas for legal migrants in sectors such as agriculture have proved insufficient to satisfy demand. Attempts to develop comprehensive migratory reform in the US following the amnesty programmes of 1986 and 1996 had limited success when dealing with the backlog of administrative regularisation of immigrants. In the case of Spain, different regularisations have also proved to be a consequence of inefficient migration policy. The main challenge for Spanish migration policy has been to maintain a balance between EU membership commitments and increased labour force demands in sectors requiring low-skilled migrants. This fact was reflected in the evolution of regularisation processes which were based on providing access to citizenship, legal residence and entry to those people from 2000-2001 in an attempt to balance labour market demands with the offer of immigrants. However, increased irregular migration was calculated to be almost double that of legal residents by 2004 (Izquierdo, 2004a: 23). This means that, in the case of Spain, migratory policy favoured flexible irregular migration as it was convenient for the business sector as in the case of the US. Thus, regularisation from 2005 was more ambitious in terms of reducing the backlog from previous regularisations.

Another dimension of cooperation for development (more apparent in the North American than the Euro-Mediterranean case) is the emergence of public-private agreements. An example of this was the Partnership for Prosperity, an agreement between the public and the private sectors from both the US and Mexico signed at the bilateral executive meeting in September 2001. The main goals of this agreement were to increase investment in specific productive areas and to promote development in sending regions. There was also an attempt to improve the treatment of remittances by reducing the costs of sending funds and to facilitate their reception by expanding banking services in the sending regions. However, while the initiative included a number of key

institutions and actors that were needed to ensure cooperation for development, the US perspective on the initiative was more focused upon business-oriented projects rather than involving in greater numbers the local communities or groups such as the HTAs.

Trade and market liberalisation as substitutes for migration have constituted the principal component of cooperation for development for nearly two decades. Yet the impact of NAFTA has been to diversify the sources rather than to diminish the levels of migration. Predictions that migration would decrease according to the "migration hump" seem far from being the case. Instead, structural constraints have limited the competitiveness of Mexican producers in key primary economic sectors. Overall, the benefits of economic growth in Mexico have not been reflected in a fairer distribution of income or increase in employment, and consequently migration has remained at a high level.

Nowadays, the increase in remittances has received most of the attention in bilateral efforts to ameliorate the migrant's family's living standards in the short run and to inhibit future migration in the long run. In other aspects of bilateral cooperation, however, a number of promising complementary initiatives have been constrained by state and local governments. For instance, the use of Mexican Consular ID or driving licenses as official documents which can be used to open accounts in American banks, thereby boosting the increase of remittances, has been rejected in some parts of the US.

In the Euro-Mediterranean case, the role of development aid has been apparently much more significant. However, despite the rhetorical emphasis on co-development as a mechanism which implies a link between migration and development, Spanish aid projects are directed towards a wide range of topics (health, urban infrastructure, vulnerable groups, human rights, etc) and projects aimed at the migration-development nexus have to struggle for resources. At the same, the geographical preference in quantitative terms also indicates that cultural and foreign policy factors have resulted in a greater and more organised intervention in Latin American countries than in Morocco. Moreover, the absence of participation by the migrant associations, calls into question the

commitment behind those policies which do address migration-development issues.

7.3.3 Migration and development from the bottom up: Migrants as Agents of Development

So far, we have focused on the “top-down” aspects of co-development policy, highlighting the way in which it has interacted with broader programmes of economic liberalisation on the one hand and security on the other. However, it is clear that while we have identified the dynamics between different tiers of government, there are important aspects of co-development which have not yet been addressed.

The research carried out in Chapter 6 sought to explore this aspect, focusing in particular upon the activities of hometown associations in the US and their efforts to channel remittances into their home communities in Mexico. As we have seen, such schemes have been supported in mainstream thinking on development and by agreements between governments to facilitate financial transfers. In practice, such bottom up initiatives have also involved the participation of home governments, and relationships between migrants and those authorities are often conflictual, due to differences in perception over what constitutes development (household and community benefits versus the promotion of businesses). Moreover, even if bottom-up initiatives from HTAs can be incorporated into local development programmes, there are structural constraints on boosting remittance–based development in an effort to stem migration.

The bottom-up initiative embracing the cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan associations have been shaped by the national organisational characteristics of the decentralisation in Spain and the democratisation in Morocco. It is worth noting the decentralisation of the aid programmes carried out by the central and subnational government through the DNGOs. At the sub national level, the Autonomous Communities and Municipal governments have been following the guidelines provided by the central governments in terms of the co-development policy. Here, the inclusion of the migration issues is related

to the policy of immigrants' integration in Spain. Moreover, these subnational governments have shown also a geographical preference shaped by cultural and political interest. Hence, Andalusia and Catalonia, two regions that have large immigrant communities from Morocco, seem to be the most active in developing joint actions with the Moroccan government. Nevertheless, the concentration of resources in the Northern Provinces in Morocco has been questioned in terms of its impact on the regions which have been the source of migration.

It has been said that Spanish DNGOs have followed the Spanish foreign policy guidelines the field of co-development, though they seek to complement the activities of other DNGOs operating in the country. However, it has only been recently that they have increased their commitment to the country; hitherto they focused most of their activities in Latin America.

The research on the achievements of Spanish DNGOs working along with the AECID has shown that the implementation of such projects has been characterised by a number of organisational, cultural and political obstacles. The limited number of DNGOs and their concentration in the regions of Tetouan and Tangier indicates a failure to reach out to the poorest zones of Morocco and those considered source of migration. Thus, the Spanish DNGOs are far from being considered an example of good co-development practice. Nevertheless, their organisational capabilities and their growing interest in working with Moroccan associations indicate that there is the potential for improvement.

At the same time, the democratisation process has contributed to a change in the way that home country governments have engaged with civil society. In the Mexican case, the growing pressures for democratisation in the 1990s and the change in the Presidency in 2000 contributed both to greater activism on the part of groups and to a more engaged response from governments at various levels. To some extent, a similar process is under way in Morocco as NGOs and migrant associations have emerged as more autonomous entities from the state (in the past the regime had sought to control such organisations). However, the lack of professional and experienced

organisational capabilities, on the one hand, and, persisting tensions with the Moroccan government on the other, are factors which have constrained the potential of the NGOs to engage in local development programmes. Instead, it is the migrants abroad who, relying on the social capital gained with their remittances, are challenging the hierarchical and traditional organisation in their local communities to improve their families' living standards.

Comparing the institutionalisation of the relationship of Government – diaspora in the cases of Mexico and Morocco, both have been able to increase their channels of communications. However, the Moroccan organisations have not been included in a comparable state-led programme such as the 3x1 in the Mexican case. The research suggests that the institutional and consular infrastructure of the Mexican government and geographical concentration of the Mexicans in the US have played an important role in the proliferation of the HTAs, whereas in the case of Morocco the spread of the diaspora in traditional and new destination regions have slowed down the process.

7.4 The Heuristic Approach to Multi-level Governance.

The primary contribution of this research has been in terms of its analysis of the issues of co-development and migration on the basis of fieldwork. However, this analysis was framed by a mixed approach to examining how those policies were pursued. Based on the assumption of a multi-level dynamic of interaction within the EuroMed and North American regions, the thesis has drawn upon the approach of multi-level governance, complemented by insights from the literature on regionalism and transnationalism.

In terms of regionalism, our findings arguably support the use of a broader analytical perspective than a basic regional integration theory. Such theories tend to address the overall dynamics of integration rather than the specifics of particular policy issues. Clearly, the phenomenon of migration in our two case studies underlines the importance of understanding regionalism as a phenomenon which embraces much more than a particular set of rules and institutions. Drawing on Hurrell's model, it appears that the North American and Euro-Mediterranean constitute spaces of regionalisation beyond particular rules,

even if those rules may have an important impact. The movement of people from Mexico to the US and Canada and from Morocco to Spain and other parts of the EU are signs of an ongoing process of integration through migration. This is all the more important to highlight given the way that existing regional agreements either do not incorporate migration from abroad as a part of their liberalising arrangements or regard it as a problem to be addressed through control policies.

Such a contrast demonstrates the importance of taking a wider view of the region than institutional arrangements. That is not to say that the formal structures of regional governance are not significant, however. On the contrary, they form a very important framework which impinges on the possibilities of migration and the pursuit of co-development policies. Similarly, it is clear that states are still very much at the heart of the policy process and diplomacy surrounding migration issues (as our discussion of the domestic and bilateral contexts indicates). We would, however, argue that focusing the analysis solely at this level would not provide a comprehensive perspective on the governance of migration in either region. In that respect, a wider sense of governance to embrace the role of non-state actors such as migrants and their organisations has been needed. In particular, understanding the transnational dimensions of the migrants' action and their relations with public authorities has been important.

Our decision to adopt a multi-level governance approach was motivated by recognition that the migration-development nexus has manifest itself in a variety of institutional settings, relationships and practices. The way in which the processes of migration and development interacted – and more specifically the way in which co-development was pursued – required a conceptual framework which looked at activities across a number of tiers of authority and which took into account the practices and potential of protagonists beyond the state.

It is clear that a full understanding of how migration and development have been treated in the two cases required a perspective which incorporated developments involving various tiers of public authority. However, it is also clear, particularly when considering co-development as a bottom up activity, that only

focusing on governmental actors was not sufficient. In that sense, adopting a "governance" – rather than simply a "government" - approach was also important, capturing the involvement of other actors as well as public authorities. Recalling Peters and Pierre's use of governance to convey the way in which power is dispersed as much outside the state as above or below it, the role of migrant organisations but also other civil society groups - whether engaged in managing the allocation of resources or to in discussing or challenging policies - has been an important part of the analysis. To understand those dynamics, we have drawn on the insights of transnationalism to complement our MLG approach.

As we noted in Chapter 1, MLG is not a theory of regional integration in the same way as neofunctionalism or inter-governmentalism and as such it does not offer a causal model of integration. However it does capture the complexity of the way that issues are addressed in a regional setting: as Rosamond summarises the approach, it conveys the overlapping, multitiered structures within which government and non government actors operate (Rosamond, 2000: 110-111). While our earlier discussion of the thesis findings hopefully provides a sense of the multi-level framework, the Table 7.1 maps out both the roles of actors and what outcomes can be observed.

Although MLG has emerged out of the study of the European Union – and was useful as a framework in which to examine the EuroMed migration development nexus - it is arguably less defined by EU circumstances and therefore easier to apply in other contexts – such as North America -than more "Eurocentric" approaches to integration noted above. From one perspective, it might have been considered to be of less relevance to the North American case given that NAFTA is, by comparison with the EU, institutionally thin, less endowed with powers and responsibilities, inter-governmental in its decision procedures and most importantly with only limited competence on migration issues. Yet the intensification of economic links, which followed NAFTA, seems to have created a variety of other forms of cooperation within the region.

Table 7-1 Multi-level applied in the EUROMED and NAFTA regions on the specific task of co-development

	VERTICAL						
HORIZONTAL		EUROMED			NAFTA		
		Governmental	Non-Governmental		Governmental	Non-Governmental	Outcomes
	Regional Regimes	Euromed Institutions: EuroMed Conferences Ad-Hoc groups Association Agreements	Business groups Euromed civil society	Remittances Management of Migration : Readmission and return agreements Co-development: Investment in Northern Province of Morocco	Nafta Institutions Partnership for Prosperity Security and Prosperity Partnership	Labour, Environmental and Commercial groups Private banking system Development Bank	Promotion of the Mechanism of Dialogue Strengthen banking system to increase Remittances Smart Borders
	State	State's institutions AECID	Confederation of NGOs DNGO and National NGOs HTAs Associations	Institutionalization of State-Diaspora relationship	State's institutions	DNGO and National NGOs	Institutionalization of State-Diaspora relationship
	Subnational	Autonomous Communities And Municipalities		Social Co-development projects in Spain and in Morocco	State's and Municipal authorities	Civil society NGOs HTAs Associations	Social Programmes involving HTAs Traditional organizations (J'maa)
	Outcomes	Macro development programmes :MEDA	Mechanism of dialogue with NGOs	Macro development programmes	Macro development programmes :PPP Mechanism of dialogue with NGOs	Mechanism of dialogue with NGOs	Local development

Source: Elaborated by the author.

7.4.1 Primacy of the Nation - State

However, while MLG has allowed us to capture some important dynamics which other approaches might have missed, it would be wrong to suggest that it vindicates the arguments of those in the governance literature who claim that the nation state has been "hollowed out". In fact, such claims were never part of the argument put forward by proponents of MLG. While advocates of MLG contrasted it with state centric approaches they did not reject the centrality of the state in policy making (Marks et al., 1996: 346) nor did they see MLG confronting state sovereignty directly (Marks et al., 1996: 371).

It is clear that relatively speaking the role of formal regional frameworks for migration control is mixed, and that the extent to which it has emerged has been largely a function of the willingness of governments to permit the development of a shared competence at the regional level. Thus, with some very limited exceptions, migration did not figure in the NAFTA context nor in the subsequent SPP. In the EU setting, by contrast, it was more developed, reflecting perhaps the more "institutionalised" structures of the EU and its relations with neighbouring states. The fact that the EU was also developing a wider range of competences – such as migration and security – meant that its widening agenda was also incorporated into its economic and political diplomacy.

In both regions, our analysis indicates that relations between nations remain at the heart of migration policy and that the preferences of those governments are very much shaped by domestic political considerations. Given the increased significance of security concerns in shaping migration policy the importance of the nation state is not surprising. Considerations of sovereignty have been central to this area of policy leaving some such as Guiraudon to note that migration control "is a domain rarely associated with MLG" (Guiraudon, 2000: 251). Yet as she goes on to show, a "vertical dimension" has emerged "given that all levels of governance have acquired prerogatives in this area" (Guiraudon, 2000: 252). That relationship is to some extent apparent in the North American case but more in bilateral settings than in regional frameworks (though this may be as much due to geographical differences between the regions).

7.4.2 Subnational actors in Multi-level Governance

An important strand of the multi-level governance approach is its attempt to integrate sub-national actors as a unit of analysis. We have noted a variety of roles played by these actors in each country: in Mexico, subnational governments are involved in coordinating the allocation of resources with migrant organisations and sending communities; in Spain, subnational governments are involved in providing aid to countries of migration and implementing aspects of the national migration and integration policies; in the US, subnational governments have pursued their own policies on the treatment of migrants and implemented federal agreements. In each case, there is considerable diversity in the commitment of these governments: some Mexican states are more effective in handling the 3X1 programme; some ACs have given more emphasis to providing aid to Morocco than other regions; some US states have been more obstructive in applying ID and other reforms to facilitate the opening of bank accounts. By contrast, the role of subnational authorities is less developed in the case of Morocco, largely due to the political context.

Moreover, in such a setting, the boundaries between different levels of government can become blurred: due to the "absence of clear-cut distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs,.... local problems can become transnational" (Rosenau, 1997: 38; Cited in Marks and Hooghe, 2004: 10).

7.4.3 Multi-level Governance and Transnationalism

Overall, the MLG approach adopted in the thesis has been usefully enhanced by taking into account the insights from transnationalism. Hitherto, there has been relatively little engagement between these perspectives. Tarrow's account of transnational activism refers to multi-level governance as characteristic of "an increasingly complex structure of internationalism" (Tarrow, 2005: 9) but notes that the approach itself has tended to focus on elite interactions "leaving citizens as objects of policy" (Tarrow, 2005: 82). By bringing in the insights from transnationalism and focusing upon the role of migrants as potential agents of development, our approach to MLG hopefully avoids some of the tendencies which Tarrow criticises.

Perhaps the value of our synthesis of MLG and transnationalism is most apparent where we look at the bottom up experience of co-development. It is clear that, without the insights from transnationalism, the MLG analysis of migration would not fully explain the case of Mexico and the interaction between Mexico's local governments and the Mexican diaspora in the US. Social and political demands initiated by Mexican migrants and addressed to their government created the economic and political power necessary to modify relations between them. The development of active state policies towards the diaspora has helped to shape a new political realm in both the host and home countries. Thus, the theoretical framework of transnationalism provided by Thomas Faist and Alejandro Portes serves to fill gaps in the multi-level approach. Since transnational action develops at different levels in the governmental and non-governmental fields, it possible to analyse a variety of relationships such as the relations between states (the "Transtate" as T. Faist conceives the actions of states across boundaries), State relations at supranational and multilateral levels and the relations states maintain with sub-national entities.

7.4.4 Multi-level Governance and Co-development

Bringing together the different dimensions of multi-level governance in both regions on the one hand and the policies of co-development on the other, it is possible to explore the dynamics of the migration-development nexus in each case.

Institutionally, as noted, the EuroMed region is "thicker" with more formalised structures (of treaty agreements, funding programmes, binding legislation etc) than the North American region. But in terms of an economic space it appears that the North American region is more densely integrated than the EuroMed. When we consider the manifestations of co-development these institutional and economic factors appear to shape the outcomes. In North America, the density of relations (and the associated patterns of migration) have permitted the development of a significant (if flawed) role for migrants in the diaspora and arrangements for managing the transfer and spending of

resources in home communities. By contrast in the EuroMed the mix of strong institutions and less dense economic interactions has not been associated with an equivalent degree of bottom up activity. Moreover, while arguably the formal framework for top-down co-development programmes is more established in the EuroMed than the North American region, its impact has been quite limited due to problems of implementation and the increasing importance of security in structuring the relationship between North and South. This suggests that the relative importance of institutionalised integration structures and de facto integration associated with economic interactions in terms of trade and migration might favour the former over the latter.

Just as important in explaining these contrasts are the capacities within both the home countries and the diaspora communities. Arguably the administrative structures in the Mexican case are better geared and more responsive to the task of managing development. In terms of the migrant communities, it may be that the decisive factor is the more established status of the Mexican diaspora in many parts of the US compared with their Moroccan equivalents in Spain (a fact borne out perhaps by the less effective bottom up activities in hometown associations from relatively new migrant regions in Mexico).

7.5 Lessons to learn

What lessons can be learnt from the analysis of co-development in the two contexts? In particular, are there aspects of policies and practices in either of the regions which might be valuable for the other? What might be the constraints on transferring such approaches?

One clear lesson, which emerges from the experience of both regions, is that top-down co-development programmes which focus on fostering economic integration and trade (or provide aid to facilitate such interactions) do not appear to constrain migration in either region. The reasons for this are difficult to pin down: has trade delivered the development which some would argue might limit the urge to migrate?; if development has increased, what have been the distributional effects?; have the specific programmes (particularly on the aid

side) been effectively implemented? One factor which might be addressed is the element of discrimination within the regional agreements. In both cases, there is arguably a bias against the Southern partners in terms of the coverage of the agreement – particularly regarding the restrictions on agricultural products which characterised the trade diplomacy between MENA countries and the EU. In other respects however, there are clear implications for the governments of the sending countries as regards closing regional disparities.

Turning to more specific aspects of co-development, there are potentially examples to follow but there are questions regarding how easy they are to replicate. As regards channelling remittances into community development, it appears that the Mexican experience is one which is on balance successful and which might be worth emulating. Arguably this system depends on some important contributory factors such as the establishment of a consular infrastructure to keep in touch with migrants abroad and to act as a coordinating mechanism, the emergence of a decentralised system of government which has empowered municipalities to implement the development programmes, the democratisation of the political system to facilitate the participation of community groups in both sending and home regions and the underpinning of social capital in migrant communities to provide the resources. While these factors have been established in the most successful instances in Mexico, there are many cases where they are less well developed and it is debateable whether such mechanisms could be replicated in the Moroccan case given existing institutional and political circumstances. While migrant organisations have emerged in some destination regions, they have been primarily concerned with defending and establishing their interests in the host country. The national government has also sought to reach out to diaspora communities but it has been primarily focused on financing projects in the host countries and characterised by a paternalistic outlook, encouraging remittances but not willing to match those resources in home community projects. More problematic may be the adaptation of the bureaucratic and political settings: while some steps towards democratisation and administrative reform have been taken, the context is still one where most power is centralised and participation is limited.

Overall, while some elements might be replicable in other national contexts such as Morocco, others may be harder to transfer.

Potentially the Spanish model of development assistance might be worth emulating in so far as in principle it embraces the co-development objective and disperses it to the subnational authorities who might be able to gear the resources to the needs of their local migrants' home countries and communities. The practical experience has been mixed given the problems in engagement between both sides but it arguably has potential. However, the circumstances are too different in the North American case. Given Mexico's status as an upper middle-income country, it is not likely to be a strong candidate for development aid (though USAID does provide limited resources for health programmes in poorer regions of Mexico). One possible model – noted in Chapter 1 – would be to replicate the system of regional development funds within the EU. However, such a distributive scheme goes well beyond the ambitions or the machinery of NAFTA. In any case, the record of accomplishment of PPP is not particularly encouraging on the potential of such resources to rebalance disparities between regions.

In both regions, the development of regional agreements has either included mechanisms for dialogue amongst the governments or provided a catalyst for intensified dialogue. The US-Mexican experience - despite a number of disagreements and disputes - has been broadly more positive and extensive. Replicating that in the case of the EuroMed, and particularly between Morocco and Spain, is highly desirable but there are serious obstacles to overcome. The latter relationship appears to be more constrained by, on the one hand, a more difficult political context and on the other (and perhaps paradoxically) the much more institutionalised relationship between the countries. Whether such obstacles can be transcended is unclear but perhaps a start could be made by fostering better relations between the migrant communities on the one hand and destination country's public authorities on the other.

However, in both cases, improving relations and establishing frameworks to address sources of tension and disagreement are likely to be constrained by

the political contexts in the destination countries. Public perceptions of immigrants and the securitisation of migration have made it more difficult to make such agreements. Indeed, migratory policies have become increasingly restrictive, in the process undermining some of the factors which have fostered bottom up co-development (e.g. the use of seasonal migration and the engagement with migrant communities).

7.6 Final Remarks

7.6.1 Limitations and Future Research

This thesis has sought to provide a comprehensive overview of migration governance in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. However, it remains clear that not all aspects have been addressed as fully as they could have been due to a combination of constraints on funding and timing as well as the availability of and accessibility to interviewees and information. In particular, a fuller account of the perspective of officials and politicians in the US (at both the federal and state levels) would have enhanced certain aspects of the analysis. Access to EU officials was mainly confined to Moroccan fieldwork while engagement with protagonists in the main institutions in Brussels would also have proved valuable.

This thesis has raised a number of questions relating to the practice of co-development and its impact. Since I have focused primarily on policy, a full evaluation of the effects of co-development has not been possible. However, it is clear that such evaluations need to be performed to establish whether and how the application of co-development policies and co-development practices on the ground affect the welfare of communities and their propensity to migrate.

7.6.2 A Particular Assessment

More generally, my research has left me with a number of fundamental and principled questions concerning the migration-development nexus. What is development? How can remittances be channelled into productive sectors? These questions need to be answered in a way that responds to the increasing need to create jobs for the 20% of the male population under the age of 25 in Morocco now seeking work. The answers should also respond to the problems

faced by agriculture where fields have been abandoned by owners who have migrated to urban centres and even abroad to escape poverty.

In the comparison of Mexico and Morocco, it was shown that both countries rely on transnational communities which have proved to be channels of development for their home communities. These communities help to foster a degree of social capital which encourages the channelling of remittances to serve as a source of capital to be used to boost the economy in the migrants' countries of origin. However, Government help together with conscious cooperative willingness from receiving countries is needed to make this possible. Reducing the cost of sending remittances is also important and this requires participation by banks in order to channel and release credit to migrants. There is, moreover, still a lack of co-responsibility on the part of sending and receiving countries to consider transnational workers as members of both societies rather than just units of economic benefit. These people should be granted political rights in the country of origin and comprehensive economic and political integration in the receiving country. A transnational worker would not hesitate to continue investing in his country of origin for sentimental reasons, but at the same time, this worker is participating economically in the host country. Therefore, co-development is a spontaneous action performed by migrants seeking to maintain links with their community of origin. Financial transfers, as well as political, social and technological transfers, form part of a complex transnational dimension in which co-development emerges. Both receiving and host governments should therefore create adequate mechanisms for channelling the benefits of transnationalism. Receiving countries would need to improve integration policies, temporary labour agreements, and dialogue with the sending countries to diminish political misperceptions while sending countries should provide guarantees to nationals abroad by increasing their human rights protection through consulates and improving their access to local investment which requires a combined effort between local government and the banking system.

A mutual understanding in terms of controlling borders is crucial. How can the benefits of a globalised liberal economy be received if only capital flows are

welcome and the labour force is restricted to “desirable migration”? All forms of violence should be punished and prevented. However, should those people who attempt to cross borders continue to die as a result of increasingly repressive immigration controls?

Annex: List of Interviewees.

ID	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION	COUNTRY	On record
1	Alfredo Martínez de la Torre	Under Secretary for Investment Promotion	Chiapas State Government	Mexico	yes
2	Ahmed Ben Amin	Coordinator for Education's Department	ATIME	Spain	no
3	Francisco Javier Bernáldez Fernández	Chief for the Observatory Service in Immigration and Refugee Policies	Migration and Social Services, General Secretary for Social Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	Spain	no
4	José Angel Sotillo Lorenzo	Director	University's Institute of Development and Cooperation	Spain	yes
5	Berta Alicia Escobar Enríquez	Treasury of Fundacion Colosio	Ex-official for Migration Services in Veracruz's State	Mexico	Yes
6	Cecilia Romero Castillo	Senator, President for the South American Commission	Mexican Senate	Mexico	yes
7	Fernando Margain -B	Senator, President, Foreign Affairs Committee	Mexican Senate	Mexico	no
8	Juan Peña Fernández	General Coordinator	Office for Technical Cooperation, Spain's Embassy in Morocco	Morocco	no
9	Manuel Lorenzo	General Coordinator in Morocco	Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad	Morocco	no
10	Louis Dey	Chief for Programs,	Delegation for the European Commission at Morocco, European Union	Morocco	no
11	Ismail Hijji	Chief of the Partenariat Department,	Direction for Cooperation and Partnership, Agency for Nothern Region	Morocco	no
12	Carlos Alberto Martinez	Minister for Economic Affairs	Mexican Embassy	USA	no
13	José Antonio Alonso	Director,	Institute Complutense of Foreign Affairs Studies	Spain	yes
14	Gerald Collange	Directeur -Adjoint	Agency for French Cooperation	Morocco	no
15	Carlos Gonzalez Gutiérrez	Executive Director	Institute of Mexicans Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Mexico	no

16	Deborah Waller Meyers	Policy Analyst	Migration Policy Institute	USA	yes
17	Javier Gabaldón	General Coordinator	Medicos sin Fronteras	Morocco	no
18	J. Ernesto López-Córdova	Economist	Inter-American Bank Development	USA	yes
19	Alejandra Vallejo	Coordinator for Institutional Affairs	Inter-American Bank	USA	no
20	Andrew D. Seele	Director, Mexican Institute	Woodrow Wilson	USA	no
21	Julien Millet	Attache Commercial	Mission Economique, French Embassy	Morocco	no
22	Hipólito Vázquez Barragán	Technical Cooperant	Fundacion Codespa	Morocco	no
23	Onésimo Hidalgo	Member	CIEPAC	Mexico	no
24	Alicia González Ceresero	Secretary for Social Development,	Veracruz State Government	Mexico	yes
25	María Angustias Parejo	Professor	University of Granada	Spain	no
26	Juan Manuel Sandoval Palacios	General Coordinator	Seminario Permanente de Estudios Chicanos y de Fronteras	Mexico	yes
27	M. Abdessalam El Ftouh	Directeur du Pole Economique	Foundation Hassan II	Morocco	no
28	Oscar Luebbert	Senator,	Committee for Northern Border Affairs	Mexico	yes
29	Serafín Rios	Senator	Committee for Northern Border Affairs	Mexico	yes
30	Minister Angel Yunes	Diplomat	Under Secretary for Latin America, Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mexico	yes
31	Jesús Rodríguez Andia	General Director for North Africa	Agency for Spanish International Cooperation, Minister of Foreign Affairs	Spain	no
32	María Gracia Sánchez de Torres	Technical Chief for North African General Direction	Agency for Spanish International Cooperation, Minister of Foreign Affairs	Spain	yes
33	Rosa María González	Chief for Cooperation and Development Department	Madrid's Comunity Government	Spain	yes
34	Tomás Vera	General Director for Cooperation and Development	Madrid's Municipality	Spain	yes
35	Bernábe López	Professor	Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Spain	no
36	María de los Ángeles	North African Migration	Institute Ortega y Gasset	Spain	yes

	Ramírez	Studies Analist			
37	Leticia Delgado	Immigration Analist	University Rey Juan Carlos	Spain	yes
38	Sana Desalasi	Coordinator for Morocco	Oxfam Morocco	Morocco	yes
39	Jesús Nuñez	Chief and Inmigration Analist	Institute for the Resolution of Conflicts and Peace	Spain	yes
40	Manuel Montes	Vice-Minister for Inmigration Services	Ministry for Labour and Social Services	Spain	yes
41	Prof. Belguendouz	Professor	University of Rabat	Morocco	no
42	Prof. Kachani	Professor	University of Rabat	Morocco	no
43	Prof. Mohammed Boudoudou	Professor	University of Rabat	Morocco	no
44	Antonio Namib	Ex Director for the Migration Office	Veracruz's Delegation	Mexico	yes
45	Jorge Burguete	Professor	ECOSUR, Chiapas	Mexico	no
46	A. Fajid	Coordinator for Cooperation	Immigration Office, Ministry of Interior	Mexico	yes
47	Elizabeth Ramírez	Chief for Mexico	USAID	USA	no
48	Martha Carvallo	Researcher	Institute Complutense for Cooperation and Development, University Complutense of Madrid	Spain	yes
49	Maurice Schiff	Researcher	World Bank	USA	no
50	José María Ramos García	Policy Analyst in U.S.A.-Mexico's Security Issues	El COLEF	MEXICO	no

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